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The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) has has been widely quoted by academics, policy 
for many decades been marginalised, with only very makers, writers, researchers and journalists when 
l imited  ev idence-based research  be ing  producing reports, books and articles, illustrating its 
commissioned. As a result, policy makers have often value in encouraging debate and understanding. It 
been dependent on romantic, and ultimately can also be credited for contributing towards the 
inadequate prose produced by journalists, pushing through by the Government of Pakistan 
travellers, adventurers and historians. This has (led by the Pakistan People's Party) of the FATA 
inevitably  generated a  mass ive  gap in  Reform regulations in August 2011.  
understanding, both with regard to the outside 
This report would not have been possible without world looking into the region and the people of FATA 
the dedication of the fifty enumerators who carried looking out.
out the survey component. These men and women, 
The 'Understanding FATA' series has endeavoured hailing from FATA, professionally engaged with 
to bridge this gap in knowledge by beginning a respondents to build trust and accurately 
conversation with local communities about their document data, while often courageously visiting 
current concerns and aspirations for the future. very remote and difficult areas. Their contribution is 
Through this process of surveying attitudes, certainly worthy of praise and appreciation as they 
opinions can be formed without drawing on the have enabled the 4,000 participants from FATA to be 
prejudices of the many intermediaries working in heard. 
FATA. The result of which, is that policymakers in 
I also wish to show my appreciation for the Peshawar, Islamabad, Kabul, Washington and 
dedication exhibited by my team at CAMP, without London are empowered to positively engage with 
whom it would not have been possible to produce the region over issues of religion, culture, politics 
this report. In particular, I would like to thank my and governance. 
colleagues Tahir Ali (Programme Manager, 
As CAMP has followed trends in FATA over the last Development) and Mariam Khan (Programme 
five years, it is evident that social, political and Manager, Advocacy) for their support; Riaz-Ul-Haq 
economic perceptions in FATA are constantly (Programme Project Manager, Research) and 
evolving  catalysed in large part by the conflict in Marjana (Project Manager, Understanding FATA) for 
neighbouring Afghanistan. This edition continues to co-ordinating field work, organising and 
carefully document how internal and external moderating focus-group discussions and for 
forces interact with historical customs and supervising data collection; and, Rabia Jahangir 
traditions to shape contemporary attitudes towards Khan (Project Officer: head office) and Hamid Jan 
security and development. It is unlikely that this (Project Officer: regional office) for assisting me 
report provides answers to all of the important throughout the project. 
questions but it does underline an important 
My special appreciation also goes to Shahid Ali for principle  that is the people of FATA must be 
designing this years report and to Nic Benton encouraged to speak for themselves. 
(Editor: London, UK) for providing the lead in copy-
The production of the 'Understanding FATA' series editing the material presented. 
would not have been possible without the active 
In addition, this body of work would not have been involvement of the people of FATA. They have been 
possible without the generous financial support of extremely helpful in sharing their knowledge and 
the British High Commission (Islamabad, Pakistan). insights, enabling clear analysis of the issues 
Special mention is reserved for Phil Boyle (First documented in this report. 'Understanding FATA' 
Preface
Preface IX
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Preface IX
The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) is Assistant Political Agent. The Political Agents 
located along Pakistan’s north-western Himalaya perform several functions at the same time – they 
zone and south-western Suleiman Mountains. It act as an executive, judge and revenue collector. In 
runs as a narrow tract along the river Indus with the facilitating their role they are assisted by the 
parallel lines almost north to south, and consists of former-colonial Malik system (a local leader 
s e v e n  s e m i - a u t o n o m o u s  a g e n c i e s  o r  appointed by the government to represent their 
administrative units – Khyber, Mohmand, Bajaur, community). As Maliks are appointed by the PA 
Kurram, Orakzai, North and South Waziristan. their independence and loyalty can be 
Additionally FATA includes ‘frontier regions’ that questionable: with some acting in accordance with 
adjoin the districts of Peshawar: Kohat, Bannu, the wishes of the PA rather than the interests of the 
Lakki Marwat, Tank and Dera Ismail Khan. This people they are supposed to be representing. 
united territory is separated from the Pakhtun Generally, the local people feel that they have been 
tribes of Afghanistan by the Durand line: drawn in marginalised and inequitably treated. The 
1893 by the British colonial rulers of India. participation of civil society is limited or non-
existent. 
The 3.2 million people living in FATA, according to 
1
the Pakistan census report (1998) , are Furthermore, prior to the signing of the FATA 
predominantly Pakhtuns, which are largely Sunni Reforms in August 2011 no political representation 
Muslims by faith; with Shia communities largely was allowed to function in the tribal areas. In the 
concentrated in Kurram and Orakzai Agencies. FATA absence of a vibrant political process, there has 
is characterised by a strong tribal structure and been no platform to address grievances or to 
cultural heritage, supported by rich ethnic diversity. contribute to local and national affairs.  The 
The census report calculated the population negative impact of this absence of inclusion is 
growth rate at 2.2% and the population density further compounded by a distinct lack of trust in the 
estimated at 117 persons per sq. km (versus capacity of existing institutions to fulfil people’s 
national and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa [KPK] average of aspirations. This environment, aligned with poor 
166 and 238 respectively), varying greatly between economic development has created a broad 
individual agencies and frontier regions. political vacuum for militant groups to capitalise on.
The administrative structure of FATA is unique. The The economy of FATA is shaped by a number of 
region is primarily governed through the Frontier factors, most importantly: geography and 
Crimes Regulation (FCR), 1901 and is managed by topography; social and cultural traditions; political 
the Governor of the KPK province, based in instability; insecurity; and, socio-economic 
Peshawar, who is a nominee and representative of dynamics. In general, there are few livelihood 
the President of Pakistan. At the national level: FATA opportunities, with employment largely dependent 
falls under the purview of the Ministry of States and on agricultural activities in the region's few fertile 
Frontier Regions (SAFRON) based in Islamabad. valleys. Land use data from 2003–04 shows that 7% 
of the total geographic area of FATA is cultivated, 
Local administration in each agency is managed by a with another 1% recorded as fallow, while more 
Political Agent (PA), who is a federal civil servant; than 82% of the land is not available for cultivation. 
and each sub-division (Tehsil) is headed by an This puts intense pressure on available farmland. 
Executive Summary XI
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1
 It is acknowledged by the Survey Team that these 1998 figures are dated but they remain the latest official numbers available. 
The census is widely quoted and allows for some important comparisons to be possible with national statistics that would not 
be possible with later (unofficial) approximations. However, the findings of this survey and its predecessors are going someway 
to filling in the gaps in national knowledge on the region.
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on all of these issues. Pakistani population will have useful, actionable 
information. This 2011 edition of ‘Understanding 
To oppose the Pakistani Taliban and foreign fighters, FATA’ is a comprehensive assessment of 
including Al-Qaeda, the Pakistani military has perceptions that complement and build on 
conducted more than 15 offensive operations since historical assessments on several key policy areas 
2002. At the beginning, most of these operations including governance, society, religion and politics. 
had limited success, resulting in compromises and, The goal of which, is to convey the aspirations and 
sometimes in spite of intense criticism, frustrations of the people of FATA so that these 
agreements. However, the recent military perceptions can directly feed into governmental 
offensives in Bajaur, Mohmand, Orakzai, and South initiatives.
Waziristan agencies seem to have achieved 
considerable gains for the Government of Pakistan. Volumes I and IV were more descriptive, carrying 
greater reference material: this year's report is 
In the recent past, much analysis has been mainly a presentation of primary data. For further 
conducted on the insurgency in the FATA, but most information on FATA see the previous volumes, 
of this focus has been on the number and efficiency accessible at www.understandingfata.org and 
of these operations. The survey provides a different www.camp.org.pk   
perspective based on sample statistics (instead of 
anecdotal evidence) of the landscape of militant ‘Understanding FATA V 2011’ is based on both 
groups, their perceived agenda and favourability in qualitative and quantitative data. Each chapter 
the eyes of the people of FATA. presents background material from multiple 
sources, together with supporting documentation 
Following improved military operations, it appears from the experiences of CAMP; this is  
the Pakistan Army is growing in approval within complemented by the findings of statistical data.
FATA, resulting in increased acceptance and trust 
from communities. Also, successes in the Swat To strengthen the qualitative information 
valley and South Waziristan have earned Pakistan incorporated in the survey: eighteen focus-group 
reasonable credit and praises from the US and discussions were held to gather the qualitative 
western countries. Consequently, the findings in opinions of men and women from FATA. Transcripts 
this survey show that within FATA the people have were recorded, analysed and utilised to write this 
become increasingly supportive of operations report. Brief background and factual material used 
against militants, including from those that have in the report came from the Understanding FATA 
been victims of displacement. Notwithstanding this Volume IV and desk research.
level of satisfaction, several questions still need to 
The quantitative data was collected through be  addressed  in  terms  of  the  use  of  
structured questionnaires with additional disproportionate levels of force by the military, 
questions incorporated for this year. The objective access to compensation for crisis hit communities, 
was to sample an equal number of adult males and responding to the associated humanitarian crises 
females to ascertain their opinion on the arising from the conflict and the issue of more than 
considered key issues of the people of FATA. 3,000 suspect militants arrested by army. 
Expanding on previous data recorded - the 2011 
The Community Appraisal & Motivation survey continues to track core appraisal areas while 
Programme (CAMP) has been conducting surveys developing new information sources in response to 
documenting the opinions of the people of FATA changing dynamics and improving methodology. 
s i n c e  2 0 0 7 .  T h at  wo r k  co m p r i s e s  t h e  
A hierarchical sampling strategy was used to poll ‘Understanding FATA’ series. The goal of this series 
adult opinions across all six Frontier Regions and is to map the thinking and attitudes within FATA so 
the seven Agencies. The first level of sampling was that policy makers and influential actors in: 
to select 400 villages from the accessible areas of government, civil society, the international 
FATA. The second level was to select a community, academia, media and the broader 
Executive Summary XIII
Only, 44% of this farmland is under irrigation, with that the money ultimately ends up in the pockets of 
the remaining cultivated area relying entirely on parliamentarians and a few ‘favourite’ local 
4
contractors.’  rainfall (http://fata.gov.pk).
This ineffectual and inadequately monitored With only very limited economic opportunities, 
implementation of development has clearly most of the population is engaged in primary-level 
benefited the elite, leaving little or no opportunities subsistence activities such as agriculture, livestock 
for the majority of the population. Women in rearing or local small-scale businesses. Others are 
particular have remained marginalised (largely due involved in trade within the tribal belt or local 
to the local tradition of ‘purdah’), while youth and security; some have (e)migrated, in the hope of 
minorities (both ethnic and religious) have little or securing greater economic security. In particular, 
no opportunity to express themselves or skilled labourers seek to migrate, with their 
participate in the planning processes. families, to urban centres outside the tribal areas, 
including: Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan and Peshawar. 
People’s socio-economic status has also been 
affected by the presence of large numbers of There are few reliable statistics on socio-economic 
Afghan refugees in FATA. The influx of refugees has indicators in FATA: those that do exist reveal 
further burdened the already overstretched significant disadvantages are held by inhabitants of 
resources of the region and caused disruption to the tribal areas – with government estimates 
cultural practices. This is likely to remain a daunting recording that some 60% of the local population is 
2
living below the poverty line.  A measure impediment to security and development in FATA, if 
exacerbated by below average levels of literacy initiatives such as the UNHCR funded ‘Refugee 
(male literacy stands at 29.5%, while female literacy affected and Hosting Areas Programme’ (RAHA) fail 
is a very troubling 3%) and primary school to effectively implement policies that will improve 
3
participation (41.3%).  Of those residents that do livelihoods, rehabilitate local environments and 
enjoy a positive education, significant numbers enhance social cohesion within affected and host 
end-up deserting FATA looking for superior communities.
prospects; thus potential drivers for reform or 
FATA has a unique strategic importance in terms of 
entrepreneurship are continually removed. 
its impact on the security and stability of 
Latest health indicators are unavailable but judging neighbouring Afghanistan and the associated ‘War 
from the 1998 Census one doctor is available for on Terror’. Pakistan and the international 
7,670 people in FATA, which indicates poor health community are extremely concerned about how to 
conditions. Where hospitals and clinics are running, deal with the situation inside of the FATA. The 
they are generally poorly staffed, under-equipped ongoing militancy in FATA seems to be contributing 
and unhygienic. significantly to the sustaining of Taliban resistance 
against the US-led intervention in Afghanistan. 
Although development p lans  ex ist  and Poverty, difficult terrain, an archaic system of 
programmes have been implemented, most of administration, cross-border tribal and ethnic ties, 
them have been fragmentary and short-term Pakhtun traditions and the presence of Jihadi 
solutions: often producing insensitive and corrupt militants combine to create a set of overlapping 
consequences. According to a news report: challenges for the governments of Pakistan and 
Afghanistan, as well as for the US and the 
‘Interestingly, most corruption cases show that such 
international community. This volume of 
projects [in FATA] are executed in such a manner 
’Understanding FATA’ sheds some additional light 
Understanding FATAXII
2
 http://www.adb.org/documents/tars/pak/tar_pak33268.pdf
3
 In comparison: national averages for literacy and primary school participation equal 45% and 77% respectively.
4
 Development Funds: Gilani doles out Rs. 30 million to FATA lawmakers’, The Express Tribune, 21 January 2011.
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KEY FINDINGS priority (13.4%). This could mean that efforts to 
reform local administration is being mis-
• Direction of the country: Compared to last directed in the short-term, and that resources 
year, statistics for the 2011 survey show a would be better  spent  empowering 
decline in optimism; with more than two-thirds development and strengthening conflict-
of people in FATA feeling that Pakistan is going resolution; enabling reform of governance 
in the wrong direction. Moreover, levels of through integration of FATA into mainstream 
optimism have reduced from 38.4% in 2010 to political structures. ‘Tackling terrorism’ at 28% 
just 12.95% in 2011. Supported by other data is unexpectedly low. 
sets, the widespread pessimism seems to be 
• Feeling of security: The 2011 survey shows a 
the result of the poor governance exhibited by 
dramatic change in opinion – with just 43% of 
the ruling PPP government. Also: frustrations 
respondents declaring that they felt safe, an 
over the length of time being required by 
alarming decrease from 2010 levels. A change 
military counter-operations to oppose 
compounded by an accompanying increase in 
incessant Taliban resistance, price hikes, years 
feelings of ‘insecurity’.
of regional instability in Afghanistan, 
humanitarian crises, ineffectual response to 
• Suicide bombing: The perception is that the 
IDP vulnerability have further reduced 
mistrusted States of the US (43.4%), India 
confidence in the government.
(24.5%) and Israel (15.9%) were largely 
responsible for motivating suicide bombings. 
• Pakistan’s biggest problem: Concern about 
With, the internal Tehrek-e-Taliban only 
deteriorating ‘law and order’ in Pakistan 
coming fourth with 13.8%. Despite the 
continues: this year noted by two-thirds of FATA 
international focus of perceptions regarding 
residents. This is followed by ‘inflation’ (14.4%) 
motives – the local issues of ‘unemployment’ 
and ‘bad governance’ (14.3%). Related to law 
(22.1%), ‘poverty’ (17.4%) and ‘intelligence 
and order concerns:  ‘bomb blasts’ continue to 
failures’ (16.7%) were considered the main 
be a source of anxiety as identified by 8.4% of 
motivator for suicide bombers in Pakistan. 
people. 
• Internal displacement and governmental 
• FATA’s biggest problem: Within FATA leading 
assistance: Due to ongoing militancy and 
worries continue to include ‘education and 
military operations, internal displacement is a 
health services’ plus ‘employment’. In 2011 
considerable area of concern. The survey 
these concerns were joined by ‘law and order’ 
measured the percentage of population that 
following a radical growth in insecurity 
had been victims of displacement, finding that 
identified by 43.1% of people. Dramatically, 
some 18% of people had had to leave their 
fears concerning ‘Talibanaisation’ have 
homes. Of this percentage, almost half of these 
reduced to zero from 15% in 2010. Taliban 
respondents showed great dissatisfaction in 
groups, or other militant groups, remain active 
the Government of Pakistan’s levels of 
however military successes or increased 
assistance at the time.
acceptance have made concern negligible.
• Islamic extremism: Less than half of FATA 
• Essential services needed in FATA: ‘Electricity 
residents (46.2%) felt that Islamic extremism 
supply’ (45%) tops the list of the most desired 
was a ‘threat’ to Pakistan; a dramatic decrease 
service required by FATA residents. This was 
from the two-thirds recorded in 2010. In spite 
f o l l o w e d  b y  ‘ s e c u r i t y ’  ( 4 4 . 6 % ) ,  
of this, extremism remains an area of 
‘education/schools’ (44.2%) and ‘health 
substantial concern that requires continued 
services/hospitals’ (39.9%). Despite bad 
attention. The dramatic shift may be the result 
governance being a recognised problem for 
of increased acceptance of Taliban ideology or 
Pakistan, improved ‘governance’ was a low 
the result of ‘war fatigue’.
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representative sample of adult males and females rural areas. These findings may also bias certain 
from each village, as was necessary to create a social and developmental priorities, such as 
robust sample with only a small margin of error (as education and empowerment. However, they 
described in the Appendix). should still be considered appropriate of long-term 
aspirations.
Since the latest census (1998) is out of date, a 
presumption had to be made on the current If a larger survey were to be conducted, samples 
population size in FATA. It was calculated that the would be obtained from across a village, taking in 
total population would be circa 4 million people. people of all ranks and stations. In this survey, 
Therefore, in order to achieve the desired margin of however, the interviewers counted off in four 
error of less than 2% within a 95% confidence directions (two for males and two for females) to 
interval for “yes/no” type questions, 4,000 adults sample a total of five males and five females in each 
were interviewed. This is likely to provide an village. This was achieved by interviewers 
extremely robust sample because the total conducting two interviews in one direction and 
population will also include children; ergo the 4,000 then three in another. 
people interviewed are more representative of 
FATA has been described as a mysterious border-adult perspectives than might otherwise have been 
land by historians, writers, travellers and suggested.
journalists. Much of what has been written was 
There are two areas of sampling bias however that based on misconceptions, creating further 
must be noted. The first has to do with the misconceptions from the students of the analytical 
inaccessibility to certain villages. This year again, and descriptive documentation produced. Part of 
42% of the 960 villages were not secure enough for the objective of this long-term study is to dispel the 
enumerators. The sample of 400 villages was drawn notion that the Pakhtun are a quaint and isolated 
from the remaining 557 villages that were people. And instead illustrate how the region is a 
accessible. This introduces a bias of undetermined valuable focal-point in historical and contemporary 
implications because there is no way to accurately international and domestic developments.
represent the opinions of the people inhabiting 
Since the only viable means of sensitising these insecure areas. If one wished to be cautious in 
governance and development is through the conclusions, one would have to add, “In secure 
incorporation of local concerns into planning and areas at this time, the people of FATA believe…”  
implementation processes, the ‘Understanding 
The second area of bias has to do with the starting FATA’ series is a sincere attempt to inform those 
point method used to generate quantitative debates that desire a greater understanding of the 
samples in each village. The technique involves the aspirations of FATA people, and possible 
selection of a starting point followed by a opportunities for local ownership of programmes. 
subsequent counting off of houses. The starting 
This survey is unlikely to provide all the answers to point bias comes from an important cultural fact, 
key issues, but it does underline an important that the more influential families are closer to the 
principle: that the people of FATA if encouraged to hujra or mosque (or in the case of the Shia areas, 
speak for themselves, have a voice that wishes to be the Imam Bargah) that were practical starting 
heard.points for enumerators. Hence there is likely to be a 
bias towards more urban and affluent areas in each 
village. This bias also leads to the possible 
hypotheses that rural populations will be under-
represented in the sample. In the analysis of 
occupations of the respondents, it can be noted 
that there is a greater proportion of professionals 
and merchants than would be expected for the 
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• Foreign fighters: The overwhelming majority of can be accessed in isolation but interweave with 
people in FATA desire the removal of each other in many ways; therefore a complete 
international fighters, by force if necessary. This study will provide a more comprehensive 
opinion is a continuation of attitudes expressed understanding of the perceptions and aspirations 
in 2010. of people in FATA.
• Afghan refugees: In response to a question 
asking whether Afghan refugees should return 
to Afghanistan: an overwhelming 81.4% were 
of the opinion that they should. 
• Sources of information: Access to information 
appears to be dominated by men, with women 
to a large extent relying on informal 
mechanisms. Radio appears to be the most 
valued form of accessing news, followed by 
television and newspapers. The radio stations: 
Deewa (Voice of America), BBC Pashtu and BBC 
Urdu remain popular radio stations. It is 
difficult to reconcile this attachment to these 
stations with the apparent negative attitudes 
attached to the countries that fund them (the 
US and the UK respectively); however, the 
cultural sensitivity of programmes broadcast 
may explain this.
• Foreign affairs: The findings are diverse but it is 
generally seen that the US and India produce 
considerable mistrust but there appears to be 
some softening of opinion to the ‘West’. It also 
seems that general perceptions of the UK 
influence perceptions across all aspects of 
diplomacy that may affect Pakistan. 
Considerable support is recorded for China and 
Saudi Arabia. There is also support for Muslim 
countries (as exemplified by attitudes towards 
Malaysia) and a greater willingness to offer an 
opinion. Iran also appeared to have 
considerable support,  but on closer 
examination, findings appeared to be distorted 
by extreme support in certain locations – a 
finding that showed that considerable 
opposition is being marginalised. 
These findings provide only a glimpse of the results 
documented in the 2011 survey. It is important that 
the data introduced in this summary is 
contextualised by referring to the relevant sections 
as it is essential for a holistic and sensitive analysis. 
The chapters are segregated by theme so that they 
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• Human rights in FATA: The largest group of remain as to the value of the changes 
respondents in 2011 identified ‘inability to formalised in August 2011.
provide basic amenities’ as the greatest human 
• Support for Political Parties Ordinance: The rights concern in FATA.
2010 survey mapped that the majority (59.7%) 
• Living in FATA: Although there are differences of respondents supported the extension of the 
according to Agency, in most parts of FATA, Ordinance in to FATA; in comparison to just 
individuals preferred to remain in FATA. 9.6% who opposed this decision. The survey of 
Nevertheless, one-third (34.9%) would rather 2011, however, documents a surprising 
leave if given the chance. Interestingly, the reduction in support for the Political Parties Act 
greatest interest in (e)migrating came from to one-third; with opposition to the PPO rising 
areas that were more stable. to 16%.
• Drone attacks: US Drone attacks were • A d m i r a t i o n  f o r  a  l i v i n g  p o l i t i c a l  
considered by a lmost  two-thirds  of  leader/political party: Interestingly, the 
respondents to be ‘never justified’. Only 4.3% popularity of Imran Khan - founder of Tehrek-e-
were of the opinion that ‘sometimes justified’ Insaf (PTI) - has consistently risen from just 
and 1.7% that they were ‘always justified’. 4.1% in 2008 to a high of 18.6% in 2011. Support 
Between January 2008 and mid-November for Imran Khan is likely to be due to his 
2011, 283 drone attacks have killed 2,550 popularity with FATA youth and his effective use 
people and left 207 injured. of media.
• Support for military operations in FATA: • FATA Secretariat (FS) and FATA Development 
Communities appear to continue supporting Authority (FDA): As in previous surveys, 2011 
military offensives in FATA. In 2011, two-thirds shows that discontent continues to devalue 
of people in FATA (66.8%) supported these trust in the FDA and FS. It was opined that 
operations. Opposition was expressed by only greater involvement of local communities 
18.5%. would improve effectiveness.  
• Trust in security providers: The Pakistani • Taliban: It is notable that some differing 
military is documented as having the greatest attitudes can be recorded between the Afghan 
support as acknowledged by 36.6% of the FATA and Pakistani Taliban but overall two-thirds of 
population. They were followed by traditional respondents were unfavourable towards the 
‘tribal communities/Lakhkar’ with 25.4%. In Pakistani Taliban, compared to only one-
addition, some 60% desired the Pakistani quarter for the Afghan Taliban (the result of a 
military to pursue Taliban, Al Qaeda and foreign 12% point drop in opinion). Nevertheless, 
fighters without the assistance of international endorsement of Afghan Taliban as Islamic 
forces – i.e. the US. However, some support was heroes fighting Western occupation in 
evident for international assistance in Afghanistan have similarly lost legitimacy 
strengthening the Frontier Corps. (23.55%) since 2009 (40.35%). 
• Future status of FATA: Variations of opinion • Al Qaeda: Approximately only one-third of 
were prevalent with only 11% of respondents respondents were aware of Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda 
desiring ‘no reform’. However, more than one- is often mentioned in the media and discussed 
third of the FATA population were not able to at hujra gatherings, therefore, the discrepancy 
offer an opinion. Overall, only 3.4% of people in knowledge may not be as stark as is recorded: 
supported the establishment of a FATA Council. instead fear of intelligence agencies, Taliban 
and Al Qaeda informers could have influenced 
• Support for FATA Reform: While reforms respondents.
appear to be generally supported concerns 
Understanding FATAXVI
• Foreign fighters: The overwhelming majority of can be accessed in isolation but interweave with 
people in FATA desire the removal of each other in many ways; therefore a complete 
international fighters, by force if necessary. This study will provide a more comprehensive 
opinion is a continuation of attitudes expressed understanding of the perceptions and aspirations 
in 2010. of people in FATA.
• Afghan refugees: In response to a question 
asking whether Afghan refugees should return 
to Afghanistan: an overwhelming 81.4% were 
of the opinion that they should. 
• Sources of information: Access to information 
appears to be dominated by men, with women 
to a large extent relying on informal 
mechanisms. Radio appears to be the most 
valued form of accessing news, followed by 
television and newspapers. The radio stations: 
Deewa (Voice of America), BBC Pashtu and BBC 
Urdu remain popular radio stations. It is 
difficult to reconcile this attachment to these 
stations with the apparent negative attitudes 
attached to the countries that fund them (the 
US and the UK respectively); however, the 
cultural sensitivity of programmes broadcast 
may explain this.
• Foreign affairs: The findings are diverse but it is 
generally seen that the US and India produce 
considerable mistrust but there appears to be 
some softening of opinion to the ‘West’. It also 
seems that general perceptions of the UK 
influence perceptions across all aspects of 
diplomacy that may affect Pakistan. 
Considerable support is recorded for China and 
Saudi Arabia. There is also support for Muslim 
countries (as exemplified by attitudes towards 
Malaysia) and a greater willingness to offer an 
opinion. Iran also appeared to have 
considerable support,  but on closer 
examination, findings appeared to be distorted 
by extreme support in certain locations – a 
finding that showed that considerable 
opposition is being marginalised. 
These findings provide only a glimpse of the results 
documented in the 2011 survey. It is important that 
the data introduced in this summary is 
contextualised by referring to the relevant sections 
as it is essential for a holistic and sensitive analysis. 
The chapters are segregated by theme so that they 
Executive Summary XVII
• Human rights in FATA: The largest group of remain as to the value of the changes 
respondents in 2011 identified ‘inability to formalised in August 2011.
provide basic amenities’ as the greatest human 
• Support for Political Parties Ordinance: The rights concern in FATA.
2010 survey mapped that the majority (59.7%) 
• Living in FATA: Although there are differences of respondents supported the extension of the 
according to Agency, in most parts of FATA, Ordinance in to FATA; in comparison to just 
individuals preferred to remain in FATA. 9.6% who opposed this decision. The survey of 
Nevertheless, one-third (34.9%) would rather 2011, however, documents a surprising 
leave if given the chance. Interestingly, the reduction in support for the Political Parties Act 
greatest interest in (e)migrating came from to one-third; with opposition to the PPO rising 
areas that were more stable. to 16%.
• Drone attacks: US Drone attacks were • A d m i r a t i o n  f o r  a  l i v i n g  p o l i t i c a l  
considered by a lmost  two-thirds  of  leader/political party: Interestingly, the 
respondents to be ‘never justified’. Only 4.3% popularity of Imran Khan - founder of Tehrek-e-
were of the opinion that ‘sometimes justified’ Insaf (PTI) - has consistently risen from just 
and 1.7% that they were ‘always justified’. 4.1% in 2008 to a high of 18.6% in 2011. Support 
Between January 2008 and mid-November for Imran Khan is likely to be due to his 
2011, 283 drone attacks have killed 2,550 popularity with FATA youth and his effective use 
people and left 207 injured. of media.
• Support for military operations in FATA: • FATA Secretariat (FS) and FATA Development 
Communities appear to continue supporting Authority (FDA): As in previous surveys, 2011 
military offensives in FATA. In 2011, two-thirds shows that discontent continues to devalue 
of people in FATA (66.8%) supported these trust in the FDA and FS. It was opined that 
operations. Opposition was expressed by only greater involvement of local communities 
18.5%. would improve effectiveness.  
• Trust in security providers: The Pakistani • Taliban: It is notable that some differing 
military is documented as having the greatest attitudes can be recorded between the Afghan 
support as acknowledged by 36.6% of the FATA and Pakistani Taliban but overall two-thirds of 
population. They were followed by traditional respondents were unfavourable towards the 
‘tribal communities/Lakhkar’ with 25.4%. In Pakistani Taliban, compared to only one-
addition, some 60% desired the Pakistani quarter for the Afghan Taliban (the result of a 
military to pursue Taliban, Al Qaeda and foreign 12% point drop in opinion). Nevertheless, 
fighters without the assistance of international endorsement of Afghan Taliban as Islamic 
forces – i.e. the US. However, some support was heroes fighting Western occupation in 
evident for international assistance in Afghanistan have similarly lost legitimacy 
strengthening the Frontier Corps. (23.55%) since 2009 (40.35%). 
• Future status of FATA: Variations of opinion • Al Qaeda: Approximately only one-third of 
were prevalent with only 11% of respondents respondents were aware of Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda 
desiring ‘no reform’. However, more than one- is often mentioned in the media and discussed 
third of the FATA population were not able to at hujra gatherings, therefore, the discrepancy 
offer an opinion. Overall, only 3.4% of people in knowledge may not be as stark as is recorded: 
supported the establishment of a FATA Council. instead fear of intelligence agencies, Taliban 
and Al Qaeda informers could have influenced 
• Support for FATA Reform: While reforms respondents.
appear to be generally supported concerns 
Understanding FATAXVI
Chapter 1: Socio-economic Life and Development Needs in FATA 1
Socio-economic Life and 
Development Needs in FATA
CHAPTER  1
Chapter 1: Socio-economic Life and Development Needs in FATA 1
Socio-economic Life and 
Development Needs in FATA
CHAPTER  1
Rough topography - consisting of limited arable priority. Instead justice (73.3%), education/schools 
land and arid areas - combined with scant public (64.6%) and health/hospitals (52.1%) were the 
infrastructure - particularly poor education and foremost governmental services required in FATA 
health facilities - help to explain the enormous gaps identified by more than half of the respondents. 
between the conditions of the people of the The following year saw a change in attitudes, with 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the 62.9% of respondents identifying security as a 
rest of Pakistan. In FATA 60 per cent of the significant priority; a perception that persisted into 
5
population live below the national poverty line;   a 2010. It is therefore clear, that attitudes have 
consequence of the per capita income for the altered over the last four years; the reason for 
region being half that of the national average. This which is the fragile and volatile security 
disparity is intensified by per capita development environment contained within FATA. 
expenditure being approximately one third of that 
6 In 2009 security and tackling terrorism peaked as 
spent in other areas of Pakistan.  
top priorities, as simultaneous military operations 
were launched in various parts of FATA and Swat, This chapter discusses the economic, health, 
and ‘Talibanisation’ or militancy began spilling over education, and physical infrastructure of FATA. With 
from South and North Waziristan into other tribal survey data defining: needs, willingness to remain 
agencies and frontier regions (FRs). While, tackling in FATA and popular areas for migration in Pakistan.
terrorism is related to security the survey team 
have differentiated the two, as security (as linked to 
conventional law and order) has long been an area 
of concern in FATA while terrorism is a post 9/11 
phenomenon. Before 2001 tribes would defend Questions concerning service provision and needs 
themselves or use Khasadars (irregular levies) to elicited a mixture of responses, from security and 
tackle low intensity crimes. However, the justice to health and educational services. In 
Khasadars and well-armed local tribes were unable general, the people of FATA desire a secure 
to oppose religion-based militancy in FATA. environment with access to electr ic ity,  
Consequently, in the first two years of the surveys employment and local public health and 
(i.e. 2008 and 2009), tackling terrorism was educational services. 
identified as one of the main priorities by nearly 
The survey results vary considerably over the half of the respondents. 
period 2008-2011, as shown in figure 1.1.
However, for the subsequent surveys in 2010 and 
In 2008, before the launch of major military 2011, the importance of tackling terrorism has 
operations in FATA, security was not the main dropped to 26.9% and 28.0% respectively. Military 
Most important services required in 
FATA
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operations appear to have gained some trust respondents (40.6%). Employment, it is considered, 
among respondents, allowing for attention to shift may help divert the attention of youths from 
to other services. Similarly, events in 2011 appear criminal or other non-productive activities; thus, 
to have reduced concerns regarding security for reducing the potential for militants to find recruits. 
some people in FATA, however it remains a 
Power shortages also rank highly as a major cause significant priority as it continues to be the most 
for concern, with blackouts lasting up to 20 hours a important issue identified by respondents (44.6%). 
day. This is partly because of a lack of power For further information on security perceptions 
generating capability.  However, failure or inability refer to Chapter 4. 
to pay electricity bills is a contributing factor. For 
Education and health remain main concerns for many inhabitants of FATA, provision of electricity is 
respondents; a result of their being considered considered to be fair recompense for guarding the 
essential requirements for the resolving of many of frontier. Electricity remained a high priority in three 
the problems faced by the people of FATA. These out of the four years recorded. In 2010 the 
services have consistently remained top priorities importance of electricity dropped to a low of 21.0% 
since the first survey in 2008. In contrast, demand but has increased again to 45.0% for the 2011 
for justice has seen a considerable decline in its survey.  
perceived importance – falling from its position as 
the overwhelming requirement of respondents 
(73.3%) in 2008 (a concern that was maintained 
Questions regarding essential services required by albeit with some decline through 2009 [46.3%] and 
the people of FATA for their children were separated 2010 [46.5%]) to a low of 21.0% in 2011. It appears 
for male and female children in order to discover that during periods of heightened insecurity, justice 
gender disparities. Overall, the responses reveal drops as an immediate need.  
great differences in the services parents wish for 
Employment was included for the first time in the their children - with demand for education and 
2011 survey. Its inclusion has proven valuable as it is work opportunities generally favouring male 
a top priority for a considerable number of children.
Essential services for children
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Figure 1.2: What do you want for your children? (Male children)
6
9
.6
8
.9
2
1
.3
0
.3
1
1
.9
2
0
.2
- -
5
6
.1
6
.6
-
6
2
.0
7
.9
1
9
.1
1
.8
2
.4
6
3
.6
3
0
.7
0
.6
1
.5
4
.6 5
.6
0
.6 2
.3
2
.6
More
education
More security Employment
opportunities
Marriage Religious
education
Others Don’t know
2008 (%) 2009 (%) 2010 (%) 2011 (%)
N
A
N
A
N
A 0
.0
N
A
N
A
Understanding FATA4
Figure 1.1: Which of the following are the most important services that the GoP should provide to your district? 
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respondents; a result of their being considered considered to be fair recompense for guarding the 
essential requirements for the resolving of many of frontier. Electricity remained a high priority in three 
the problems faced by the people of FATA. These out of the four years recorded. In 2010 the 
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perceived importance – falling from its position as 
the overwhelming requirement of respondents 
(73.3%) in 2008 (a concern that was maintained 
Questions regarding essential services required by albeit with some decline through 2009 [46.3%] and 
the people of FATA for their children were separated 2010 [46.5%]) to a low of 21.0% in 2011. It appears 
for male and female children in order to discover that during periods of heightened insecurity, justice 
gender disparities. Overall, the responses reveal drops as an immediate need.  
great differences in the services parents wish for 
Employment was included for the first time in the their children - with demand for education and 
2011 survey. Its inclusion has proven valuable as it is work opportunities generally favouring male 
a top priority for a considerable number of children.
Essential services for children
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attitudes of mothers towards their children’s 
development and that of fathers. In summary, 
mothers wish for more education, employment 
opportunities and marriage. Fathers, in contrast, Various foreign countries, including the US and the 
appear to favour more conservative religious and UK, have expressed their interest in providing 
cultural traditions for their daughters. These are development assistance to FATA. A question about 
significant differences that have implications for development priorities was asked first in 2010 and 
education provision in the community and for was repeated in the 2011 survey. Respondents 
opportunities offered, as well as predicting the were asked to state whether or not they thought 
expectations of future generations. international assistance was needed, and if so, to 
identify areas requiring development assistance 
from international partners. 
The survey attempted to document the qualitative 
perceptions of different male and female residents Keeping in mind that the current humanitarian 
of FATA through the focus group discussions. In crisis in FATA is closely linked to the development 
total, the survey organised 10 male and 8 female and legacy of military operations, some interesting 
8
FGDs.  Among the participants were male elders trends can be noted. For instance, education was 
and male youths, as well as female elders and identified by only 12.1% of respondents in the 2010 
female youths. The survey intended to explore and survey as an area requiring international 
document the views of each segment of the society. assistance; this however jumped to 31.4% a year 
later. Likewise, help in improving access to 
electricity has risen from 12.2% in 2010 to more 
In all FGDs, participants identified: security as the than double that figure (28.8%) in 2011. The 
main service that the Government of Pakistan greatest rise in perceived need for international 
needed to provide to the people of FATA, along with development aid relates to health. In 2010 only 
employment, justice, education and health. 3.2% of respondents identified health provision as a 
main concern, but this rose to 25.2% for the 2011 
Youths from North Waziristan highlighted similar 
survey. 
concerns, with the need for better security being of 
primary concern, followed by justice, health and One of the most striking changes in attitude 
education. towards perceptions of the value of international 
assistance is recorded in the desire for help in road 
construction. The people of FATA have traditionally 
Elder women from FATA, like their male counter-
remained very possessive of their culture and way 
parts, identified security as their top priority 
of life and have historically opposed initiatives that 
followed by health and education, and to a lesser 
would mean exposing themselves to outside 
extent the issues of employment, justice and female 
influence. As a consequence, activities such as road 
empowerment. 
construction have historically been actively 
opposed. Given this, it was unsurprising that only For young women, education and health were top 
5.4% respondents identified roads as a priority in priorities. The importance of education cannot be 
the 2010 survey. In 2011 however, the data reveals understated as female youths were of the opinion 
that this attitude may have changed as almost a that the Government of Pakistan needs to make 
quarter of respondents (24.5%) desired help in provisions on an emergency basis. Through 
improving road access in 2011. The reason behind discussion, improved security and justice were also 
this could be an improvement in people’s trust considered priorities in FATA.
Findings of focus-group discussions (FGDs)
Male FGDs 
Female FGDs
Development priorities in FATA with 
international assistance 
8
 For further details refer to Methodology section.
Male children: Throughout the lifetime of the association of women as keepers of virtue and faith. 
survey process, the majority of respondents (an 
This discrepancy in the aspirations of parents average of 62.8%) desire more education for their 
towards their male and female children is shared male children. With the second highest concern 
with regard to employment opportunities. The role (with an average of 22.8% for four years) being 
of girls in the work place is seen to be a very low employment opportunities. In contrast to the 
priority for both fathers (2.1%) and mothers (3.2 %).security concerns highlighted by adults: more 
security has consistently ranked as a low priority.  
Distinctions between male and female children 
Marriage also appears to be a low priority for 
continue with regard to perceptions of the need for 
parents with regard to their male children.
more security. A greater number of respondents 
desired improved security provision for their Female children: Education for female children has 
daughters. In the honour-bound tribal psyche similarly been a consistent priority for parents, with 
on average a quarter of respondents (28.2%); security for males is not openly sought as it is 
however this figure is considerably lower (by considered very un-Pakhtun to not be able to rely 
approximately half) than the demand for on themselves. This is not the case for females, 
7
where security is interpreted differently; instead opportunities for male children.   However, 
security is linked to the concept of Purdah or veil. religious education appears to have become a 
Therefore, it is unsurprising that concern regarding significant demand for female children, with 23.3% 
security for female children is approximately twice of parents desiring this for their daughters 
that for male children.  according to the findings of the 2011 survey. This 
figure is more than four times that recorded for 
Parental differences: As already indicated, there 
male children. This is likely to be because of the 
appears to be some discrepancy between the 
Pakhtun cultural (which is shared by most tribes) 
Understanding FATA6
7
 This difference can be attributed to the tribal nature of society, with a male becoming a source of income for their family, while 
females are expected to leave the family once they are married.
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education provision in the community and for was repeated in the 2011 survey. Respondents 
opportunities offered, as well as predicting the were asked to state whether or not they thought 
expectations of future generations. international assistance was needed, and if so, to 
identify areas requiring development assistance 
from international partners. 
The survey attempted to document the qualitative 
perceptions of different male and female residents Keeping in mind that the current humanitarian 
of FATA through the focus group discussions. In crisis in FATA is closely linked to the development 
total, the survey organised 10 male and 8 female and legacy of military operations, some interesting 
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and male youths, as well as female elders and identified by only 12.1% of respondents in the 2010 
female youths. The survey intended to explore and survey as an area requiring international 
document the views of each segment of the society. assistance; this however jumped to 31.4% a year 
later. Likewise, help in improving access to 
electricity has risen from 12.2% in 2010 to more 
In all FGDs, participants identified: security as the than double that figure (28.8%) in 2011. The 
main service that the Government of Pakistan greatest rise in perceived need for international 
needed to provide to the people of FATA, along with development aid relates to health. In 2010 only 
employment, justice, education and health. 3.2% of respondents identified health provision as a 
main concern, but this rose to 25.2% for the 2011 
Youths from North Waziristan highlighted similar 
survey. 
concerns, with the need for better security being of 
primary concern, followed by justice, health and One of the most striking changes in attitude 
education. towards perceptions of the value of international 
assistance is recorded in the desire for help in road 
construction. The people of FATA have traditionally 
Elder women from FATA, like their male counter-
remained very possessive of their culture and way 
parts, identified security as their top priority 
of life and have historically opposed initiatives that 
followed by health and education, and to a lesser 
would mean exposing themselves to outside 
extent the issues of employment, justice and female 
influence. As a consequence, activities such as road 
empowerment. 
construction have historically been actively 
opposed. Given this, it was unsurprising that only For young women, education and health were top 
5.4% respondents identified roads as a priority in priorities. The importance of education cannot be 
the 2010 survey. In 2011 however, the data reveals understated as female youths were of the opinion 
that this attitude may have changed as almost a that the Government of Pakistan needs to make 
quarter of respondents (24.5%) desired help in provisions on an emergency basis. Through 
improving road access in 2011. The reason behind discussion, improved security and justice were also 
this could be an improvement in people’s trust considered priorities in FATA.
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where security is interpreted differently; instead opportunities for male children.   However, 
security is linked to the concept of Purdah or veil. religious education appears to have become a 
Therefore, it is unsurprising that concern regarding significant demand for female children, with 23.3% 
security for female children is approximately twice of parents desiring this for their daughters 
that for male children.  according to the findings of the 2011 survey. This 
figure is more than four times that recorded for 
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male children. This is likely to be because of the 
appears to be some discrepancy between the 
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 This difference can be attributed to the tribal nature of society, with a male becoming a source of income for their family, while 
females are expected to leave the family once they are married.
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Female FGDs 
Females from Khyber and Mohmand Agency were 
of the view that no international assistance was 
needed for their local development. Instead they 
felt that the Government of Pakistan should be 
responsible for provision of all services. Female 
participants from Bajaur Agency were of the 
opposite opinion and welcomed assistance, 
highlighting employment opportunities for both 
men and women as key issues that could be 
prioritised. 
Females from FR Peshawar and Kohat indicated 
that assistance was of limited value because 
benefits were largely confined to tribal elders, 
without trickling down to the population at large. 
participation was essential in planning the kinds of 
The 2011 survey asked 4,000 respondents 
international intervention offered so that 
“whether they knew how development priorities 
assistance was appropriate to their needs. In 
were decided in FATA, and how projects were 
particular, youths from North Waziristan desired 
selected”. The greatest number of respondents 
that local peace committees should be more 
(37.3%) was unsure, with a further 21.1% indicating 
involved. FGD participants from Khyber and 
that they were unable to say how these decisions 
Mohmand Agencies also emphasised that capacity 
were reached. Only a quarter (26.6%) of those 
building support was a necessary requirement for 
surveyed answered yes to the question. 
local organisations to take a greater role in 
supporting initiatives. It should also be noted that many respondents 
echoed the findings of the Male FGDs, in that 
For some participants it was opined that foreign aid 
political administration, particularly that involving 
should  be channelled through the Pakistan Army. 
FDA and FS, was viewed negatively. It was desired 
This is because respondents perceived government 
departments - including: political administrators, 
the FATA Secretariat (FS) and the FATA Development 
Authority (FDA) - to be corrupt and lack the capacity 
to implement large-scale programmes (see Chapter 
3).  
It was felt that the priorities of the international 
community should be focused on addressing 
problems regarding the fulfilment of essential 
services. Therefore, assistance was most desired in 
addressing security concerns, improving justice, 
education and health potential of FATA. It was also 
observed that assistance would be best utilised in 
supporting the rehabilitation of existing 
infrastructure, such as roads and bridges, hospitals 
and schools. 
Understanding of development 
priorities and project selection
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towards the government, especially Pakistan Army developing employment opportunities; a sharp rise 
(see Chapter 4).  from the approximate 10.0% documented in 2010. 
This increase is likely linked to the understanding 
In addition, respondents identified humanitarian that a lack of employment has contributed to 
assistance as a development priority. Whilst this mi l i tants  exploit ing disaffected youths.  
was seen as the main need in FATA during the 2010 Notwithstanding this, expectations regarding 
survey, and has  dropped only a couple of points in international assistance for the development of 
2011 survey, other needs appear to have taken livelihood options have not increased, remaining at 
priority this year. approximately 13.0% for both 2010 and 2011.
Perceptions regarding the need for greater security However, there remain a significant number of 
assistance have also increased between surveys. In people in FATA (nearly 10.0% in 2011, a rise from the 
2010 only 8.6% of those surveyed desired 3.5% in 2010) who believe that no international 
international aid in providing security in FATA but assistance is required. It is notable that particular 
this had more than doubled by the conclusion of hostility is held towards the US and UK; this is likely 
because of concerns that these countries have in the 2011 survey to 19.6%. This is likely to be 
fact worsened the attempts to improve law and because the Pakistani military has yet to achieve full 
order across Pakistan, including in FATA. control over the region, with many militants 
remaining at large, a reality which has created 
Male FGDs increased insecurity. This increase in the desire for 
The FGD respondents were asked to share their help in improving the security situation in FATA is 
priorities concerning international assistance. The also likely to be a consequence of general feelings of 
majority of the participants agreed that disquiet towards security already documented. 
international assistance is needed to assist the 
Calls for greater international assistance is also Government of Pakistan in providing basic 
documented with respect to supporting amenities for the benefit of the local population of 
employment. The 2011 survey has found that FATA. But they stressed that community 
almost 30.0% of respondents desire greater aid in 
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Figure 1.4: Various foreign countries, including US & UK, have expressed an interest in providing development 
assistance for FATA. How do you think that assistance could be most valuable? 
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Females from Khyber and Mohmand Agency were 
of the view that no international assistance was 
needed for their local development. Instead they 
felt that the Government of Pakistan should be 
responsible for provision of all services. Female 
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opposite opinion and welcomed assistance, 
highlighting employment opportunities for both 
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prioritised. 
Females from FR Peshawar and Kohat indicated 
that assistance was of limited value because 
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were decided in FATA, and how projects were 
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building support was a necessary requirement for 
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local organisations to take a greater role in 
supporting initiatives. It should also be noted that many respondents 
echoed the findings of the Male FGDs, in that 
For some participants it was opined that foreign aid 
political administration, particularly that involving 
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FDA and FS, was viewed negatively. It was desired 
This is because respondents perceived government 
departments - including: political administrators, 
the FATA Secretariat (FS) and the FATA Development 
Authority (FDA) - to be corrupt and lack the capacity 
to implement large-scale programmes (see Chapter 
3).  
It was felt that the priorities of the international 
community should be focused on addressing 
problems regarding the fulfilment of essential 
services. Therefore, assistance was most desired in 
addressing security concerns, improving justice, 
education and health potential of FATA. It was also 
observed that assistance would be best utilised in 
supporting the rehabilitation of existing 
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and schools. 
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towards the government, especially Pakistan Army developing employment opportunities; a sharp rise 
(see Chapter 4).  from the approximate 10.0% documented in 2010. 
This increase is likely linked to the understanding 
In addition, respondents identified humanitarian that a lack of employment has contributed to 
assistance as a development priority. Whilst this mi l i tants  exploit ing disaffected youths.  
was seen as the main need in FATA during the 2010 Notwithstanding this, expectations regarding 
survey, and has  dropped only a couple of points in international assistance for the development of 
2011 survey, other needs appear to have taken livelihood options have not increased, remaining at 
priority this year. approximately 13.0% for both 2010 and 2011.
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this had more than doubled by the conclusion of hostility is held towards the US and UK; this is likely 
because of concerns that these countries have in the 2011 survey to 19.6%. This is likely to be 
fact worsened the attempts to improve law and because the Pakistani military has yet to achieve full 
order across Pakistan, including in FATA. control over the region, with many militants 
remaining at large, a reality which has created 
Male FGDs increased insecurity. This increase in the desire for 
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majority of the participants agreed that disquiet towards security already documented. 
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Figure 1.7: In your opinion what is the most important human rights issue in Pakistan today? 
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that FATA communities be afforded increased expression indicates that people’s grievances 
decision-making power because government against governance in FATA persist and there 
institutions were considered to be working for their remains a desire for more participation in decision-
own benefit and not for the interests of FATA. making. Moreover, it is important to note that 
journalists are prohibited from enjoying free access 
to FATA; their movement is continuously controlled 
by Political Administrators and by the military. 
In all of the “Understanding FATA” surveys However, there is some hope for the future as 14 
undertaken, the issue of human rights has been a press clubs have recently been established by the 
constant area of enquiry. The governance structure Tribal Union of Journalists (TUJ) and encouraged by 
in FATA does not allow the Superior Judiciary of the Governor of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, which may 
Pakistan to protect the rights of the people living in influence the potential for improved freedom of 
FATA under Article 247 of the Constitution of expression in the future. 
Pakistan, even though these rights are enshrined 
It is a matter of great concern that fears regarding elsewhere in the constitution. However, it can be 
violence have risen among the FATA population. strongly argued that the violent situation in FATA, as 
Violence against women was identified by 11.3% a result of both internal and external influences, 
respondents in 2008 as a human rights issue. This requires that the Central Government, which 
figure rose to 18.0% in 2009 and remained high for possesses the authority and responsibility for 
the 2010 survey (17.4%). This figure has risen by safeguarding the people of FATA, take action to 
almost 5.0% for the 2011 survey to 22.1%. protect vulnerable FATA residents. The figures 
Perceptions of the threat of violence to children and outlined below show the evolution of this subject as 
minorities, as well as excessive force adopted by the a source of concern over the last four years.
state, are significantly lower than those expressed 
Following the 2008 and 2009 surveys in which the with regard to violence against women, yet the 
greatest human rights concerns were not clearly 2011 survey finds that cumulatively 10% of people 
disaggregated, the 2010 survey learnt that the main are worried about violence regarding these groups. 
human rights issue facing the people of FATA was Whilst increases in concerns about violence are 
the State’s inability to provide basic amenities troubling, some positives may be derived from the 
required for life; this concern should be understood potential consequence that people of are becoming 
as those basic human services required for living. more aware of their personal and communal rights. 
This concern was identified by over a third (38.4%) 
Male FGDsof respondents. Provision of these services is the 
Male FGD participants shared concerns over the responsibility of the FATA Secretariat, as it is 
prevailing human rights situation in FATA. The mandated to lead on developmental issues in 
majority of respondents identified the need for general. 
greater protection of their right ‘to life, liberty and 
This anxiety was repeated in the 2011 survey, security of person’, as enshrined in Article 2 of the 
where it was again the most pressing issue raised, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). It 
with more than quarter of total respondents was commonly held that, at present, these basic 
(29.9%) highlighting it as an issue in FATA. human rights remain missing and there was a 
shared misgiving over the government’s ability to 
Concerns regarding freedom of expression have 
provide development and positive reforms. 
been consistently highlighted since 2008, with 
concern varying between 13.0% (as recorded in 
Female FGDs
both 2008 and 2010) and 15.0% (2009). This figure 
Female respondents continued to emphasise 
has however, dropped for the 2011 survey, with 
security as their main concern, perhaps surprisingly 
only 7.2% of respondents identifying it as 
not in regard to violence against women but instead 
significant human rights problem. Irrespective of 
expressing the concern that a male family member 
this fall, the continued reference to freedom of 
Human Rights issues in FATA
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Figure 1.9: Would you live outside the FATA if given the opportunity?  (break down by region)
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This data however, cannot be taken at face value as could be endangered by militants or Pakistani 
opinions differ widely according to agency (see military operations. Other areas of concern include: 
Figure 1.9). freedom of speech and right to education. 
From the information presented, it is evident that Anxieties were also shared over women’s status in 
the agencies/FRs, where the greatest numbers of tribal society. A lack of empowerment was thought 
people wish to migrate from (that is more than half to prevent women from having a voice or decision-
of the local population wish to relocate), are areas making potential, even at the familial level as a wife, 
of conflict. FR DI Khan, for example, possesses the mother, sister and/or daughter. 
highest number of people wishing to leave FATA 
with 76.3% declaring they would go if they could. 
The areas of FR DI Khan, Kurram, FR Peshawar and 
A lack of economic opportunities has compelled a FR Kohat can all be described as locations suffering 
major portion of the FATA population to migrate, from conflict where the military has yet to establish 
either to other cities in Pakistan or to foreign its full control. In contrast areas considered under 
countries (especially in the Middle East). This Pakistani military control, such as Bajaur and South 
migration has contributed significantly to local Waziristan, the majority of respondents indicated a 
economies, through the international remittances willingness to stay. 
sent to family remaining in FATA. 
The conclusion is that FATA as an area is made up of 
Despite the implications of the security and disparate communities – each possessing varying 
development concerns identified by this survey, motivations for remaining or migrating from their 
57.5% of the respondents still want to continue tribal areas. This is not unique to FATA as similar 
living in FATA. As indicated in Figure 1.8: lack of trends can be identified in other developing 
freedom of movement is not a significant barrier as societies as part of rural-to-urban migration. 
only 2.5% of respondents recognise this as a 
If no: why would you prefer to live in FATA? problem. Yet, a very significant minority (34.9%) of 
Those who did not want to leave FATA were asked respondents would leave if given the opportunity. 
subsequently why they preferred to remain. The 
largest group of respondents, 30.6% replied that 
they like the way they live in their tribal culture and 
tradition, while 28.9% preferred to live within their 
own villages and communities. A further 20.1% 
argued that they had been living in FATA for so long 
that it would be hard for them to leave the area. 
While there is some fluctuation in the total 
percentages over the last three years, the same 
reasons appear to be generally accepted, with 
respondents offering different perspectives each 
year rather than it being symbolic of shifting 
attitudes.  
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opportunities outside of FATA as their primary militancy and military operations. They said that if they 
motivation. In addition, 5.4% pointed out that had to leave FATA because of military operations they 
development conditions were insufficient to inspire had only done so for a limited time and had returned to 
them to live in FATA. their homes once the situation had normalised. 
A similar number of survey participants stated that 
Taliban brutality or resulting military operations were 
Those who wanted to leave FATA were asked to identify 
their primary motivator. The linked use of drones 
their preferred destination. The majority of respondents 
appears to be significant, despite representing just 3.4%, 
preferred to remain in Pakistan, choosing to migrate to 
because they are concentrated in a particular region of 
Peshawar (approximately one third (29.3%) of the 
N. Waziristan. Therefore, this percentage is 
respondents favoured this option in 2010), the provincial 
disproportionately large considering its overall influence 
capital of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Peshawar is a central 
across FATA. While the presence of the Taliban is of 
commercial and cultural point for the FATA people; they 
greater concern to residents of FATA, Al Qaeda fighters 
frequently visit Peshawar for many reasons, for example 
are also a concern for 1.7% respondents.
health treatment, employment, business, education, 
etc. Other unidentified cities in Pakistan received a 
Male FGDs
similar number of endorsements (29.2%) in 2010. The 
The issue of leaving the FATA was discussed by FGD 
close proximity of these figures may be the result of 
participants, with some showing a willingness to migrate 
participants being allowed to make more than one 
to other cities of Pakistan, especially Peshawar. However, 
choice; accordingly those who preferred Peshawar could 
an equal number considered that no city in Pakistan was 
also mention other cities.  
safe anymore, thus they would prefer to leave Pakistan. 
Favoured overseas destinations are Saudi Arabia and 
Female FGDs Dubai, with the remainder of those desiring to leave FATA 
opting for destinations in the western world. This Surprisingly, no female respondents wanted to leave 
division of support between Pakistan and the rest of the FATA, even after having faced the negative impacts of 
Preferred destination if leaving FATA
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Living outside of FATA by age group If yes: why would you prefer to live outside of FATA? 
The 2011 survey has attempted to document the reasons To further disaggregate the findings of the survey, 
motivating those who want to leave FATA if the chance responses were grouped by age. In 2011, it appears that 
arose. Almost a quarter (23.7%) of respondents believed the young and middle-aged groups seem to be more 
that FATA is no longer a peaceful place to live, while some willing to leave FATA than they were in 2010 where the 
20.0% identified the greater potential to find older generations appeared to be much more willing.
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world appears to corroborate the findings from the male 
FGD outlined above, where equal numbers of 
respondents supported these options.
Many development issues have been identified in this 
chapter, and despite the fact that they are not unique to 
Pakistan and FATA, the data is of importance in that it 
signals the areas that are in need of significant attention 
and will help policy makers prioritise interventions. To 
this end, it is clear that demands regarding security and 
peace remain high, while education, health, and other 
basic amenities are in need of development in order to 
meet the needs of FATA communities. For this to be 
achieved, to some extent, cultural attitudes towards 
men and women need to be addressed, with a greater 
emphasis on inclusion, both economically and politically 
being required.
Moreover, the willingness of FATA residents to seek 
employment opportunities outside of Pakistan is also 
significant in highlighting discontent, but also an 
opportunity to develop local economies through the 
influx of remittances from abroad.
Conclusion
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On 12 August 2011, President Asif Ali Zardari signed annulled the special treaties held between the 
the long awaited FATA reform package, Tribal Areas and the British Raj, allowing Pakistan to 
incorporating two orders that extended Pakistan’s negotiate new relationships with the territory. In 
Political Parties Order of 2002 to the Tribal Areas return for continued loyalty, the Government of 
and amended FATA’s Frontier Crimes Regulation Pakistan – represented by Mohammad Ali Jinnah, 
(FCR). These reforms are hoped to encourage the founder and first Governor General of Pakistan 
greater integration of FATA into mainstream – agreed to allow the FATA region’s 200 Maliks to 
Pakistani life, as it will allow political parties to form retain their rights and privileges. The recognition of 
and operate in the region for the first time. These FATA as a semi-autonomous region was 
regulations have however, met with some subsequently formalised in the constitution of 
opposition with a significant number of local elites Pakistan; under Article 1 FATA is identified as being 
10
part of the territory that comprises Pakistan.publicly questioning whether the reform package 
will bring about any significant reforms to the 
In Article 246, the agencies and frontier regions that overall governance structure. This chapter 
form FATA were formalised and include: Tribal Areas discusses the constitutional status of FATA and 
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so provides under law.  In spite of the liberties The links between the FATA Secretariat and tribal 
afforded FATA, most laws – civil, criminal, electoral structures is maintained through local leaders - 
and fiscal – have been incorporated into local holding the titles of Maliki or Lungi.  These leaders 
governance structures. are paid with allowances (Mojib) so that they 
remain loyal to the Political Agents that bestow this 
FATA is represented in the Lower (National status (with the consent of the Governor-General) 
Assembly) and Upper (Senate) Houses of the upon them. Should a Maliki or Lungi not be deemed 
Parliament by 12 and 8 independent members to be fulfilling their purpose, Political Agents can 
respectively. However, because the parliament has also retain authority by withdrawing, suspending or 
no jurisdiction over FATA it is not clear what cancelling this status. 
influence these representatives possess, 
particularly since the Constitution of 1973 does not The Political Agents, through the Maliks, maintain 
afford the people of FATA full participatory status in security through the use of Khasadars, police-like 
political processes. As a result, it can be argued that agents in tribal tradition; or Lashkars, a system by 
the people of FATA have effectively been which tribal members are called together to form a 
marginalised from mainstream politics in Pakistan. militia to defend their community or to apprehend 
criminals.
To implement the constitutional provisions 
described above, the President and FATA In spite of the debate that has centred on the 
Secretariat must be linked to local tribal structures. subject of FATA's status, more than one third of 
Historically, colonial structures co-opted the local respondents (36.6%) questioned in the 2011 survey 
leadership in order to annex tribal structures. A do not know or have an opinion on the political 
leading legal scholar summarises the nature of this future of the tribal areas. This figure has risen 
system of governance:  dramatically over the lifetime of the survey process 
– from a low of 0.3% in 2008 – which indicates that 
‘The region has a peculiar system of administration. there appears to be wide spread confusion on the 
The people are governed through their local issue. The reason for this is likely to be because of a 
chieftains called Maliks, through financial lack of understanding regarding the constitutional 
compensation controlled by Federal Government status of FATA rather than an increase in apathy, as 
and exercised by the FS official called a Political only 11.0% of respondents desire no reform. 
14
Agent.’ 
Consistently, respondents have advocated for 
This style of government has formed the template substantial change to the system of governance 
for sustaining relations between FATA and the used in FATA. Demands have generally focused on 
Government of Pakistan.  full integration of FATA into the Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa or its assimilation as separate 
The local administration in each agency is managed 
province of Pakistan, enjoying equal constitutional 
by a Political Agent, who is a federal civil servant; 
rights and guarantees.  
and each sub-division (Tehsil) is headed by an 
Assistant Political Agent. The Political Agent Support for keeping FATA’s current governing 
performs several functions at the same time – they arrangements has been gradually declining. In 2008 
act as an executive, judge and revenue collector. and 2009 approximately one in five respondents 
They also head the Agency Council and oversee favoured this option but by 2010 this had reduced 
development projects. to less than one in ten. In 2011, despite a small 
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Mainstreaming FATA - Future status
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Reasons for establishment of a FATA 
Council Reasons for FATA to be established as 
a separate province of Pakistan
province have consistently increased over the last 
four years, after an initial decline from a high of 
34.3% in 2007 to 19.8% in 2008. 
Of the participants that wanted FATA to be 
established as a separate province, over half (887 
respondents) were moved to this decision because 
they wanted greater control of their resources; an 
eventuality that could not be achieved through 
union with KPK and its more powerful elites (a 
concern of a further 185 respondents). 
Accession of provincial status was also favoured by 
a significant 28.2% (or some 10.0% of the total 
number of people surveyed) because they believed 
it would allow FATA to be mainstreamed into 
Pakistan while preserving local cultures and 
traditions. Again, it is evident that inhabitants of 
FATA are very possessive of their culture, and wish 
to safeguard it from external influence. 
As illustrated by Figure 2.1: only a very small 
percentage of FATA respondents (3.4%) believed in This option was supported by the greatest number 
the establishment of a FATA Council - with elected of respondents, (26.7%), participating in the 2011 
members, and with the President of Pakistan survey. Calls for FATA to evolve into a separate 
retaining constitutional powers under Article 247. 
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increase in support, only 11.0% of respondents opportunities (15.6%), while, 19.1% of respondents 
supported maintaining the current status quo in favoured closer ties with KPK because they perceive 
FATA. In 2010 an additional question was added to the two regions to be inexorably linked by 
the survey, asking respondents if they would geography.
support a FATA Council with an elected assembly.  
It is important to mention that the merger of FATA While, this option appears to have some support 
with KPK is supported by the Awami National Party. from elites, just 2.9% of people in 2010 and only 
3.4% supported this development. 
Of the 11.0% who believed that the present political 
system in FATA should be maintained (see Figure As shown in Figure 2.1: 22.0% of respondents 
2.1), over half of the 560 respondents (or 7.2% of believed that FATA should be fully integrated into 
the total number of people surveyed) were of the KPK; these 1,729 respondents were then asked why 
opinion that this should be the case because they they believed this to be a positive outcome. The 
had been living with this system for a long time and majority of respondents 30.7% (or 13.3% of the 
that they were used to it. A quarter of respondents overall survey) believed that FATA and KPK are 
opined that the system of FCR suits our culture and historically one and the same area, while 22.3% (or 
environment. This opinion is surprising as FCR is a 9.6% of the overall survey) were of the opinion that 
draconian system, introduced by Colonial Britain, KPK and FATA shared ethnic links to each other. 
and works to the detriment of local tribes. Various tribes or clans live on both sides of the 
border between KPK and FATA - for example the 
Furthermore, some 15.7% believe that the political 
Utman Khel tribe of Bajaur is also located in Lower 
system in the rest of Pakistan is not as good and are 
Dir; a considerable number of the Wazir tribe are 
therefore happy to maintain the current 
resident in Bannu; and, Mohmands have occupied 
administration in FATA. This view appears to be 
most part of Shabqadar Tehsil in Charsadda. 
particularly prominent among the  older 
generation. This was because of concerns regarding Additionally, a quarter of the respondents who 
police and judicial systems introduced in settled favoured uniting FATA and KPK into one province, 
districts; it was feared that similar systems imposed did so because they believed that merging KPK and 
in FATA would undermine their valued culture and FATA would make either administrative sense 
traditions.(10.0%) or improve economic and social 
Reasons that FATA should keep its 
current governing arrangements Reasons for supporting full integration 
into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK)
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that are fully supportive (an attitude shared by a those calling for its abolition. In 2010, 45.4% 
quarter of respondents, an increase of over 7.0%), wanted the FCR to be abolished; this figure has 
while opposition has significantly reduced; less reduced to 30.0% (still a very significant number as 
than 4.0% of people expressed open opposition. it equals nearly a third of all respondents) in 2011. 
Calls for fundamental reform have remained steady 
with approximately 25.0% of people calling for this 
in both 2010 and 2011. 
Partial reform of the FCR remains a largely 
As indicated by Figure 2.7: continued support for 
unsupported option with just 8.4% of people 
the FCR is held by only a very small minority of 
offering this response. Again, a sizeable number of 
survey respondents. In 2010, only 3.4% of people 
respondents, 16.3%, again did not know the answer 
would choose to retain it in its present form. In 
or were undecided. 
2011, this figure, while enjoying some more 
support, remains at only 4.9%. In contrast, a It appears that confusion has increased with regard 
sizeable majority desire significant change. It is to administration in FATA as over a quarter of 
noteable however, that between the 2010 and 2011 respondents were unable to answer. However, the 
surveys, there has been a dramatic reduction in 
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Of the 220 respondents that preferred this established, prior to the formation of agency level 
development, the majority of respondents (some Advisory Councils. They were particularly 
43.8% representing 2.4% of the overall survey) supportive of curtailing the powers of the Political 
believed that the establishment of a FATA Council Agent. 
would help to prepare the leadership, as well as the 
Female FGDslocal population, for future political changes; 
The majority of female respondents were unhappy namely, the full mainstreaming of FATA into the rest 
with the present political system in place in FATA of Pakistan. This notion of facilitating a gradual 
and therefore desired change. There was a change was shared by a further 61 respondents 
commonly shared view that they were unsure how (comprising 28.4%) who felt that a FATA Council 
best to achieve this; however, some preferred the would empower a steady transition from an old 
establishment of FATA as a separate province.system to a new one. 
A further minority opined that dealing with one 
decision maker, i.e. the President of Pakistan, was 
easier than dealing with the whole parliament – a 
potential cause of numerous delays and confusions. While reforms appear to be generally supported, 
concerns remain as to the value of the changes 
Male FGDs
initially proposed by presidential decree in August 
All male respondents from the FGDs were invited to 
2009 and subsequently formalised in August 2011. 
share their opinions relating to the constitutional 
status of FATA. The most commonly identified In 2010, some 43.0% of the respondents were 
theory was that FATA should be established as a supportive, at least in part; with 17.1% in full 
separate province, rather than merged with KPK. support and 26.7% partly supporting the notion. 
However, respondents from Bajaur and Mohmand However, significant minorities of 15.6% (fully) and 
Agencies unanimously agreed that joining KPK was 6.9% (partly) opposed the idea. Approximately one 
preferential. This is likely to be because of close third of respondents were undecided or unable to 
ethnic ties with communities in KPK. answer. 
Male respondents from North Waziristan Agency In 2011, similar numbers of people have remained 
suggested that a FATA Advisory Council be supportive, but with a notable increase in those 
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residents of FATA from abuses. This is illustrated by Pakhtun tribes perceive Jirga to be the most 
the exclusion of the superior judiciary from ruling efficient mechanism for justice dispensation in 
on issues in FATA. FATA. Furthermore, 13.5% respondents opined that 
the Maliks/tribes should remain responsible for 
Collective Arrest and Territorial Responsibility managing law and order in their area.
clauses of the FCR are very much intertwined. Law 
and order in a territory is the responsibility of the Interestingly, 19.4% of the respondents thought 
local tribe or clan but in extraordinary situations the that FATA people should be given the right to 
territorial Political Administration can enforce practice their customs and traditions without any 
these clauses. Approximately one in ten of external interference. This is surprising as only five 
respondents desired that these clauses be per cent of respondents oppose reforms to FCR (see 
completely removed; however, it should be noted Figure 2.7).
that if this were to be facilitated no other 
Retaining any or all of these elements under FCR mechanism exists by which security can be 
would require some changes to improve provided to local communities against forms of 
implementation; for instance, it is evident from the internal or external aggression. These clauses 
f indings documented in Chapter 1 that remain part of FCR (Amended). 
Maliks/tribes have failed to address security 
concerns in FATA. The justice system represented by 
Jirga also raises several concerns, including the 
representation of women and minorities, the 
safeguarding of human rights, capacity to deal with 
Respondents were asked “what aspects are most 
complex cases of a civil and criminal nature. 
important to retain in the FCR”? The most desired 
aspect of the FCR is the Jirga system, a mechanism 
Male FGDs
supported by a quarter of respondents. The 
In all male FGDs the majority of participants 
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 FCR (Amended) 2011 had yet to be signed when CAMP facilitated the FGDs for the 2011 report
29
Additionally, 18.1% of survey participants desired data positively shows that there is an overwhelming 
the removal of the collective responsibility/arrest desire for change even though the exact nature of 
clause. Amendments to the FCR, introduced in the change is not as clear. It is therefore necessary 
2011, have gone someway to facilitating this end, that, there should be a vote on this issue and launch 
with women, children and elderly (age 65 and of public education programmes explaining the 
above) being granted exemption but considerable options needed to be introduced.
expectations remain on FATA males. 13.5% desired 
that the people of FATA be given the right to appeal 
against the decisions of the Political Agent. 
Subsequent to the conclusion of the research for 
this survey the FCR (Amended) 2011 has addressed Following the findings of the 2010 survey an 
this issue. additional question was asked in 2011 to illicit those 
aspects of the FCR that respondents felt were in 
Among respondents (11.3%), there also appears to 
most need of change. The data shows that more 
than one third of respondents (35.4%) are be a greater desire for the implementation of 
undecided or did not know. Of those who did fundamental rights - an issue which has not been 
answer, the most supported view (held by 20.6% of addressed by the FCR (Amended) 2011. The people 
respondents) was that the powers of the Political of FATA are supposed to possess all fundamental 
Agent should be considerably curtailed. rights as enshrined in the Constitution of Pakistan: 
however, there is no mechanism for safeguarding 
What aspects of the FCR are in most 
need of change? 
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It can therefore be surmised that following the supported the reforms to the FCR announced on 14 
15
announcement in 2009, delays in implementation August 2009,  although there was little knowledge 
have had a detrimental impact on perceptions of precisely what reforms were being proposed. 
resulting in a loss of confidence in the government. 
Female FGDs
It is important to mention that, prior to the In all female FGDs, the overwhelming majority were 
implementation of the Political Parties Act 2011, unsure what aspects of the FCR needed reform. A 
representatives from FATA in the parliamentary lack of female empowerment may explain this 
houses had been independent and without party uncertainty, with any information on the reforms 
affiliation. Following the acceptance of the PPO, largely derived from male members of their 
party affiliation may help the electorate of FATA families, who, as shown by the previous data may 
command greater influence in forming party have been similarly unaware. 
agendas for change and development. 
Male FGDs
Male respondents from all FGDs, with the exception 
of those from Orakzai Agency, supported the 
The 2011 survey attempted to gauge the level of 
extension of the PPO to FATA. It was felt that this 
agreement with the (then-current) proposal to 
reform would empower communities to become 
extend the Political Parties Act 2002 to FATA. As 
increasingly aware of their political rights and 
previously noted, the survey was conducted prior 
become more engaged in decision-making 
to 12 August 2011.
processes. 
As seen in Figure 2.10: the 2010 survey identified 
Respondents from Orakzai Agency remained 
that the majority (59.7%) of respondents agreed 
cautious, as they feared that the PPO could result in 
that the Ordinance should be extended to FATA; 
increased conflict, by making reference to the 
while only 9.6% of respondents opposed this 
politically motivated violence that has been 
decision. The survey of 2011, however, has seen a 
experienced in other areas of Pakistan, especially 
surprising reduction in those supporting the 
during elections. 
Political Parties Act. Despite retaining significant 
backing (with one-third [34.9%] continuing to Female FGDS
support the Act) the figure has dropped by almost Almost all the female respondents were unsure of 
25.0%. This reduction is compounded by the the benefits of PPO represented. But they were 
growth in opposition to the PPO rising to 16.0%. aware that activists from Pakistan People’s Party 
(PPP) and the Muslim League were present in FATA. 
Since PPO has been extended to FATA, all political 
parties appear to be interested in establishing a 
presence in FATA. In order to gauge the interest and 
awareness of political life in Pakistan, respondents 
have been asked to identify the politician whom 
they most admired.
For the survey years that this question has been 
asked, the most dramatic finding has been that the 
majority, (56.7% in 2008; 51.1% in 2009; 54.0% in 
2010; 54.7% in 2011), either did not know a 
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during elections. 
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Since PPO has been extended to FATA, all political 
parties appear to be interested in establishing a 
presence in FATA. In order to gauge the interest and 
awareness of political life in Pakistan, respondents 
have been asked to identify the politician whom 
they most admired.
For the survey years that this question has been 
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Pakistan Teher-e-Insaf (PTI), Imran Khan’s party, periods in office. During President Farooq Laghari's 
remains the popular choice, receiving approval caretaker government in 1996, the Adult Franchise 
from 20.6% of respondents. The PPP came second Ordinance was extended to FATA, allowing for 
with 8.2%. It is quite surprising to see how low residents to vote in the 1997 elections. 
support appears to be for PPP at this time, as they Furthermore, FCR (Amended) 2011 and the 
have generally supported some positive changes in extension of the PPO have been established during 
FATA during their periods in office. FATA during their their latest rule. 
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national politician, considered none to be leaders have enjoyed gradual improvements in 
admirable or failed to respond to the question. As popularity, however, it could be argued that they 
shown in Figure 2.11: there is clearly a great deal of remain peripheral figures in the eyes of 
work to be done before FATA can fully integrate into respondents. Fazal ur Rehman, for example, 
the political mainstream. The Figure carries a great received just 1.6% of respondents’ support in 2008 
number of politicians however the following but this increased 3.1% in 2009 and 2010 before 
analysis will focus on the most prominent leaders. rising slightly in 2011 to 3.6%.  This growth in 
From the surveys it appears that a dramatic shift popularity is mirrored by Qazi Hussain Ahmad, 
has been recorded in respondents' perceptions. former Amir of Jumaat-e-Islami (JI), whose rating 
has risen from 1.8% (2008) to 2.0% in 2011. 
Interestingly, the popularity of Imran Khan - 
founder of Tehrek-e-Insaf (PTI) - has consistently As initially stated, the answers (none, do not know, 
risen from just 4.1% in 2008 to a high of 18.6% in and no response) continually represent the 
2011. Support for Imran Khan is likely to be due to majority. This suggests that Pakistani politicians 
his popularity with FATA youth and his effective use have not endeared themselves to the FATA 
of media. population and that political parties need to 
undertake extensive activities to engage with local 
Conversely, Nawaz Sharif of the Pakistan Muslim communities.
League (Nawaz Group) – PML (N), who was the 
most admired politician in 2008 (10.3% of Male FGDs
respondents supporting his reputation) and 2009 Responses from the FGDs support the survey data 
(with 14.9%) saw his standing decline substantially presented  in  F igure  2 .11.  Part ic ipants  
in 2010 (to a low of 3.9%). In 2011, Nawaz Sharif’s overwhelmingly supported Imran Khan, with 
reputation has improved but remains low at 6.7%. almost 80.0% of respondents identifying him as the 
Concerns appear to have been raised that he is not contemporary political figure in Pakistan that they 
able to affect unpopular government decisions. most admired. He is followed by Asif Ali Zardari then 
Nawaz Shahirf and lastly by Asfandyar Wali Khan. 
Asif Ali Zardari, President of Pakistan and Co-chair 
of Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) has seen similar Female FGDs
drops in his popularity following strong initial Though female respondents were not as confident 
support in 2008 (9.9%) and 2009 (8.4%). In 2011, in identifying a living politician whom they admired, 
support for Asif Ali Zardari remained largely most respected the late Benazir Bhutto. Of those 
unchanged from his 2010 low (4.4%) at 4.5%, less contemporary politicians that were identified: Asif 
than half that of his initial rating. Ali Zardari, Nawaz Shahrif, Yousaf Raza Gillani and 
Asfandiyar Wali Khan featured most prominently. 
Respondents' admiration for Asfandyar Wali Khan, 
Imran Khan was not mentioned by any female 
head of the Awami National Party, who led the 
respondent, except in South Waziristan where 
coalition government in KPK, has undergone 
respondents provided unanimous support. 
consistent decline. He was the third most admired 
politician in 2008 (4.9%) but his following dropped 
to just 1.6% in 2009 and then 1.4% in 2010. 
Asfandyar Wali Khan’s reputation in 2011 has 
reached a new low of just 1.2%. This negative 
As noted, Imran Khan has the greatest support perception is in keeping with a general decline in 
within FATA, the survey sought to understand trust towards ANP. Despite having a historical 
whether this was mirrored with respect to political presence in FATA, ANP is overwhelmingly perceived 
party preference.to be corrupt in its management of KPK.
Respondents were asked who they would vote for While support for political party leaders, with the 
in the next general-elections. The data shows that exception of Imran Khan, is waning, religious 
Favourite political party for the next 
general elections 
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national politician, considered none to be leaders have enjoyed gradual improvements in 
admirable or failed to respond to the question. As popularity, however, it could be argued that they 
shown in Figure 2.11: there is clearly a great deal of remain peripheral figures in the eyes of 
work to be done before FATA can fully integrate into respondents. Fazal ur Rehman, for example, 
the political mainstream. The Figure carries a great received just 1.6% of respondents’ support in 2008 
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From the surveys it appears that a dramatic shift popularity is mirrored by Qazi Hussain Ahmad, 
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risen from just 4.1% in 2008 to a high of 18.6% in and no response) continually represent the 
2011. Support for Imran Khan is likely to be due to majority. This suggests that Pakistani politicians 
his popularity with FATA youth and his effective use have not endeared themselves to the FATA 
of media. population and that political parties need to 
undertake extensive activities to engage with local 
Conversely, Nawaz Sharif of the Pakistan Muslim communities.
League (Nawaz Group) – PML (N), who was the 
most admired politician in 2008 (10.3% of Male FGDs
respondents supporting his reputation) and 2009 Responses from the FGDs support the survey data 
(with 14.9%) saw his standing decline substantially presented  in  F igure  2 .11.  Part ic ipants  
in 2010 (to a low of 3.9%). In 2011, Nawaz Sharif’s overwhelmingly supported Imran Khan, with 
reputation has improved but remains low at 6.7%. almost 80.0% of respondents identifying him as the 
Concerns appear to have been raised that he is not contemporary political figure in Pakistan that they 
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Asif Ali Zardari, President of Pakistan and Co-chair 
of Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) has seen similar Female FGDs
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support for Asif Ali Zardari remained largely most respected the late Benazir Bhutto. Of those 
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Respondents' admiration for Asfandyar Wali Khan, 
Imran Khan was not mentioned by any female 
head of the Awami National Party, who led the 
respondent, except in South Waziristan where 
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respondents provided unanimous support. 
consistent decline. He was the third most admired 
politician in 2008 (4.9%) but his following dropped 
to just 1.6% in 2009 and then 1.4% in 2010. 
Asfandyar Wali Khan’s reputation in 2011 has 
reached a new low of just 1.2%. This negative 
As noted, Imran Khan has the greatest support perception is in keeping with a general decline in 
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whether this was mirrored with respect to political presence in FATA, ANP is overwhelmingly perceived 
party preference.to be corrupt in its management of KPK.
Respondents were asked who they would vote for While support for political party leaders, with the 
in the next general-elections. The data shows that exception of Imran Khan, is waning, religious 
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Figure 2.13: What would you be willing to participate in?
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PPP’s limited endorsement is likely to be because of respondents’ opinions on various political and 
perceived limitations concerning issues such as developmental decision-making processes. The 
governance, energy management, inflation, drone results are shown in the figure of responses to the 
attacks. However, it should be noted that party question: what would you be willing to participate 
approval is higher than that for its leader (see Figure in?
2.11). Equally, PTI’s stance on improving 
Effective development needs to be inclusive both to governance and addressing corruption appear to 
support the needs of the receiving community and have increased party approval. 
to ensure that it is sensitive to the local context. It is 
PML (N) has a similar following as the PPP with 7.2% encouraging therefore, that in 2010 one third 
of respondents declaring their support for future (32.8%) of the respondents desired inclusion in this 
elections. This figure is roughly equal to attitudes decision-making activity; while the 2011 figure is 
expressed towards PML (N) leader Nawaz Sharif.  lower it remains significant – with a quarter of 
Attitudes towards ANP remain very low, enjoying respondents (25.8%) calling for inclusion. This 
just 2.5% of respondent votes; however, it should decline is likely to be due to other issues gaining 
be noted that this figure is approximately double greater significance rather than development 
the level of support directed towards Asfandyar decision-making losing importance, especially as 
Wali Khan. citizen forums to discuss local issues have 
maintained their value.
As was the case when clarifying perceptions 
towards political figures, more than one third of For instance, the desire to influence the activities of 
respondents did not select a party. This again political parties has risen dramatically from its 2010 
reflects the need for improved political interaction low of 4.5% to 11.7% in 2011. This may be a direct 
in FATA and increased education at the grassroots result of debate surrounding the PPO. 
level. 
Another interesting trend, that should be noted, is 
that the number of respondents desiring greater Male FGDs
participation in the monitoring of government There was less clarity as to the level of support for 
service delivery has fallen steadily since 2008.  In political parties, but the FGDs highlighted that the 
2008, over 20.0% of those questioned called for problem of political indecision is unlikely to be 
increased involvement in this area but by 2011 this because of apathy, as strong opinions were evident 
figure had dropped to 3.2%. The implementation of and has elicited strong debate. 
a monitoring system for government projects 
Female FGDs would be challenging to achieve, keeping in mind 
the ongoing struggle with militancy in most parts of Female participants were not aware of the PTI as a 
FATA, however this decline is likely linked to political party but stated support for the ‘party’ of 
perceived disenchantment with government Imran Khan if given a choice. 
efforts to support such a process.  
Male FGDs
All participants complained that the Government 
excluded FATA communities from decision-making The people of FATA have largely been excluded from 
processes and demanded reforms that would decision-making processes. The FCR administrative 
empower involvement as a matter of urgency; system established by British colonial rule in 1901 
however, the extension of the PPO was welcomed was reaffirmed by a fledgling Pakistan in 1947. The 
as a start.  marginalisation of the FATA people continues to be 
a problem, in spite the fact that local people desire 
Female FGDs
greater involvement. 
Most of the female participants were unsure of 
their rights and believed that male family members Since 2008, CAMP has sought to document 
Participation in the decision-making 
process
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dictate decision-making. However, they, like their 
male counter-parts were of the opinion that the 
extension of the PPO to FATA was positive. 
The survey data for 2011 again documents the great 
desire for change possessed by large sections of 
FATA society, from the long-established 
A d m i n i s t rat i ve  m o d e l  ( E xe c u t i ve  n o n -
representative) and the regulatory system (FCR) to 
a new system - not as yet defined - that champions 
the level of governance enjoyed by other 
Pakistanis. 
Furthermore, it is apparent that in combination 
with political reforms, a programme of political 
education is required in order to improve debate 
surrounding political leaders and the parties they 
represent. Accordingly, well-defined options must 
be presented to the people so that they can emerge 
from being an ‘administered people’ to one capable 
of fully interacting in the political process.
Respondents also showed their support for the PPO 
and exhibited a desire for increased decision-
making powers to be bestowed on FATA. However, 
significant numbers also showed distinct 
frustration and disappointment with governmental 
fa i lures  to  address  concerns  regarding 
empowerment. 
Conclusion
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There are several institutions that manage of respondents were of the opinion that 
governance and development issues in FATA. The performance was satisfactory; a further 9.7% 
2011 survey has sought to document perceptions in described performance as good. This indicates that 
FATA of the performance of these organisations and almost half (47.5%) of the respondents interviewed 
the extent to which communities interact with perceived their administration in a positive light. 
leadership mechanisms. However, a significant minority opposed this view, 
as one third (34.3%) of respondents described their 
Information has been collected on a range of administration as poor (13.8%) or very poor 
d e p a r t m e n t s ,  i n c l u d i n g :  t h e  P o l i t i c a l  (20.5%). Approximately one in five (18.2%) of 
Administration, FATA Secretariat and FATA respondents were undecided.
Development Authority. This data provides a basis 
for understanding effectiveness and offers insights 
into how these bodies can improve their 
performance to better meet the needs of the 
people they are serving. 
As mentioned in previous chapters, a Political Agent 
leads the Political Administration in each tribal 
agency; this senior civil servant operates as an 
 
agent of the Governor of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 
province. In addition to heading administration, 
they also manage their agency’s judiciary, revenue 
16
collection and development agencies.  There is 
Overall, the data shows that respondents were 
considerable opposition in FATA to this 
generally satisfied but urgent steps are still required 
centralisation of authority, as it is strongly believed 
to improve performance. The ‘War on Terror’ has 
that bestowing so much power on one person has 
seen a considerable amount of financial aid 
increased insecurity among the population. In 
provided to Pakistan in order to improve its 
order to investigate this assertion further 
authority in FATA, and this appears to have been 
respondents were asked to evaluate the 
successful to some extent with regard to the 
performance of their local Political Administration.
performance of Political Administration but is less 
compelling in other data sets. The data derived from the 2011 survey appears to 
be encouraging for local administrations, as 37.8% 
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What could the Political Administration do to the accuracy of these data. 
improve their performance?
Male FGDs This question sought to highlight areas of concern 
Male participants were very explicit in their views: held by respondents that local political 
they opined that over the course of the last couple administration could address in order to improve 
of years some development had taken place in performance and consequently support.  
certain areas but were unable to define what had Unsurprisingly, given the findings outlined in 
been done. This has changed attitudes a little in Chapter 1 of this survey, the response that received 
favour of Political Administration; however, as the greatest support was concerned with security. 
shown above this change has been insufficient to 32.8% of respondents believed that Political 
improve overall perception, with participants Administration should concentrate on improving 
demanding greater developments. the law and order situation in their area. 
An equally large number of respondents (30.7%) Female FGDs
wanted their political administration to Female participants were generally unaware of 
concentrate on improving living conditions. It is not improvements in political administration, a 
entirely evident what respondents would require consequence of gaps in knowledge rather than an 
from Political Administration but some examples opinion of things staying the same. Some however, 
may be discerned from the answers provided by especially those from Khyber Agency, declared that 
participants of the FGDs documented below. 10.0% the performance of the Political Administration in 
of respondents identified employment, and a their locality had improved because of 
comparable number called for improvements to developments in improving road infrastructure. 
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Donors, especially the United States of America however, they were less confident in their analysis, 
(US), Germany, the United Kingdom (UK) and as their knowledge of the Political Administration 
Switzerland have assisted political administration system appeared to be generally derived from 
through the provision of development grants: others. 
aimed at restoring government influence in remote 
How has the performance of the Political areas of FATA. The Office of Transition Initiatives, 
Administration changed over the past 12 months?part of USAID, has implemented around 1,300 quick 
impact projects across FATA in collaboration with 
To better understand attitudes towards Political 
Political Administration. Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Administration, respondents were asked to 
Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), a German 
evaluate the performance of their political 
development agency, has similarly implemented 
administration over the past 12 months. 
FATA Livelihood Programmes in Khyber and FR 
Interestingly, the data appears to support the 
Peshawar.  These  combined with  other  
positive attitudes highlighted in Figure 3.1. If the 
internationally supported initiatives may explain 
data for those that answered improved a lot (8.0%) 
some of the changes in perception towards the 
and improved a little (32.8%) are combined it 
Political Administration. 
appears that a considerable number of people 
(40.8%) have noticed a positive change. This clearly 
Male FGDs
shows that Political Administration is gaining 
The overwhelming majority of participants offered 
support. It is also encouraging that this figure is 
negative views on the performance of Political 
almost twice that for those that considered 
Administration. They believed that Political 
performance to have worsened to some degree 
Administration is skewed in favour of elites, 
(21.3%).
especially Maliks, and have never championed the 
interests of the people living in FATA. It was argued However, this indication of growing support for 
that Political Administration was unable to resolve Political Administration in FATA does need to be 
the simplest of issues of local communities. tempered, as over half of the respondents have not 
Participants also negatively referred to the ongoing noticed improvements if the number of 
law and order situation in FATA, stating that Political respondents who believe no change has occurred 
Administrations were failing and that the Pakistani (31.1%) with those that hold a negative perception. 
military should intervene. 
It is not possible to compare attitudes towards 
Female FGDs Political Administration over previous years, as this 
The views offered by female participants were is the first survey to conduct quantitative research 
similar to those expressed in the male FGDs, on the subject. It is therefore difficult to evaluate 
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However, the capacity of FS to effectively co- It is clear that the FS needs to improve its 
ordinate implementat ion of  large-scale  communication with communities in order to 
development projects is yet to be seen, and better promote its activities and to ensure projects’ 
impartial oversight may be difficult to institute relevancy. This management of projects could be 
because of the present security situation in FATA. immediately improved with the adoption of 
This is essential, both in terms of ensuring quality policies that encourage widespread use of 
and context sensitivity, but also in the policing of participatory planning – to encourage improved 
corruption – for example, the diversion of state and implementation and facilitate effective monitoring 
donor resources by government agents and Maliks. and evaluation of development efforts.
The survey results presented below show the Male FGDs
recorded perceptions of these administrative Majority of participants were aware of the 
structures in FATA. existence of FS: however, they were unable to 
properly evaluate its performance. In response to 
Performance of the FS
questions regarding FS performance, most 
perceived it negatively. This in part, was because The most remarkable finding is that two-thirds 
focus group members were of the opinion that FS (66.6%) of respondents were unable to provide an 
was not treating them fairly; for example, a opinion on the performance of the FS; a figure that 
complaint was raised against FS because is twice that documented in 2010. Given the 
participants had been barred from entering its resources at the disposal of the FS and its direct 
building. It was also noted that FATA citizens were links to locals and their traditional leadership 
not properly represented at the policy level.  structures, it is essential that questions be asked as 
to why this is the case. 
It is also troubling that the number of people that Female FGDs
viewed the FS in a positive light has reduced from There was only limited knowledge of FS. But 
22.6% in 2010 (3.1% perceiving its performance to concern was raised that the body was likely to be 
be excellent and 19.5% as good) to only 14.8% in biased towards elites. Female participants asserted 
2011 (3.7% as excellent and 11.1% as good). This is a that the FS needed to be more actively involved in 
reduction of approximately one-third. providing clean water, education, health care, roads 
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justice dispensation systems. A further 6.1% desired infrastructure (i.e. roads, schools and hospitals) 
improvements in education and health conditions. which would help to improve living conditions, and 
should therefore be the priority of political 
Only 2.2% of respondents required that their administrations. 
political administration ensure community 
participation in decision-making processes. This is 
surprising as inclusion and empowerment have 
been common desires throughout the survey (see The FATA Secretariat (FS) is a government 
Chapter 1 and Figure 2.13). It is clear that local institution working on development programmes 
participation is weak in influencing political and in the FATA region. The FS was established in 2002, 
development administrations and is likely to remain first under the Planning and Development 
so in the near future, but this is a necessary reform Department of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 
to improve governance and the sensitive Government, and then, in 2006, established as an 
implementation of development activities. independent secretariat. 
Improving human rights received an equal number 
The FS has administrative authority for health, of responses, however changes to this situation 
e d u c a t i o n ,  l i v e l i h o o d ,  s e c u r i t y ,  may be expedited by greater inclusion and 
communication/roads, infrastructure and the improvements in the other conditions identified. 
general well-being of the people of FATA. However, 
Male FGDs it is yet to be properly recognised by Presidential 
Different views were expressed on this subject but Ordinance, as required by the Constitution of 
general consensus focused on the issues of Pakistan. 
education and health; also tackling the issue of 
FS, in a very short number of years, has had to corruption was seen as essential in improving the 
contest with stigmatised perceptions of neglect image of Political Administration. 
formed from the successive marginalisation of FATA 
Representatives from Bajaur Agency added that by governments in Pakistan. FATA is one of the most 
confidence in political administration could be under-developed regions of Pakistan. However, as a 
restored only after compensation had been consequence of the ‘War on Terror ’ the 
provided to the victims of military offences. Government of Pakistan has dramatically increased 
Furthermore, it was opined that the hereditary its involvement in FATA’s development. 
Maliki system be abolished and replaced with a 
In the 2003-04 fiscal year, the Government of system that allowed for equal opportunities to be 
Pakistan, through the FATA Secretariat, allocated provided to all. 
PKR 3,256 million to encourage development in 
Participants from Khyber Agency were of the view FATA. This allocation of funds was more than 
that the political administrations should allocate doubled by the 2008-09 budget when it was 
funds for developmental works only after the local increased to PKR 8,662 million - an annual increase 
community had been consulted. of 266%. For the fiscal year 2010-11, this figure has 
again increased to PKR 15,000 million. The 
In Mohmand Agency, it was believed that their 
international community, especially the US and 
Political Administration needed to improve in 
UK;, Germany and the German Development Bank; 
providing basic services, a role that had so far had to 
along with the international organisations of the 
be filled by non-governmental organisations.
United Nations and World Bank, have invested 
heavily in FATA development, and provided some 
Female FGDs
additional humanitarian assistance to refugee 
Areas of concern identified included building local 
camps. 
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recorded perceptions of these administrative Majority of participants were aware of the 
structures in FATA. existence of FS: however, they were unable to 
properly evaluate its performance. In response to 
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questions regarding FS performance, most 
perceived it negatively. This in part, was because The most remarkable finding is that two-thirds 
focus group members were of the opinion that FS (66.6%) of respondents were unable to provide an 
was not treating them fairly; for example, a opinion on the performance of the FS; a figure that 
complaint was raised against FS because is twice that documented in 2010. Given the 
participants had been barred from entering its resources at the disposal of the FS and its direct 
building. It was also noted that FATA citizens were links to locals and their traditional leadership 
not properly represented at the policy level.  structures, it is essential that questions be asked as 
to why this is the case. 
It is also troubling that the number of people that Female FGDs
viewed the FS in a positive light has reduced from There was only limited knowledge of FS. But 
22.6% in 2010 (3.1% perceiving its performance to concern was raised that the body was likely to be 
be excellent and 19.5% as good) to only 14.8% in biased towards elites. Female participants asserted 
2011 (3.7% as excellent and 11.1% as good). This is a that the FS needed to be more actively involved in 
reduction of approximately one-third. providing clean water, education, health care, roads 
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justice dispensation systems. A further 6.1% desired infrastructure (i.e. roads, schools and hospitals) 
improvements in education and health conditions. which would help to improve living conditions, and 
should therefore be the priority of political 
Only 2.2% of respondents required that their administrations. 
political administration ensure community 
participation in decision-making processes. This is 
surprising as inclusion and empowerment have 
been common desires throughout the survey (see The FATA Secretariat (FS) is a government 
Chapter 1 and Figure 2.13). It is clear that local institution working on development programmes 
participation is weak in influencing political and in the FATA region. The FS was established in 2002, 
development administrations and is likely to remain first under the Planning and Development 
so in the near future, but this is a necessary reform Department of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 
to improve governance and the sensitive Government, and then, in 2006, established as an 
implementation of development activities. independent secretariat. 
Improving human rights received an equal number 
The FS has administrative authority for health, of responses, however changes to this situation 
e d u c a t i o n ,  l i v e l i h o o d ,  s e c u r i t y ,  may be expedited by greater inclusion and 
communication/roads, infrastructure and the improvements in the other conditions identified. 
general well-being of the people of FATA. However, 
Male FGDs it is yet to be properly recognised by Presidential 
Different views were expressed on this subject but Ordinance, as required by the Constitution of 
general consensus focused on the issues of Pakistan. 
education and health; also tackling the issue of 
FS, in a very short number of years, has had to corruption was seen as essential in improving the 
contest with stigmatised perceptions of neglect image of Political Administration. 
formed from the successive marginalisation of FATA 
Representatives from Bajaur Agency added that by governments in Pakistan. FATA is one of the most 
confidence in political administration could be under-developed regions of Pakistan. However, as a 
restored only after compensation had been consequence of the ‘War on Terror ’ the 
provided to the victims of military offences. Government of Pakistan has dramatically increased 
Furthermore, it was opined that the hereditary its involvement in FATA’s development. 
Maliki system be abolished and replaced with a 
In the 2003-04 fiscal year, the Government of system that allowed for equal opportunities to be 
Pakistan, through the FATA Secretariat, allocated provided to all. 
PKR 3,256 million to encourage development in 
Participants from Khyber Agency were of the view FATA. This allocation of funds was more than 
that the political administrations should allocate doubled by the 2008-09 budget when it was 
funds for developmental works only after the local increased to PKR 8,662 million - an annual increase 
community had been consulted. of 266%. For the fiscal year 2010-11, this figure has 
again increased to PKR 15,000 million. The 
In Mohmand Agency, it was believed that their 
international community, especially the US and 
Political Administration needed to improve in 
UK;, Germany and the German Development Bank; 
providing basic services, a role that had so far had to 
along with the international organisations of the 
be filled by non-governmental organisations.
United Nations and World Bank, have invested 
heavily in FATA development, and provided some 
Female FGDs
additional humanitarian assistance to refugee 
Areas of concern identified included building local 
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FATA Development Authority (FDA) However, as will be shown from the survey data, like 
the FS, not many people in FATA are aware of the 
The FATA Development Authority (FDA) was existence of the FDA.
established as a specialised development 
Performance of the FDAorganisation in 2006 through a Presidential 
Data reveals that opinions directed towards the Ordinance. Its objective was to promote a more 
FDA are similar to those documented on the FS (see innovative, fast moving and participatory approach 
Figure 3.4). An overwhelming majority of to development and replace the conventional 
respondents (70.5%) were unable to provide an straight-jacketed system that the FS is perceived to 
opinion on performance; a doubling of 2010 figure use. 
of 35.8%.  
Accordingly, the goals of the FDA – as enshrined in 
Again it is clear that greater overtures need to be its Statutory Regulations – are to plan, execute and 
undertaken by the FDA to communicate with local administer sustainable development projects in: 
communities to improve awareness and increase minerals, industries, skills development, small 
local ownership of activities. Confusion in dams, township development and tourism. The aim 
distinguishing the responsibilities between FS and was to harness abundant human and natural 
FDA may contribute to a loss in confidence in resources in FATA to create increased economic and 
offering an opinion. Furthermore, apparent local employment opportunities for tribal area 
emphasis on the role of the Political Administration communities. 
may also have contributed to this emphasis (see 
Figure 3.6: In what way has FATA Secretariat performed badly? 
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and women-centred vocational training.  well in including FATA people in the planning 
processes. This figure may be the result of localised 
In what way has FS performed well? involvement by participants in projects rather than 
To elicit opinions on FS performance respondents an institutionalised practise. Nonetheless, this data 
were asked a multiple-choice question and Figure should not distract from the compelling calls for 
3.5 documents the answers provided by greater inclusion documented before. 
participants. Predictably, the most common 
response, expressed by 42.4% was an inability to In what way has FS performed badly? 
answer. This is likely to be a direct result of survey In comparison, respondents were also asked what 
participants not being able to provide a universal aspects of FS could be improved. 
opinion on FS. 
Again we see close to half the number of the 
Of those that were able to identify a particular FS respondents not being able to share their opinion. 
value: 10.0% of respondents shared the opinion 
Interestingly, there are no dramatic differences that FS staff were co-operative with FATA 
between positive and negative attitudes, but it is 
worth noting that concern relating to inclusion is in communities, while 6.8% declared that FS had been 
excess of 10.0%, with 5.6% of people indicating that successful in implementing projects in FATA. A 
FS does not involve FATA people in the planning further 2.8% believed that projects implemented 
process and 5.9% declaring FS does not involve FATA by FS have a long-term impact on the region. 3.4% 
people in the management of projects. A further of respondents were of the opinion that FS had 
indication that local empowerment regarding used grants sensibly.
development programmes should be prioritised in 
Arguably, an unexpected finding is that over 6.0% of the future. 
participants believed that the FS had performed 
Figure 3.5: In what way has FATA Secretariat performed well? 
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and women-centred vocational training.  well in including FATA people in the planning 
processes. This figure may be the result of localised 
In what way has FS performed well? involvement by participants in projects rather than 
To elicit opinions on FS performance respondents an institutionalised practise. Nonetheless, this data 
were asked a multiple-choice question and Figure should not distract from the compelling calls for 
3.5 documents the answers provided by greater inclusion documented before. 
participants. Predictably, the most common 
response, expressed by 42.4% was an inability to In what way has FS performed badly? 
answer. This is likely to be a direct result of survey In comparison, respondents were also asked what 
participants not being able to provide a universal aspects of FS could be improved. 
opinion on FS. 
Again we see close to half the number of the 
Of those that were able to identify a particular FS respondents not being able to share their opinion. 
value: 10.0% of respondents shared the opinion 
Interestingly, there are no dramatic differences that FS staff were co-operative with FATA 
between positive and negative attitudes, but it is 
worth noting that concern relating to inclusion is in communities, while 6.8% declared that FS had been 
excess of 10.0%, with 5.6% of people indicating that successful in implementing projects in FATA. A 
FS does not involve FATA people in the planning further 2.8% believed that projects implemented 
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With regard to positive perceptions of FDA barriers to inclusion; this result means that 
supporting local community participation and approximately 150 participants were not as 
involvement, 5.6% of respondents believed this to negative towards the FDA as they were to the FS. 
be the case. This figure almost exactly fits those 
opinions expressed favourably towards the FS. 
It is evident that, despite FDA being created as Over the lifetime of the survey process, 
specialised department to implement innovative, respondents have been invited to respond to a 
participatory projects, it has failed to substantially multiple-choice question on their interaction with 
improve on the development initiatives undertaken different leadership figures. As shown in Figure 
by the FS. 3.10: two important trends can be charted: 1) A 
decline in regular contact with the Political Agent, 
 In what way has FDA performed badly? 
and 2) A reduction in contact with Mullahs. The first 
In comparison, respondents were also asked what 
finding is probably linked to weaknesses in the 
aspects of FDA could be improved
Political Administration outlined above. The second 
finding reflects a decline in prestige held by local Again, close to half of the respondents (45.0%) 
religious leaders as a source of advice and guidance. were unable to offer an opinion. Interestingly, all of 
the choices, with the exception of attitudes towards 
The events of the last few years have undoubtedly 
the long-term impact of a project, were lower than 
influenced attitudes held by local people towards 
those expressed towards the FS. In particular, less 
their leaders, with the reputation of Mullahs has 
than eight per cent of respondents identified 
suffered because of their weak response to terrorist 
Closest interaction with leadership
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Figure 3.3). 9.8% opined that the staff of FDA were co-operative 
- a similar number to that of FS staff. A greater 
In what way has FDA performed well? number of respondents supported FDA’s usage of 
To elicit opinions on FDA performance respondents development grants, in comparison to the FS - 8.7% 
were asked a multiple-choice question and Figure versus 3.4%. A further 8.0% considered FDA 
3.8 documents a sample of the answers provided. projects to be implemented successfully in FATA. 
Predictably, the most common response, expressed This is a slight increase on the same perception 
by 40.7% was an inability to answer. associated with the FS.
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With regard to positive perceptions of FDA barriers to inclusion; this result means that 
supporting local community participation and approximately 150 participants were not as 
involvement, 5.6% of respondents believed this to negative towards the FDA as they were to the FS. 
be the case. This figure almost exactly fits those 
opinions expressed favourably towards the FS. 
It is evident that, despite FDA being created as Over the lifetime of the survey process, 
specialised department to implement innovative, respondents have been invited to respond to a 
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improve on the development initiatives undertaken different leadership figures. As shown in Figure 
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and 2) A reduction in contact with Mullahs. The first 
In comparison, respondents were also asked what 
finding is probably linked to weaknesses in the 
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finding reflects a decline in prestige held by local Again, close to half of the respondents (45.0%) 
religious leaders as a source of advice and guidance. were unable to offer an opinion. Interestingly, all of 
the choices, with the exception of attitudes towards 
The events of the last few years have undoubtedly 
the long-term impact of a project, were lower than 
influenced attitudes held by local people towards 
those expressed towards the FS. In particular, less 
their leaders, with the reputation of Mullahs has 
than eight per cent of respondents identified 
suffered because of their weak response to terrorist 
Closest interaction with leadership
3.9
3.3
4.3
5.3
45.0
3.7
4.0
FDA does not involve FATA people in the 
planning process
FDA does not involve FATA people in the 
management of projects
FDA has not successfully implemented 
projects in FATA
FDA staff are not co-operative 
FDA projects do not have a long-term impact
FDA is inefficient in using development grants
Other (specify)
Don’t know
2011 (%)
Figure 3.9:  In what way has FATA Development Authority (FDA)  performed badly? 
0.4
Chapter 3: Assessment of Governance and Development Agencies 47
Figure 3.3). 9.8% opined that the staff of FDA were co-operative 
- a similar number to that of FS staff. A greater 
In what way has FDA performed well? number of respondents supported FDA’s usage of 
To elicit opinions on FDA performance respondents development grants, in comparison to the FS - 8.7% 
were asked a multiple-choice question and Figure versus 3.4%. A further 8.0% considered FDA 
3.8 documents a sample of the answers provided. projects to be implemented successfully in FATA. 
Predictably, the most common response, expressed This is a slight increase on the same perception 
by 40.7% was an inability to answer. associated with the FS.
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attacks perpetrated by the TTP and Al Qaeda. of Mullahs, teachers, parliamentarians, or NGOs. 
However, the slight recovery in 2011 interaction 
Female FGDswith Mullahs may indicate that people may again 
The general consensus among the six female focus seek their support if other institutions are not able 
groups was that male family members, in to meet the aspirations of the FATA people. 
accordance with tribal Pakhtun society, provided 
Tribal elders appear to be a strong source of leadership. In addition, some mention was made of 
leadership for a quarter of respondents (26.6%); a doctors and teachers: with whom guidance was 
figure that almost doubles data recorded in 2010. sought for a particular health or educational issue. 
This growth in support may indicate that 
respondents are increasingly turning towards 
traditional leadership mechanisms; that is, seeking 
guidance from existing administrative and tribal 
structures to resolve local issues and restore The surveys conducted between 2008 and 2010 
communal harmony. Interaction with teachers also allowed for respondents to choose a single answer 
appears to have grown in significance. Responses to the question of which institution or leader was 
over the last three years have remained consistent, most trusted – for the 2011 survey respondents 
rising to 20.2% in 2011. were invited to select more than one option. The 
data contained in Figure 3.11 largely supports the 
Following a steady decline in recent years, 
f indings defined by Figure 3.10. Those 
interaction with NGOs has improved in 2011 (i.e. 
representatives that had had most interaction were 
from 1.6% in 2010 to 3.0% in 2011). The decline in 
largely considered the most trustworthy. 
previous years is likely to be because the security 
situation constricted their ability to operate; very Attitudes towards Political Agents mirror that of the 
few NGOs are able to work in the challenging FATA level of interaction documented above. However, it 
environment. is interesting to note that levels of trust in this 
government representative have not fluctuated too 
It is encouraging that less than 1.0% of respondents 
greatly, while interaction has decreased over time. 
have sought interaction with the Taliban (0.8%) or 
This indicates that certain mistrust has been felt 
foreign fighters (0.1%). While in contrast, trust 
towards the Political Agent, a finding that needs to 
seems to be growing towards Pakistani forces: with 
be addressed if they are to become a source of 
both the military and Frontier Corp enjoying 
guidance. 
increased support
Substantial trust appears to be afforded to both the 
It is concerning however, that a fifth of survey 
military and Frontier Corps, with almost three times 
participants (21.5%) had not interacted with a 
the number of people declaring trust in the military, 
leadership figure. Political and development 
than the number of those that had had direct 
organisations need to be aware of this discouraging 
contact with them in 2011. This indicates that 
finding as it may be symbolic of communities 
military intervention, in order to provide security, is 
exhibiting a lack of trust or disenchantment with 
not antagonising the FATA population, and as 
progress. Also it may indicate that large proportion 
shown in Chapter 1 is supported.
of the FATA population is not being effectively 
represented, for example, because of local issues of Disturbingly, levels of distrust remain high, with the 
gender inequality or of fear. perception that none were trustworthy rising from 
15.5% in 2010 to 18.7% in 2011. Also the number of 
Male FGDs
those that were unable to answer has risen sharply 
The overwhelming majority of participants 
from 6.2% (2010) to 15.1% (2011). This absence of 
identified tribal elders as the figures that they had 
trust needs to be addressed otherwise issues such 
had most interaction with, followed by Political 
as the insurgency in FATA may persist because 
Administration. Surprisingly, no mention was made 
Most trusted institutions/leaders in 
FATA
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attacks perpetrated by the TTP and Al Qaeda. of Mullahs, teachers, parliamentarians, or NGOs. 
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leadership for a quarter of respondents (26.6%); a doctors and teachers: with whom guidance was 
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leaders are unable to inspire support from 
communities to address political and development 
shortcomings.
Male FGDs
Male participants greatly valued the role of the 
military in safeguarding security, and this trust was 
centred on their ability to oppose Taliban forces and 
reclaim land; excessive use of force was however 
questioned but trust was largely based on results 
and not human rights. 
Furthermore, some respondents identified the 
Jirga system of tribal elders as a most trusted 
institution, dispensing timely resolutions on justice 
and communal issues. 
Female FGDs
The Pakistan Military and the Frontier Corps were 
similarly considered the most trusted institution; 
however this was not universal, with some 
participants not being fully aware of the parties 
under discussion.  
This chapter has examined opinions regarding the 
administrative systems of governance in FATA. It 
shows, from the various perspectives, that 
discontent remains significant, with need for 
change being quite evidently illustrated. 
This problem is compounded by the lack of a 
predominant leader that the people of FATA trust. 
With so many institutions providing leadership, a 
lack of coherence is inevitable, and generates 
confusion amongst the community about who 
should be expected to provide particular services. 
As expressed above, the FS and FDA must make 
greater efforts to engage with communities to 
communicate what they are doing and to empower 
increased local ownership of projects, a necessity 
for context-sensitive development. However, some 
trends regarding trust can be considered 
encouraging - trust in the military will be explored 
further in Chapter 4. 
Conclusion
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This chapter is organised into five themes: 1) The FATA assess the country’s overall situation. The 
overall direction of Pakistan and FATA specific question was, ‘Do you believe that the country is 
issues; 2) Security in general; 3) Perceived security going in the right or wrong direction?’
threats to individuals; 4) Opinions on security 
Findings from 2009 appear to show quite a negative providers; and 5) Support for the military and the 
perception of Pakistan’s overall direction by the tactics they employ.
people of FATA. At this time, FATA was fully overrun 
The statistical findings are based on random, with militants and remained so, until Pakistani 
stratified samples taken in the FATA agencies using military operations were started in many tribal 
the methodology described in the Methodology areas; a process that was met with some disquiet as 
Appendix. Where comparable data from 2008, FATA communities had been distrustful of military 
2009, 2010 and 2011 is available, it is used to show intervention.  
changes in opinion. Otherwise single-year data is 
It is important to mention here that in the used and described. 
beginning, probably after 2004, Taliban groups 
were seen to be very co-operative with local 
communities and had provided a justice service to 
the people: resolving very complex, decades-old 
conflicts. This interaction won the Taliban much 
support among locals. However, as Taliban brutality 
increased, which included the forceful recruitment 
The survey sought to determine how the people of 
of FATA locals for Jihad in Afghanistan, and local 
resources were confiscated, their prestige 
meaningfully declined; a process accelerated after 
imposed Sharia court rulings resulted in the 
beheading of several innocent people in FATA. 
Hundreds of tribal elders were also brutally killed 
and humiliated in Waziristan, Bajaur, and 
Mohmand agencies, which created a huge gap in 
leadership. Several suicide bomb blasts targeting, 
among others, Jirga sessions, funerals and 
mosques intensified feelings of insecurity among 
local tribes. 
Despite growing opposition, FATA communities 
were unable to resist the militants, as the Taliban 
were too strong and better equipped when 
compared with tribal Lashkars. Therefore, the 
people of FATA started looking towards the 
Pakistani military for support. In this environment it 
4.1 The overall direction of Pakistan 
and FATA specific issues
Pakistan - optimism versus pessimism 
FATA in the Context of International Conflict
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Figure 4.1: Do you believe that the country is going in 
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was predictable that only a minority of people Female FGDs
(16.7%) believed that the country was going in the Similarly, all female focus groups, with the 
right direction. However, as military operations exception of Bajaur, agreed that the country was 
grew in success and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) going in the wrong direction. Respondents from 
began to lose influence levels of trust started to Bajaur agency remained quite optimistic about the 
increase significantly. Looking at the 2010 survey political situation and direction of the country. 
more than one-third of the respondents thought 
Optimism from Bajaur is surprising, as locals have that the country was heading in the right direction. 
suffered extensive hardship as a result of militant This support has dramatically dropped to just 13.0% 
and military operations. Approximately half of the in 2011, its lowest rating. People’s perceptions tend 
population have been internally displaced and their to change in accordance with external influences 
properties have been damaged in fighting. In spite and therefore, there could be several reasons 
of this, success in fighting the militants appears to behind this decline. These could include: failed 
be more influential. military operations in FATA - allowing militants to 
continue to impose themselves on vulnerable and 
innocent people; killing and humiliation of tribal 
elders at the hands of militants; indifferent 
governmental treatment against internally 
The survey attempted to highlight opinions displaced person (IDPs) from FATA as compared to 
regarding the biggest problems facing Pakistan as a those from Swat; the use of excessive force by the 
whole, and FATA in particular. Problems listed are Pakistani military and air force resulting in local 
repeated for both Pakistan and FATA, with a few c iv i l i an  in s ecu r i ty ;  an d  th e  co nt in u ed  
exceptions. marginalisation of FATA (see Chapter 2 for more 
details) is totally ignored. 
Pakistan’s biggest problems: 
In 2009, 45.1% of respondents offered a variety of As support has dropped pessimism has inevitably 
unclassifiable problems at the national level. The increased. In 2009, 55.3% respondents believed 
reason for this was restricted number of options that the country was heading in the wrong 
available for respondents to identify within the list. direction, a figure that lowered to 48.5% in 2010, 
Since 2010 the list has been expanded allowing for a but his radically increased 70.9% in 2011. These 
more comprehensive study to be undertaken. statistics show, that despite military successes, over 
two-thirds of people from FATA continue to 
The main problem identified by 35.1% of 
perceive Pakistan as heading in the wrong 
respondents was law and order, an unsurprising 
direction. This attitude may directly contribute to 
choice given the context. In the 2009 survey, by 
the findings documented in Chapter 1, in which it 
comparison, only 2.6% of the respondents 
was recorded that approximately one-third of 
identified this issue as the biggest problem facing 
respondents would, if it were viable, leave the FATA 
Pakistan. This rise in identification of law and order 
region (see Figure 1.9, 1.11 and 1.12).
as a problem corresponds with changes in 
perception towards militants. An additional reason Male FGDs
could be that respondents are no longer as fearful Overwhelmingly participants from across the 
of expressing their views openly. majority of FATA, except Mohmand agency, 
believed that the country was going in the wrong 
Other significant priorities remain the historical 
direction. Concerns were raised over security, 
issues of inflation (14.4%) and bad governance 
inflation, corruption and a lack of political vision. 
(14.3%) in Pakistan. Governance is a complex issue 
Focus group participants from Mohmand Agency 
and often difficult to understand, yet it is apparent 
were quite optimistic about the direction of the 
that increased awareness of the system has 
country; however, they were unable to define why. 
influenced public consciousness concerning its 
What are Pakistan’s, biggest problems 
and FATA's in particular?
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problems. In 2009, only 2.5% of respondents This is likely due to their experiences in living with 
recognised corruption as a problem but this has militancy and military counter-operations.  
risen to 14.3% in 2011. This issue is also compelling 
as it indicates that local complaints regarding unjust 
government (as described in Chapter 2) are 
With regard to local concerns in FATA: education, considered to be shared by other communities 
health services and employment were the leading across Pakistan.
concerns in 2009, however, subsequent years have 
Other notable concerns are bomb blasts, which witnessed a radical change in perceptions with 
were identified by 8.4% of respondents; while the contemporary concerns focussing on law and 
level of insecurity caused by this form of violence order. Law and order was recognised by just 1.6% of 
remains troubling it is notable that the level of people in 2009 but has consistently risen to a new 
concern has reduced by over 5.0% points from that high of 43.1% in 2011. 
recorded in 2010. These changes are directly linked 
Taliban remain a considerable source of insecurity to instances of terrorist activity. Due to increases in 
in FATA but military engagement and local advocacy bomb blasts between 2009 and 2010 concern 
by media and NGOs appear to have reduced raised from an initial low of 2.1% to 14.6%. In 2011, 
concern by engaging youths in productive activities. following a substantial decrease in terrorist attacks, 
However, changing perceptions towards the fear of bomb blasts has reduced.
Taliban (i.e. they are fighting for freedom, Islam and 
Male FGDs tribal cultures) by some participants may also 
The perceptions shared in FGDs are documented explain this change (see Chapter 5).
above. The majority of respondents confirmed 
The nature of the conflict in FATA has seen fears security, terrorism, and destabilisation as the 
regarding bomb blasts steadily rise. In 2009 only challenging issues for Pakistan. 
1.5% of respondents identified this threat as being 
Further concerns were raised at particular important, but this increased to 5.0% in 2010 and to 
locations: some participants from Khyber said that 8.8% in 2011. 
that corruption was a significant problem; while 
Education and health services were a major concern participants from FR Kohat and FR Peshawar 
for 21.6% of respondents in 2009 but this dropped identified widespread unemployment in the 
dramatically in 2010 (to 2.5%) this does not mean country as the biggest challenge. 
that education and health are not causes for 
Among young participants, concern over a lack of concern, as improvements remain an urgent 
sincere political leadership in Pakistan was a demand for large portions of the FATA population 
considerable problem. (see Figure 1.1 and 1.4).
The overall data identifies that the people of FATA 
are more concerned with security, inflation, Interestingly, female participants offered different 
presence of foreign fighters and Taliban as their concerns. The general consensus was that poverty 
primary concern, rather than basic services. and unemployment were major issues that need to 
Furthermore, governmental increases in annual be addressed across the country. As previously 
spending in FATA may have allowed people to start illustrated female empowerment is a problem in 
believing that problems concerning basic services FATA and it is unclear what exposure women have 
are being gradually resolved by local political had to national problems; therefore these concerns 
administrations and international aid agencies.may reflect family concerns as much as they do an 
analysis of national concerns. 
  Male FGDs
Nevertheless, female members from South 
A number of issues were identifed through the Waziristan shared the concern of law and order. 
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FGDs but primarily peace and security and Tackling terrorism was identified by 28% of people. 
terrorism were considered the main causes for This figure could be considered low given concerns 
concern in FATA. This was followed by regarding security, the Taliban and bomb blasts but 
unemployment, low literacy, poverty and the social is in actuality reflective of common perceptions 
injustice that is inherent in the existing regarding threat and danger. This subject is 
administrative structures in FATA. analysed in greater detail in the next section. 
However, this should not diminish the fact that 
Participants from North Waziristan also pointed out tackling terrorism remains an expectation of 
the issues of the weak political awareness, health government for over a quarter of respondents.
and undemocratic governance processes. 
Male FGDs
Female FGDs
Security remained the leading concern of 
Female respondents from the agencies of Bajaur, participants. This desire was followed by the 
Kurram, South Waziristan and Khyber identified expectation that government should provide peace 
militancy and the Talibanisation of tribal society as and security in their region; enabling businesses to 
FATA’s biggest problem (in contradiction of the operate unmolested and for other livelihood 
findings outlined in Figure 4.3). This was followed activities to be made available. This concern 
by unemployment, poverty, inflation and weak highlights that the spectre of terrorism remains of 
education and health services as the biggest considerable concern for large parts of the FATA 
problems of FATA. population. In addition, many other issues were 
highlighted, including the expectation that 
government should be responsible for: roads, 
hospitals, schools, establishment of industrial units, 
and provision of electricity. 
In order to focus more on the specific needs of the 
It was shared, however, that expectations of people of FATA the following question was asked: 
government may be influenced by the shared ‘what are the most important services that the 
feeling that FATA remains a neglected part of Government of Pakistan should provide to your 
Pakistan; it was considered essential that the district?’ Multiple responses were allowed. 
Government of Pakistan address this as a matter of 
Respondents were largely of the opinion that supreme urgency. 
Government was responsible for providing services 
that address the concerns highlighted in Figure 4.3; Female FGDs
Female participants regarded employment and with the issues of security (44.6%), education 
l ive l ihood opportunit ies  to be the key (44.2%) and health (39.9%). However, it was 
responsibilities of government. They also shared documented that the greatest expectation from 
the opinion of their male counterparts that government is for electricity supply, which was 
providing peace and security needed to be a desired by 45.0% of those interviewed. 
primary responsibility of government. 
Again, governance is a low expectation at 13.4%. 
Females from Kurram Agency also raised the issue This may be due to limited knowledge but it may 
of sectarianism in FATA, especially in their locality, also reflect a lack of concern. Meaning 
where fighting between Shia and Sunni sects has governmental efforts to reform political 
been an issue for the last four years.administration in FATA is being misdirected and 
should be redirected towards development and 
conflict resolution. This may, in the short-term, 
allow for the improved integration of FATA and lay 
the foundation for reforms in the long-term. 
Services that the government should 
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Again, governance is a low expectation at 13.4%. 
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of sectarianism in FATA, especially in their locality, also reflect a lack of concern. Meaning 
where fighting between Shia and Sunni sects has governmental efforts to reform political 
been an issue for the last four years.administration in FATA is being misdirected and 
should be redirected towards development and 
conflict resolution. This may, in the short-term, 
allow for the improved integration of FATA and lay 
the foundation for reforms in the long-term. 
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personnel have seen this first-hand in the case of Pakhtun men traditionally suppress fears because 
Bajaur Agency IDPs, who preferred to leave their of Pakhtunwali. On the other hand, it may also 
IDP camps quite early - despite military operation reflect that women in FATA are more vulnerable to 
continuing in their region – rather than remain. security than their male counterparts. 
Respondents questioned the quality of the support 
being provided by the Government of Pakistan and 
the international aid community. 
Male FGDs
The survey attempted to elicit perceptions on the 
Male participants shared mixed feelings with the changing security conditions in their respective 
survey team. Half felt insecure while an equal tribal areas. The responses remain quite consistent 
number felt more secure. In areas where the in terms of respondents’ understanding of 
Pakistani military has extended its control, improvements in security. It needs to be 
participants appeared to have an improved acknowledged that the survey was limited in its 
perception of security, particularly those from ability to interview respondents in certain tribal 
Khyber and North Waziristan agencies and the areas therefore they could be considered an 
Frontier Regions of Bannu, Lakki, Tank and DI Khan. abstraction of true levels; furthermore, the survey 
Participants from Orakzai Agency however, was only able to chart the perceptions of those 
remained quite pessimistic, noting that the currently living in FATA, and therefore does not take 
government had been unable to secure their tribal into account the perceptions of the large numbers 
area from militants. of people who remain displaced – a proportion of 
society that would presumably not currently 
Female FGDs
consider the local security environment to be 
Interestingly, the majority of female participants in 
conducive to return.
FGDs were concerned about the security situation 
in FATA. This response, it could be argued, reflects a As shown in Figure 4.6: over the last two years 
more realistic perspective of concerns in FATA as significant numbers of people have declared that 
Improvements in the security 
situation
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Figure 4.6: Compared to last year, do you feel your security is getting better or worse?
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4.2 Security in General In 2011, feelings of security remained high, with 
15.1% stating that they were very secure and 27.9% 
As noted above in Figures 4.2 and 4.3: law and order that they were somewhat secure but it has to be 
has been the main concern in FATA for the last two noted that the total number of those feeling secure 
years. We now seek to better understand this has dropped alarmingly by nearly 20% points; a 
concern. change compounded by data equally showing that 
feelings of insecurity have risen. In 2011, around 
FATA is known as a ‘no-go area’ for non-FATA 50% of respondents informed the survey team that 
residents; however, it is home to more than 4 they felt insecure (32.0% were very insecure and 
million people. The brutal excesses of TTP and other 18.8% were somewhat insecure). This is a 
militant groups and military counter-operations significant rise from the total of insecure (36%) in 
have driven an important proportion of the local 2010. 
population out of FATA; thus giving the impression 
that FATA is an insecure area. In areas under Pakistani military control: 
respondents consistently noted feelings of security. 
However, this external perception may need to be Conversely, in areas of conflict respondents 
revaluated following the finding that in 2010, 61.4% remained quite pessimistic – noting governmental 
respondents felt secure (6.2% stating they were inability to secure their locality from influence by 
very secure and 55.2% that they were somewhat militants. Figure 4.7 provides some insights into 
secure). When the 2010 survey introduced the feelings of security, but it must be noted that it 
question of ‘feelings of security’ some optimism refers to perceptions regarding improvements in 
was recorded, probably due to confidence being the security situation and not overall feelings of 
expressed due to the success of military operations security in general.
Swat, Bajaur and Dara Adam Khel, as well as in parts 
of Mohmand, Orakzai and lower Kurram agencies. It This shift in opinion is understandable. Refugee 
was hoped that these operations would continue to camps, the only viable alternative to living in one’s 
succeed and result in the return of authority to vulnerable local community, expose people to 
18
many alternative risks and challenges.  CAMP civilian administrations. 
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 18.9% of respondents had indicated that they had had to flee from their home in the recent past.
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4.2 Security in General In 2011, feelings of security remained high, with 
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the security situation has been improving. This, in situation in South Waziristan was better; implying 
conjunction with the data documented in Figure increased confidence in the efforts of the Pakistani 
4.5, implies that many FATA communities feel at military to impose security in the tribal area. In 
least some sense of security, in spite of the violence Bajaur Agency 45% of respondents noted 
that engulfs much of the region. Yet, it is not evident improvements in security; this in part may be the 
what the true meaning of this information is, as it is result of the repatriation of significant numbers 
not clear whether respondents were answering in (approximately two-thirds) of IDPs, forced out of 
terms of year-on-year improvements, or over a their homes by fighting in the region.  
longer period. That is, some 40% of respondents 
These gains are not guarantees of shifting acknowledging continued developments on top of 
perceptions however, as illustrated by findings from those recorded by half of interviewees in 2010 or do 
Kurram Agency. In 2010, 80% of respondents from they refer to a changing of attitude of those that 
this Agency, scene of some of the greatest were less than favourable in the same period? 
(sectarian) violence in FATA, noticed improvements 
Consequently, the Government of Pakistan must in security. This figure has dropped dramatically to 
not allow the improvements to trigger over- 24.9% in 2011. 
confidence, particularly as approximately one-fifth 
Overall, the gains of 2010 appear to have been of respondents in 2011 considered the security 
reversed for some 27% of the population. The situation to be at least somewhat worse (an 
opening of roads last year appeared to have raised increase of approximately seven percentage points 
hopes for the future, but substantial delays in on levels recorded the year before).
reaching agreement and a lack of trust has 
Future studies must therefore, seek to elicit the increased levels of frustration. It is essential to note 
extent to which the opinions recorded are therefore, that improvements in perceptions of 
concerned with year-on-year changes in attitude or security do not necessarily equate to changes in 
longer-term changes in security. Also additional general feelings of security. Security concerns in 
evidence is needed to understand whether no FATA remain a considerable cause for concern (see 
change has positive, negative or neutral Chapter 1) and continued governmental activity 
connotations for respondents. needs to be applied, to ensure this momentum 
extends in to the long-term and to ensure that the 
To better understand differences in opinion on worries of those that see no difference or believe 
security by geographical location, Figure 4.7 has the security situation to have got worse are 
been produced. A word of caution is necessary as it addressed. 
is important to state that only villages and towns 
that were accessible are included in the sample (see Focus group discussions
Methodology Appendix): accordingly, responses Similarly to the last question, respondents shared 
may represent a more optimistic perception than mixed views. Again equal numbers of respondents 
might otherwise be expected as perceptions of showed either optimism or pessimism. Those 
security will differ for those living in peaceful areas participants who felt most unhappy with progress 
compared to others living in more unstable areas. in their tribal area were from Orakzai and North 
Waziristan, both of which were continuing to suffer 
During the last three years (2009 – 2011) South 
from Taliban interference. Female FGDs were less 
Waziristan, Orakzai, Bajaur, Mohmand and Khyber 
able or willing to provide opinions on this subject.
agencies have witnessed high levels of conflict - 
resulting in significant numbers of IDPs – yet these 
regions seem to be enjoying some levels of 
improvement in perceptions of security. In South 
Waziristan, for example, of the 280 respondents 
The last section concentrated on attitudes to 
67% of respondents thought that the security 
security for FATA, and local tribal areas, as a whole – 
4.3 Perceived security threats to 
individuals
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4.5, implies that many FATA communities feel at military to impose security in the tribal area. In 
least some sense of security, in spite of the violence Bajaur Agency 45% of respondents noted 
that engulfs much of the region. Yet, it is not evident improvements in security; this in part may be the 
what the true meaning of this information is, as it is result of the repatriation of significant numbers 
not clear whether respondents were answering in (approximately two-thirds) of IDPs, forced out of 
terms of year-on-year improvements, or over a their homes by fighting in the region.  
longer period. That is, some 40% of respondents 
These gains are not guarantees of shifting acknowledging continued developments on top of 
perceptions however, as illustrated by findings from those recorded by half of interviewees in 2010 or do 
Kurram Agency. In 2010, 80% of respondents from they refer to a changing of attitude of those that 
this Agency, scene of some of the greatest were less than favourable in the same period? 
(sectarian) violence in FATA, noticed improvements 
Consequently, the Government of Pakistan must in security. This figure has dropped dramatically to 
not allow the improvements to trigger over- 24.9% in 2011. 
confidence, particularly as approximately one-fifth 
Overall, the gains of 2010 appear to have been of respondents in 2011 considered the security 
reversed for some 27% of the population. The situation to be at least somewhat worse (an 
opening of roads last year appeared to have raised increase of approximately seven percentage points 
hopes for the future, but substantial delays in on levels recorded the year before).
reaching agreement and a lack of trust has 
Future studies must therefore, seek to elicit the increased levels of frustration. It is essential to note 
extent to which the opinions recorded are therefore, that improvements in perceptions of 
concerned with year-on-year changes in attitude or security do not necessarily equate to changes in 
longer-term changes in security. Also additional general feelings of security. Security concerns in 
evidence is needed to understand whether no FATA remain a considerable cause for concern (see 
change has positive, negative or neutral Chapter 1) and continued governmental activity 
connotations for respondents. needs to be applied, to ensure this momentum 
extends in to the long-term and to ensure that the 
To better understand differences in opinion on worries of those that see no difference or believe 
security by geographical location, Figure 4.7 has the security situation to have got worse are 
been produced. A word of caution is necessary as it addressed. 
is important to state that only villages and towns 
that were accessible are included in the sample (see Focus group discussions
Methodology Appendix): accordingly, responses Similarly to the last question, respondents shared 
may represent a more optimistic perception than mixed views. Again equal numbers of respondents 
might otherwise be expected as perceptions of showed either optimism or pessimism. Those 
security will differ for those living in peaceful areas participants who felt most unhappy with progress 
compared to others living in more unstable areas. in their tribal area were from Orakzai and North 
Waziristan, both of which were continuing to suffer 
During the last three years (2009 – 2011) South 
from Taliban interference. Female FGDs were less 
Waziristan, Orakzai, Bajaur, Mohmand and Khyber 
able or willing to provide opinions on this subject.
agencies have witnessed high levels of conflict - 
resulting in significant numbers of IDPs – yet these 
regions seem to be enjoying some levels of 
improvement in perceptions of security. In South 
Waziristan, for example, of the 280 respondents 
The last section concentrated on attitudes to 
67% of respondents thought that the security 
security for FATA, and local tribal areas, as a whole – 
4.3 Perceived security threats to 
individuals
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In addition, crime and banditry is recognised as a Female FGDs
source of individuals’ insecurity by over 10% of Participants appeared to be less confident in 
survey respondents. This may be linked to cultural identifying threats but for those that were: the 
traditions of tribal and family feuds, although Taliban and other militant groups were considered 
previously mentioned factors of poverty, to be the greatest threat to their individual security.
unemployment and a possibly weak judiciary may 
also have an influence. Notwithstanding the cause, 
this feature of insecurity is held by a significant 
As illustrated in Chapter 1 and Figure 4.8: conflict minority and further investigation may be required.
and violence are leading sources of individual and 
Freedom from want community insecurity. As a consequence, the 
Concerns relating to ‘freedom from want’ as a survey has sought to create a more in-depth 
feature of human/individual security, while not understanding of how these phenomena manifest 
being as prominent as those concerning ‘freedom themselves. As described there are numerous 
from fear’ remain significant for approximately 20% forms of conflict in FATA but Figure 4.9 aims to help 
of respondents. illustrate what generally motivates them. 
Respondents were allowed to make more than one 
Inadequate healthcare was a cause for individual 
choice.
concern for just 3.8% of people in 2010 survey 
however this figure has risen sharply in 2011 to Based on personal experience, the most significant 
16.2%. As fighting has placed increased strains on reason for violence was conflict over land, as 
healthcare facilities, infrastructure has proved recorded by 49.7% of respondents. This was 
insufficient resulting in unnecessary deaths and followed by tribal clashes (35.9%) and family feuds 
disabilities. (30.2%). These findings may indicate that local 
issues rather than the ‘War on Terror’ generate 
Issues regarding access to food have also increased, 
conflict in FATA, an explanation further supported 
with approximately 5% of respondents noting that 
by extremism only being recognised by 21.5% of 
this was a considerable concern. It is important that 
people. 
these non-conflict issues are reduced in 
significance, especially as services relating to It has to be noted however, that there is no clear 
human development and health are considerable way of disaggregating whether conflict over land 
expectations (see Figure 1.1). and tribal clashes relate to violence associated with 
outsiders (i.e. TTP and other Taliban organisations) 
Male FGDs taking over land and imposing their values on the 
The overwhelming majority of participants stated indigenous tribe. 
that the Taliban and other militant groups posed 
Notwithstanding the difficulties in understanding the greatest threat to their individual security, but 
the root causes of the different conflicts recorded - fears were also held in regard to the Pakistani 
the destructive nature of the ‘War on Terror’ has military. They added that fighting had endangered 
had the greatest impact on life in FATA; destroying both individuals’ lives but also that of their 
the very core of tribal and Pakhtun culture and livestock. 
devaluing traditional social conflict-resolution 
An additional cause for concern was the use of mechanisms. 
drone attacks by the US. While these attacks were 
considered by some to be very precisely targeted, Male FGDs
the majority of participants were sceptical and did The majority of participants across most FGDs 
not approve of these drone strikes. agreed that the main reasons for conflict in FATA 
were land disputes and honour killing. It was stated 
Reasons for violence in FATA
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this section seeks to document threats posed to slowing in the military’s ability to exert full control 
individuals’ security. The non-specific term of has  undoubtedly  inf luenced responses.  
‘conflict’ previously referred to in the survey is to Furthermore, the Pakistan Army as a source of 
some extent broken down into its various parts (the insecurity has increased. In 2010, military progress, 
‘War on Terror’, sectarian violence, terrorist attacks particularly in Swat and South Waziristan appeared 
and army activity), while other human security to have encouraged/increased trust in the military 
concerns are also identified. as a source of security but in 2011 this confidence 
seems to have faded. Accordingly, in 2010 only 5.8% Freedom from fear
of respondents believed that ‘army activity’ was the The greatest concern raised by respondents in both 
leading threat to individuals’ however, this fear has the 2010 and 2011 surveys was that of terrorist 
risen dramatically to almost 20% in 2011. This is attacks. It is notable however, that this source of 
likely to be because of repeated examples of insecurity has risen in the last year. In 2010, 41.2% 
excessive force being used (resulting in civilian of people considered terrorism to be the primary 
casualties and destruction of property, including fear of individuals but this rose to almost 60% in 
livestock). Surprisingly, 34.1% respondents 2011. This i l lustrates that despite slow 
identified drone attacks as the prominent source of improvements in perceptions of local security and 
individuals’ insecurity. This figure is almost four military successes the spectre of suicide bombings, 
times higher that recorded in 2010 (9.1%).militant rockets, landmine and improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs) remain substantial 
In FATA, Shia Muslims constitute 12% of the total 
concerns.  
population, and in Orkazai and Kurram agencies 
sectarian violence appears to be a significant cause Another striking shift in respondents’ perceptions is 
of individual insecurity. In 2011 survey, this fear was in regard to the ‘War on Terror’. Concern has more 
shared by 17.1% of respondents while this figure than doubled from 14.7% in 2010 to 29.6% in 2011. 
was 14.4% in 2010. It is not clear the extent to which The people of FATA seems to be tired of this conflict; 
these figures represent Sunni and Shia a source of much internal displacement, bloodshed 
perspectives. and the ruining of local economies. Furthermore, a 
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In addition, crime and banditry is recognised as a Female FGDs
source of individuals’ insecurity by over 10% of Participants appeared to be less confident in 
survey respondents. This may be linked to cultural identifying threats but for those that were: the 
traditions of tribal and family feuds, although Taliban and other militant groups were considered 
previously mentioned factors of poverty, to be the greatest threat to their individual security.
unemployment and a possibly weak judiciary may 
also have an influence. Notwithstanding the cause, 
this feature of insecurity is held by a significant 
As illustrated in Chapter 1 and Figure 4.8: conflict minority and further investigation may be required.
and violence are leading sources of individual and 
Freedom from want community insecurity. As a consequence, the 
Concerns relating to ‘freedom from want’ as a survey has sought to create a more in-depth 
feature of human/individual security, while not understanding of how these phenomena manifest 
being as prominent as those concerning ‘freedom themselves. As described there are numerous 
from fear’ remain significant for approximately 20% forms of conflict in FATA but Figure 4.9 aims to help 
of respondents. illustrate what generally motivates them. 
Respondents were allowed to make more than one 
Inadequate healthcare was a cause for individual 
choice.
concern for just 3.8% of people in 2010 survey 
however this figure has risen sharply in 2011 to Based on personal experience, the most significant 
16.2%. As fighting has placed increased strains on reason for violence was conflict over land, as 
healthcare facilities, infrastructure has proved recorded by 49.7% of respondents. This was 
insufficient resulting in unnecessary deaths and followed by tribal clashes (35.9%) and family feuds 
disabilities. (30.2%). These findings may indicate that local 
issues rather than the ‘War on Terror’ generate 
Issues regarding access to food have also increased, 
conflict in FATA, an explanation further supported 
with approximately 5% of respondents noting that 
by extremism only being recognised by 21.5% of 
this was a considerable concern. It is important that 
people. 
these non-conflict issues are reduced in 
significance, especially as services relating to It has to be noted however, that there is no clear 
human development and health are considerable way of disaggregating whether conflict over land 
expectations (see Figure 1.1). and tribal clashes relate to violence associated with 
outsiders (i.e. TTP and other Taliban organisations) 
Male FGDs taking over land and imposing their values on the 
The overwhelming majority of participants stated indigenous tribe. 
that the Taliban and other militant groups posed 
Notwithstanding the difficulties in understanding the greatest threat to their individual security, but 
the root causes of the different conflicts recorded - fears were also held in regard to the Pakistani 
the destructive nature of the ‘War on Terror’ has military. They added that fighting had endangered 
had the greatest impact on life in FATA; destroying both individuals’ lives but also that of their 
the very core of tribal and Pakhtun culture and livestock. 
devaluing traditional social conflict-resolution 
An additional cause for concern was the use of mechanisms. 
drone attacks by the US. While these attacks were 
considered by some to be very precisely targeted, Male FGDs
the majority of participants were sceptical and did The majority of participants across most FGDs 
not approve of these drone strikes. agreed that the main reasons for conflict in FATA 
were land disputes and honour killing. It was stated 
Reasons for violence in FATA
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this section seeks to document threats posed to slowing in the military’s ability to exert full control 
individuals’ security. The non-specific term of has  undoubtedly  inf luenced responses.  
‘conflict’ previously referred to in the survey is to Furthermore, the Pakistan Army as a source of 
some extent broken down into its various parts (the insecurity has increased. In 2010, military progress, 
‘War on Terror’, sectarian violence, terrorist attacks particularly in Swat and South Waziristan appeared 
and army activity), while other human security to have encouraged/increased trust in the military 
concerns are also identified. as a source of security but in 2011 this confidence 
seems to have faded. Accordingly, in 2010 only 5.8% Freedom from fear
of respondents believed that ‘army activity’ was the The greatest concern raised by respondents in both 
leading threat to individuals’ however, this fear has the 2010 and 2011 surveys was that of terrorist 
risen dramatically to almost 20% in 2011. This is attacks. It is notable however, that this source of 
likely to be because of repeated examples of insecurity has risen in the last year. In 2010, 41.2% 
excessive force being used (resulting in civilian of people considered terrorism to be the primary 
casualties and destruction of property, including fear of individuals but this rose to almost 60% in 
livestock). Surprisingly, 34.1% respondents 2011. This i l lustrates that despite slow 
identified drone attacks as the prominent source of improvements in perceptions of local security and 
individuals’ insecurity. This figure is almost four military successes the spectre of suicide bombings, 
times higher that recorded in 2010 (9.1%).militant rockets, landmine and improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs) remain substantial 
In FATA, Shia Muslims constitute 12% of the total 
concerns.  
population, and in Orkazai and Kurram agencies 
sectarian violence appears to be a significant cause Another striking shift in respondents’ perceptions is 
of individual insecurity. In 2011 survey, this fear was in regard to the ‘War on Terror’. Concern has more 
shared by 17.1% of respondents while this figure than doubled from 14.7% in 2010 to 29.6% in 2011. 
was 14.4% in 2010. It is not clear the extent to which The people of FATA seems to be tired of this conflict; 
these figures represent Sunni and Shia a source of much internal displacement, bloodshed 
perspectives. and the ruining of local economies. Furthermore, a 
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that land disputes could result in the igniting of consequence of direct action in Pakistan.  In spite of 
tribal and/or family clashes. this, the authors are unsure as to the logic of 
ascribing responsibility to nations that are unlikely 
Female FGDs to be providing direct support to suicide bombers 
The majority of female participants clearly but it is a perception that cannot be ignored.
identified land disputes as the main cause of 
Furthermore, the West as a whole remains a conflict in FATA. In addition, property and business 
significant target for blame. In the 2008 and 2009 disputes also generated violence in FATA. 
surveys Western influence was identified by the 
High rates of suicide bombing in Pakistan – who is majority of respondents (50.9% and 33.7% 
responsible? respectively) as being responsible for the high 
The respondents were asked through a multiple levels of suicide attacks in Pakistan. While this 
choice question: ‘who do you think is responsible figure has declined in 2010 and 2011, if the choices 
for the high rates of suicide bombing?’ Aside from of the US and Israel are added to this selection - the 
non-state actors previously identified, the survey total is 69.9% for 2011. This clearly indicates that 
noted that substantial blame was placed on the the majority people in FATA blame for the 
three countries of the US, India and Israel. phenomenon on western countries. In contrast to 
Western perceptions of Saudi Arabia as a source of 
The 2011 survey appears to show a strengthening in 
Talibanisation, FATA respondents considered it to 
the perception of respondents that the US is largely 
have very little influence. 
responsible, because of its actions in Afghanistan; 
43.4% of those interviewed believed this assertion It is surprising that, despite TTP claiming 
to be true, compared to 25.8% in 2010. India, responsibility for many of these terrorist attacks, 
Pakistan’s historic rival, was also thought to be to only 13.7% of respondents believed that they were 
blame by approximately a quarter of respondents – ultimately responsible. This must be ascribed to the 
an increase on the 2010 figure of 13.5%. Israel was fact that survey participants believe that their 
also strongly blamed, with 15.9% of people motivations are inspired by external forces. The 
accusing them of motivating suicide bombing – this perceived responsibility of Al Qaeda is also 
is likely due to their role in international relations surprisingly low, albeit increased from 3.1% in 2010 
and repression of Palestinians rather than as a to 7.0% in 2011. This is, in part, due to Al Qaeda 
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that land disputes could result in the igniting of consequence of direct action in Pakistan.  In spite of 
tribal and/or family clashes. this, the authors are unsure as to the logic of 
ascribing responsibility to nations that are unlikely 
Female FGDs to be providing direct support to suicide bombers 
The majority of female participants clearly but it is a perception that cannot be ignored.
identified land disputes as the main cause of 
Furthermore, the West as a whole remains a conflict in FATA. In addition, property and business 
significant target for blame. In the 2008 and 2009 disputes also generated violence in FATA. 
surveys Western influence was identified by the 
High rates of suicide bombing in Pakistan – who is majority of respondents (50.9% and 33.7% 
responsible? respectively) as being responsible for the high 
The respondents were asked through a multiple levels of suicide attacks in Pakistan. While this 
choice question: ‘who do you think is responsible figure has declined in 2010 and 2011, if the choices 
for the high rates of suicide bombing?’ Aside from of the US and Israel are added to this selection - the 
non-state actors previously identified, the survey total is 69.9% for 2011. This clearly indicates that 
noted that substantial blame was placed on the the majority people in FATA blame for the 
three countries of the US, India and Israel. phenomenon on western countries. In contrast to 
Western perceptions of Saudi Arabia as a source of 
The 2011 survey appears to show a strengthening in 
Talibanisation, FATA respondents considered it to 
the perception of respondents that the US is largely 
have very little influence. 
responsible, because of its actions in Afghanistan; 
43.4% of those interviewed believed this assertion It is surprising that, despite TTP claiming 
to be true, compared to 25.8% in 2010. India, responsibility for many of these terrorist attacks, 
Pakistan’s historic rival, was also thought to be to only 13.7% of respondents believed that they were 
blame by approximately a quarter of respondents – ultimately responsible. This must be ascribed to the 
an increase on the 2010 figure of 13.5%. Israel was fact that survey participants believe that their 
also strongly blamed, with 15.9% of people motivations are inspired by external forces. The 
accusing them of motivating suicide bombing – this perceived responsibility of Al Qaeda is also 
is likely due to their role in international relations surprisingly low, albeit increased from 3.1% in 2010 
and repression of Palestinians rather than as a to 7.0% in 2011. This is, in part, due to Al Qaeda 
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The human security concerns of unemployment what the causes of suicide bombing in Pakistan 
and poverty were considered considerable were. In particular: lack of education, extreme 
enabling factors, as prescribed by almost 40% of poverty and insufficient employment and/or 
respondents (22.1% and 17.4% respectively), a economic opportunities were the main causes; 
figure almost double that calculated in 2010. The factors that had allowed militants to exploit youths 
additional concern of lack of education – a further and those disengaged from society. 
freedom from want, human security concern – also 
Some respondents, especially in Bajaur Agency, continued to rank highly; despite dropping from its 
believed that accurate religious education should position as the second most influential enabler (as 
be provided so that the extreme arguments recorded in 2010) it retained considerable impact 
provided by militants would not justify killing for 13.7% of people. These concerns link back to the 
themselves or others. findings detailed in Chapter 1.
Respondents from North Waziristan Agency and Given that over half of FATA respondents identified 
the Frontier Regions of Bannu, Lakki, Tank and DI social problems for facilitating suicide bombing, it is 
Khan also declared that social infrastructure had to somewhat unexpected that social development has 
be improved, because at present, exclusion from lost significance: dropping from 8.2% in 2010 to 
governance mechanisms was sufficient reason to approximately 1.0% in 2011. Irrespective of this, 
explain this violence. Moreover, it was suggested the findings outlined in Chapters 3 and 4 detail that 
that the Government of Pakistan needs to this issue remains of importance to the creation of 
negotiate with the Taliban in order to reduce improved perceptions of security, and will increase 
conflict and by extension the need for suicide potential for greater local inclusion in issues that 
bombing. will generate employment opportunities and 
develop programmes that can address poverty and 
It should be noted that some participants of the 
weaknesses in education provision. 
FGDs were unable to provide an answer. 
Another striking finding is that the FATA people are 
Female FGDs
growing pessimistic of police capabilities, with 
Female participants were not generally conscious 
12.4% of respondents noting this in 2011 compared 
of what weaknesses enabled suicide bombing and 
to 3.4% in the previous year. This clearly indicates 
therefore the majority were unable to provide an 
that confidence in the police has deteriorated; 
answer. 
however, this finding could be considered 
surprising as only 6.9% of respondents consider Of the few voices that were confident enough to 
policing to be the most important service needed in define the causes - poverty, lack of education and 
FATA (see Figure 1.1). Intelligence failings were also insufficient social justice were again identified. In 
identified in FATA as having allowed suicide addition, retaliation/revenge for drone attacks was 
bombing to continue; as instances of terrorism also offered as a reason. 
have increased failure to intercept has inevitably 
increased dissatisfaction. 
These factors reflect a set of internal causes that 
Respondents were also asked to identify the 
recognise local responsibilities for the act of suicide 
geographical source of suicide bombers in FATA. 
bombing and responsibility for preventing these 
While, a significant minority (9.3%) of survey 
acts from being undertaken. This is useful for a 
participants were unable to provide an answer this 
programmatic approach to changing attitudes and 
figure remains lower than was experienced in 2008 
addressing motivations for supporting militant 
and 2009. This indecision may be a direct result of 
actions.
the internal displacement of FATA communities and 
growing frustrations with conflict: meaning that 
Male FGDs
respondents were not confident in attributing a 
Respondents were very vocal in their opinions as to 
Source of suicide bombers
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being considered more of a threat to the West, 
especially US, rather than Pakistan.
Trust in the Pakistan Army (see Figure 3.11) has 
In order to supplement findings relating to suicide 
seen their blame for suicide bombings reduce 
bombing in Pakistan, respondents were asked to 
considerably from 13.1% in 2008 to just 0.5% in 
define what factors have enabled suicide bombing 
2010. While the 2011 survey has shown a marginal 
to continue in Pakistan. In both 2010 and 2011, 
increase in those that attribute blame on the 
survey findings reveal a mixed attitude towards 
military, it remains very low (1.2%). 
internal and external influences, but with some 
changes on emphasis. This section will focus on A large percentage of the respondents, 22.3% in the 
internal contributions.2011 survey, were unable to provide an opinion.    
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The human security concerns of unemployment what the causes of suicide bombing in Pakistan 
and poverty were considered considerable were. In particular: lack of education, extreme 
enabling factors, as prescribed by almost 40% of poverty and insufficient employment and/or 
respondents (22.1% and 17.4% respectively), a economic opportunities were the main causes; 
figure almost double that calculated in 2010. The factors that had allowed militants to exploit youths 
additional concern of lack of education – a further and those disengaged from society. 
freedom from want, human security concern – also 
Some respondents, especially in Bajaur Agency, continued to rank highly; despite dropping from its 
believed that accurate religious education should position as the second most influential enabler (as 
be provided so that the extreme arguments recorded in 2010) it retained considerable impact 
provided by militants would not justify killing for 13.7% of people. These concerns link back to the 
themselves or others. findings detailed in Chapter 1.
Respondents from North Waziristan Agency and Given that over half of FATA respondents identified 
the Frontier Regions of Bannu, Lakki, Tank and DI social problems for facilitating suicide bombing, it is 
Khan also declared that social infrastructure had to somewhat unexpected that social development has 
be improved, because at present, exclusion from lost significance: dropping from 8.2% in 2010 to 
governance mechanisms was sufficient reason to approximately 1.0% in 2011. Irrespective of this, 
explain this violence. Moreover, it was suggested the findings outlined in Chapters 3 and 4 detail that 
that the Government of Pakistan needs to this issue remains of importance to the creation of 
negotiate with the Taliban in order to reduce improved perceptions of security, and will increase 
conflict and by extension the need for suicide potential for greater local inclusion in issues that 
bombing. will generate employment opportunities and 
develop programmes that can address poverty and 
It should be noted that some participants of the 
weaknesses in education provision. 
FGDs were unable to provide an answer. 
Another striking finding is that the FATA people are 
Female FGDs
growing pessimistic of police capabilities, with 
Female participants were not generally conscious 
12.4% of respondents noting this in 2011 compared 
of what weaknesses enabled suicide bombing and 
to 3.4% in the previous year. This clearly indicates 
therefore the majority were unable to provide an 
that confidence in the police has deteriorated; 
answer. 
however, this finding could be considered 
surprising as only 6.9% of respondents consider Of the few voices that were confident enough to 
policing to be the most important service needed in define the causes - poverty, lack of education and 
FATA (see Figure 1.1). Intelligence failings were also insufficient social justice were again identified. In 
identified in FATA as having allowed suicide addition, retaliation/revenge for drone attacks was 
bombing to continue; as instances of terrorism also offered as a reason. 
have increased failure to intercept has inevitably 
increased dissatisfaction. 
These factors reflect a set of internal causes that 
Respondents were also asked to identify the 
recognise local responsibilities for the act of suicide 
geographical source of suicide bombers in FATA. 
bombing and responsibility for preventing these 
While, a significant minority (9.3%) of survey 
acts from being undertaken. This is useful for a 
participants were unable to provide an answer this 
programmatic approach to changing attitudes and 
figure remains lower than was experienced in 2008 
addressing motivations for supporting militant 
and 2009. This indecision may be a direct result of 
actions.
the internal displacement of FATA communities and 
growing frustrations with conflict: meaning that 
Male FGDs
respondents were not confident in attributing a 
Respondents were very vocal in their opinions as to 
Source of suicide bombers
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being considered more of a threat to the West, 
especially US, rather than Pakistan.
Trust in the Pakistan Army (see Figure 3.11) has 
In order to supplement findings relating to suicide 
seen their blame for suicide bombings reduce 
bombing in Pakistan, respondents were asked to 
considerably from 13.1% in 2008 to just 0.5% in 
define what factors have enabled suicide bombing 
2010. While the 2011 survey has shown a marginal 
to continue in Pakistan. In both 2010 and 2011, 
increase in those that attribute blame on the 
survey findings reveal a mixed attitude towards 
military, it remains very low (1.2%). 
internal and external influences, but with some 
changes on emphasis. This section will focus on A large percentage of the respondents, 22.3% in the 
internal contributions.2011 survey, were unable to provide an opinion.    
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the nations considered responsible for suicide 
bombing - are considered by the majority to be the 
In this section opinions towards security providers source of the bombers. Interestingly, the focus on 
in FATA are explored. In Chapter 3 (Figure 3.11) a India has decreased from 28.7% in 2010 while 
question regarding trust was asked of respondents. accusations towards the West have increased from 
The findings showed that the Army (17.9%) and the 4.9%. Moreover, it is compelling that despite 
Frontier Corps (8.1%) are the most trusted suspicions being levelled towards these countries, 
institutions in FATA. In contrast traditional leaders desire for increased international assistance in 
(i.e. teachers, Political Agents and Mullahs) are addressing concerns in FATA was also found to have 
losing support, with the exception of tribal elders.risen in this survey (see Figure 1.4 and 1.5).
Attitudes towards India appear to be based on their Security providers in FATA
investing hugely in Afghanistan; this has compelled Survey participants were first asked: ‘which of the 
some Pakistani politicians to accuse their rival of following institutions do you believe should 
using Afghanistan as a means of disrupting ultimately be responsible for security in FATA?’ 
Pakistan. These claims have undoubtedly affected Respondents were allowed to choose more than 
perceptions. one security provider.
Arguably, the most surprising finding is that only a From the data it is apparent that the military has the 
minority of respondents believe that suicide support of more than half (52.9%) of the 
bombers originate in FATA (6.0%) or other parts of respondents. Other security providers endorsed by 
Pakistan (6.2%). This is striking as the evidence survey participants are tribal communities/ 
documented in Figure 4.10 above, on ‘factors Lashkars (42.4%), Khasadars and levies (41.4%) and 
enabling suicide bombers’, focuses in large part on the Frontier Corps (33.8%). This shows that 
local, internal, reasons and only a minority identify conventional security providers and traditional 
external influences. Attention must be placed on FATA mechanisms are perceived to share 
trying to understand this discrepancy in the responsibility for providing security. 
findings.
In 2010, when only one provider could be selected, 
Male FGDs a minority of respondents (15%) believed the 
military were ultimately responsible for security in In accordance with the data in Figure 4.12 the 
FATA. Instead, respondents preferred to trust the overwhelming majority of participants were unsure 
Frontier Corps (31%) and the traditional where suicide bombers originated. However, some 
mechanisms of tribal communities/Lakhkars (24%) identified Afghanistan while others blamed the 
and Khasadars and levies (23%). Comparing this Taliban. Notably, the Government of Pakistan was 
data with 2011 is not entirely useful as a different also accused of being responsible for sourcing 
methodology was used in the survey but it remains bombers.
illustrative of the growing legitimacy of the military 
Female FGDs in FATA. 
Again the majority were unable to answer this 
question. Female focus group members from Male FGDs
The majority  of male participants identified the Orakzai Agency were of the opinion that local 
Pakistan Army and Lashkars as the institutions Taliban groups were responsible for grooming 
ultimately responsible for providing security in suicide bombers in FATA (and elsewhere in 
FATA. However, the capability of Lashkars to provide Pakistan). 
security against the militant threat was questioned.
Also, as with the male FGDs, some elements 
blamed the Government of Pakistan for sourcing Female FGDs
suicide bombers. Knowledge of the different security providers was 
limited among female participants but focus group 
4.4  Opinion on security providers
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homeland to suicide bombers.  geographical source of bombers). This attribution 
builds on a growing trend of blame being associated 
Of the 60% of respondents that could answer, with Afghanistan (16.0% in 2008, 14.5% in 2009 and 
increased numbers (28.4%) are associating 21.2% in 2010). 
bombers with Afghanistan (i.e. a figure that equates 
almost half of those confident in identifying the The West (14.6%), India (21.3%) and Israel (0.2%) – 
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The majority  of male participants identified the Orakzai Agency were of the opinion that local 
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builds on a growing trend of blame being associated 
Of the 60% of respondents that could answer, with Afghanistan (16.0% in 2008, 14.5% in 2009 and 
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militants, and later being found dead. 
Male FGDs
Despite the acknowledgement of the impact of 
military operations and resulting displacement the 
majority of participants echoed the findings of the 
survey – with the Pakistani military being identified 
as the most trustworthy security provider. Tribal 
elders were also identified. 
Others opined that if Khasadars were properly 
trained, trust in this traditional force’s ability to 
maintain law and order would increase.
Female FGDs
Female respondents in the majority of focus groups 
identified the Pakistani military and the Frontier 
studies of their performance are mixed: Lashkars 
Corps as their most trusted security institutions in 
were raised in Waziristan, Orakzai, Mohmand, 
FATA. However, some concerns were also expressed 
Bajaur Agencies and the FR Peshawar (with the 
in the Frontier Regions of Peshawar and Kohat as it 
support of government) but they were unable to 
was stated that they were never around to come to 
protect the hundreds of Maliks/tribal leaders 
the rescue when needed. 
targeted, humiliated and killed by militants. In 
comparison, Lashkars from Salarzai tribe (Bajaur Female respondents from Kurram Agency shared 
Agency) and Molvi Nazir (South Waziristan Agency) that they had no local Lakhkar to turn to; therefore 
have proved successful in opposing militants. These they were reliant on governmental institutions for 
differences in levels of success may be the reason their security. Participants from this tribal area 
that one-fifth of respondents were unable to share were nevertheless scathing in their attitudes 
their opinion. towards the Frontier Corps capabilities. 
Khasadars and leviesHow do you rate the performance of security 
Khasadars and levies operate as a local police force 
providers in FATA?  
under the authority of the Political Administration. 
Expanding on the above questions regarding 
They are recruited from local tribes on a quota 
security providers in FATA, the survey sought to 
basis, depending on the size and political influence 
record opinions on the effectiveness of these 
of the tribe. 
organisations in the eyes of tribal communities. 
Despite diminishing trust in Khasadars and levies 
Tribal communities / Lashkars
(see Figure 4.16) they are again seen to be effective 
Starting with traditional mechanisms, respondents 
in what they do: over half of respondents 
were asked to consider the effectiveness of tribal 
considered them to be excellent (18.0%) or good 
communities/Lashkars. Over half of respondents 
(36.9%). A further 17.9% perceived their 
looked positively on their performance, with 23.6% 
performance to be satisfactory. Again only a 
rating it as excellent and 38.8% as good. For a 
minority of survey participants were dissatisfied 
f u r t h e r  1 0 . 5 %  o f  r e s p o n d e n t s ,  t r i b a l  
(12.3%) but it is notable that this figure is more than 
c o m m u n i t i e s / L a s h ka r s  h a d  p e r fo r m e d  
d o u b l e  t h a t  e x p r e s s e d  o f  t r i b a l  
satisfactorily. Only a 5.6% of respondents opined 
communities/Lakhakars (see Figure 4.15).
that their performance had been poor. 
The data is again encouraging but is likely to be 
Respondents’ perceptions on tribal communities/ 
reflective of Khasadars’ role of maintaining routine 
Lashkars are evidently quite positive; however, case 
law and order rather than their role against 
Excellent Good Satisfactory Poor Don’t know
2011 (%)
Figure 4.15: How do you rate the performance 
of Tribal communities / Lakhkars?
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participants were able to identify the Pakistan Army 
and Khasadars as the institutions most expected to 
act as security providers. 
Which security provider do you trust? 
Building on the question of trust asked in Chapter 3 
and perceptions of responsibility for security 
(Figure 4.13) - survey participants were asked to 
choose which security provider they considered 
most trustworthy. 
Given the improving attitude of people from FATA 
towards the military it is unsurprising that they 
received the greatest approval. 36.6% of 
respondents voted the military as the service 
provider they most trusted, replacing the 
traditional mechanisms that had been considered 
to have greater legitimacy in 2010. Of these 
historical methods tribal communities/ Lashkars 
were most trusted, as chosen by 25.43% of 
respondents. 
It is worrying that levels of trust in Khasadars and 
levies (13.8%) and Frontier Corps (7.0%) is so low in questions being raised over their capacity and 
comparison to the security responsibility they are motivation to perform what is expected of them. 
expected to undertake (see Figure 4.14). This There have been instances, for example, of Frontier 
diminishing of trust may, in part, be due to Corps and Khasadar personnel being abducted by 
Tribal
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militants, and later being found dead. 
Male FGDs
Despite the acknowledgement of the impact of 
military operations and resulting displacement the 
majority of participants echoed the findings of the 
survey – with the Pakistani military being identified 
as the most trustworthy security provider. Tribal 
elders were also identified. 
Others opined that if Khasadars were properly 
trained, trust in this traditional force’s ability to 
maintain law and order would increase.
Female FGDs
Female respondents in the majority of focus groups 
identified the Pakistani military and the Frontier 
studies of their performance are mixed: Lashkars 
Corps as their most trusted security institutions in 
were raised in Waziristan, Orakzai, Mohmand, 
FATA. However, some concerns were also expressed 
Bajaur Agencies and the FR Peshawar (with the 
in the Frontier Regions of Peshawar and Kohat as it 
support of government) but they were unable to 
was stated that they were never around to come to 
protect the hundreds of Maliks/tribal leaders 
the rescue when needed. 
targeted, humiliated and killed by militants. In 
comparison, Lashkars from Salarzai tribe (Bajaur Female respondents from Kurram Agency shared 
Agency) and Molvi Nazir (South Waziristan Agency) that they had no local Lakhkar to turn to; therefore 
have proved successful in opposing militants. These they were reliant on governmental institutions for 
differences in levels of success may be the reason their security. Participants from this tribal area 
that one-fifth of respondents were unable to share were nevertheless scathing in their attitudes 
their opinion. towards the Frontier Corps capabilities. 
Khasadars and leviesHow do you rate the performance of security 
Khasadars and levies operate as a local police force 
providers in FATA?  
under the authority of the Political Administration. 
Expanding on the above questions regarding 
They are recruited from local tribes on a quota 
security providers in FATA, the survey sought to 
basis, depending on the size and political influence 
record opinions on the effectiveness of these 
of the tribe. 
organisations in the eyes of tribal communities. 
Despite diminishing trust in Khasadars and levies 
Tribal communities / Lashkars
(see Figure 4.16) they are again seen to be effective 
Starting with traditional mechanisms, respondents 
in what they do: over half of respondents 
were asked to consider the effectiveness of tribal 
considered them to be excellent (18.0%) or good 
communities/Lashkars. Over half of respondents 
(36.9%). A further 17.9% perceived their 
looked positively on their performance, with 23.6% 
performance to be satisfactory. Again only a 
rating it as excellent and 38.8% as good. For a 
minority of survey participants were dissatisfied 
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(12.3%) but it is notable that this figure is more than 
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satisfactorily. Only a 5.6% of respondents opined 
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that their performance had been poor. 
The data is again encouraging but is likely to be 
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participants were able to identify the Pakistan Army 
and Khasadars as the institutions most expected to 
act as security providers. 
Which security provider do you trust? 
Building on the question of trust asked in Chapter 3 
and perceptions of responsibility for security 
(Figure 4.13) - survey participants were asked to 
choose which security provider they considered 
most trustworthy. 
Given the improving attitude of people from FATA 
towards the military it is unsurprising that they 
received the greatest approval. 36.6% of 
respondents voted the military as the service 
provider they most trusted, replacing the 
traditional mechanisms that had been considered 
to have greater legitimacy in 2010. Of these 
historical methods tribal communities/ Lashkars 
were most trusted, as chosen by 25.43% of 
respondents. 
It is worrying that levels of trust in Khasadars and 
levies (13.8%) and Frontier Corps (7.0%) is so low in questions being raised over their capacity and 
comparison to the security responsibility they are motivation to perform what is expected of them. 
expected to undertake (see Figure 4.14). This There have been instances, for example, of Frontier 
diminishing of trust may, in part, be due to Corps and Khasadar personnel being abducted by 
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attitude compounded by data showing that the Training the Frontier Corps with international 
number of people questioning their potential had assistance
risen to 17.9% (from 14.1% in 2010). As has been noted, insurgent groups in FATA are 
often better equipped than the security providers 
(including the Frontier Corps) they are fighting. This 
combined with the ideological drive of insurgents 
has made them very difficult to oppose.
Following 9/11, the international community - led 
by the US, has offered technical and financial 
assistance to Pakistan to improve the capacity of 
the Frontier Corps. As a consequence, the 2011 
survey has sought to document attitudes towards 
Frontier Corps’ effectiveness would alter if 
international assistance supported training. It will 
also show the legitimacy attached to outside help 
by FATA people. Consequently, respondents were 
asked: ‘if trained with the aid of international 
assistance, would you have more or less confidence 
People in FATA appear, to some extent, to be in the ability of the Frontier Corps to do their job?’ 
growing disillusioned with attempts to end the 
A dramatic downturn can be seen between the insurgency by organisations other than the military. 
2010 and 2011 surveys. In 2010 more than half of Yet, if capacity concerns can be addressed (see 
the respondents (52.4%) interviewed were of the Figure 4.21) the value of the Frontier Corps in the 
opinion that international assistance would greatly eyes of the FATA population is likely to be 
benefit the Frontier Corps, but in 2011 this opinion maintained. This is exemplified by the attitudes 
had dropped to approximately one-quarter expressed in male FGDs, where it was noted that 
19
(24.7%).  A deterioration in opinion compounded since the recruits were Pakhtun they were best 
by the finding that 15% of respondents had no placed to provide security inside FATA. 
2011 (%)
Figure 4.19: Do you think the Frontier Corps plays a
valuable role in providing security in FATA?
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Figure 4.20: If trained with the aid of international assistance, would you have more or less confidence in the ability of 
the Frontier Corps to do their job? 
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 It should be noted that in male FGDs the majority of respondents believed that international assistance was essential, but only 
if it was offered without conditions.
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institution able to oppose militant violence.
The data recorded shows that a significant majority 
of respondents believe the military to be 
performing positively. In excess of 70% of 
respondents view their effectiveness as being 
either excellent (42.1%) or good (29.6%) In 
comparison to just 6.3% that perceive it as being 
poor.
The Frontier Corps 
Frontier Corps comprises Pakhtuns from KPK and 
FATA. They are provided with training and 
equipment to oppose militants, in combination 
with the military. While trust in the Frontier Corps is 
low (see Figure 4.14) attitudes towards their 
performance are more encouraging with over 60% 
militants. People in FATA remain nervous of the of respondents endorsing their effectiveness to 
national police system (see Figure 4.21) and have some extent.
vigorously opposed attempts to extend its 
influence in FATA. This viewpoint may have had 
some bearing on the findings documented in the 
survey.
In spite of the satisfaction offered by respondents, 
it is probable that Khasadars and levies are 
insufficiently trained and organised to provide 
effective leadership in the fight against militancy. 
The military
Moving on to governmental security providers – 
despite initial scepticism felt towards the military - 
successes in Swat and to some extent in Bajaur have 
helped change perceptions of their value within 
FATA. They appear to be trusted as the only In spite of this, some uncertainty remains as to their 
performance with over a quarter of respondent not 
being able to provide an opinion. 
Frontier Corps (FC) and security in FATA
As attitudes towards the Frontier Corps appeared 
to be contradictory, in terms of their ability and 
effectiveness, respondents were further asked the 
question: ‘do you think the Frontier Corps plays a 
valuable role in providing security in FATA?’
This question, when asked in 2010, noted that the 
68.9% believed the Frontier Corps could play a vital 
role in providing security in FATA; in 2011 this 
conviction had dropped considerably, while still 
maintaining a majority, to 52.2%. A change in 
2011 (%)
Figure 4.16: Performance of Khasadars and levies
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attitude compounded by data showing that the Training the Frontier Corps with international 
number of people questioning their potential had assistance
risen to 17.9% (from 14.1% in 2010). As has been noted, insurgent groups in FATA are 
often better equipped than the security providers 
(including the Frontier Corps) they are fighting. This 
combined with the ideological drive of insurgents 
has made them very difficult to oppose.
Following 9/11, the international community - led 
by the US, has offered technical and financial 
assistance to Pakistan to improve the capacity of 
the Frontier Corps. As a consequence, the 2011 
survey has sought to document attitudes towards 
Frontier Corps’ effectiveness would alter if 
international assistance supported training. It will 
also show the legitimacy attached to outside help 
by FATA people. Consequently, respondents were 
asked: ‘if trained with the aid of international 
assistance, would you have more or less confidence 
People in FATA appear, to some extent, to be in the ability of the Frontier Corps to do their job?’ 
growing disillusioned with attempts to end the 
A dramatic downturn can be seen between the insurgency by organisations other than the military. 
2010 and 2011 surveys. In 2010 more than half of Yet, if capacity concerns can be addressed (see 
the respondents (52.4%) interviewed were of the Figure 4.21) the value of the Frontier Corps in the 
opinion that international assistance would greatly eyes of the FATA population is likely to be 
benefit the Frontier Corps, but in 2011 this opinion maintained. This is exemplified by the attitudes 
had dropped to approximately one-quarter expressed in male FGDs, where it was noted that 
19
(24.7%).  A deterioration in opinion compounded since the recruits were Pakhtun they were best 
by the finding that 15% of respondents had no placed to provide security inside FATA. 
2011 (%)
Figure 4.19: Do you think the Frontier Corps plays a
valuable role in providing security in FATA?
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Figure 4.20: If trained with the aid of international assistance, would you have more or less confidence in the ability of 
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 It should be noted that in male FGDs the majority of respondents believed that international assistance was essential, but only 
if it was offered without conditions.
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institution able to oppose militant violence.
The data recorded shows that a significant majority 
of respondents believe the military to be 
performing positively. In excess of 70% of 
respondents view their effectiveness as being 
either excellent (42.1%) or good (29.6%) In 
comparison to just 6.3% that perceive it as being 
poor.
The Frontier Corps 
Frontier Corps comprises Pakhtuns from KPK and 
FATA. They are provided with training and 
equipment to oppose militants, in combination 
with the military. While trust in the Frontier Corps is 
low (see Figure 4.14) attitudes towards their 
performance are more encouraging with over 60% 
militants. People in FATA remain nervous of the of respondents endorsing their effectiveness to 
national police system (see Figure 4.21) and have some extent.
vigorously opposed attempts to extend its 
influence in FATA. This viewpoint may have had 
some bearing on the findings documented in the 
survey.
In spite of the satisfaction offered by respondents, 
it is probable that Khasadars and levies are 
insufficiently trained and organised to provide 
effective leadership in the fight against militancy. 
The military
Moving on to governmental security providers – 
despite initial scepticism felt towards the military - 
successes in Swat and to some extent in Bajaur have 
helped change perceptions of their value within 
FATA. They appear to be trusted as the only In spite of this, some uncertainty remains as to their 
performance with over a quarter of respondent not 
being able to provide an opinion. 
Frontier Corps (FC) and security in FATA
As attitudes towards the Frontier Corps appeared 
to be contradictory, in terms of their ability and 
effectiveness, respondents were further asked the 
question: ‘do you think the Frontier Corps plays a 
valuable role in providing security in FATA?’
This question, when asked in 2010, noted that the 
68.9% believed the Frontier Corps could play a vital 
role in providing security in FATA; in 2011 this 
conviction had dropped considerably, while still 
maintaining a majority, to 52.2%. A change in 
2011 (%)
Figure 4.16: Performance of Khasadars and levies
E
x
c
e
ll
e
n
t
G
o
o
d
S
a
ti
s
fa
c
to
ry
P
o
o
r
D
o
n
’t
 k
n
o
w
1
8
.0
3
6
.9
1
7
.9
1
2
.3 1
5
.0
lle
Ex
ce
nt
G
o
o
d
a
Sa
ti
sf
ct
o
ry
Po
o
r
o
o
D
n’
t 
kn
w
2011 (%)
Figure 4.17: Performance of Military
4
2
.1
2
9
.6
7
.2
6
.3
1
4
.8
Excellent Good Satisfactory Poor Don’t know
2011 (%)
Figure 4.18: Performance of the Frontier Corps
2
9
.5
2
8
.7
8
.3
8
.0
2
5
.6
Understanding FATA76
in greater detail, to elicit the specific aspects of their of the sample. Furthermore, the figure does not 
operations that are perceived to have legitimacy in account for those who remain displaced or have 
FATA, and those aspects that are less approved of. resettled outside of FATA.
To aid this analysis, data is presented per Agency/FR The degree of dislocation varies markedly by 
to illustrate how different tribal areas have reacted Agency/FR - Figure 4.23 shows these statistics for 
to the military and the tactics they have employed. 2011, thus, illustrating which areas have been most 
affected by conflict. 
Forced migration from FATA
From this disaggregation it is clear that some tribal One of the impacts of the conflicts has been forced 
areas are more secure than others. Information migration. Those people who suffered forced 
given by respondents from FR DI Khan (70.0%), migration would be one sub-set to compare with 
Orakzai Agency (59.3%) and FR Tank (53.8%) signify others who had not been forced to leave. This is an 
that these areas have been particularly vulnerable important intervening variable in public opinion.
to internal displacement. Furthermore the areas of 
Due to the on-going insurgency in parts of FATA, Kurram Agency (24.6%), Bajaur Agency (21.8%), FR 
significant numbers of tribal communities have Kohat (20.0%) and FR Bannu (16.3%) all registered 
been forced to flee their homes and settle in either: percentages close to the overall average. The 
IDP camps; host communities in adjacent districts remaining areas appear more secure, particularly in 
or major Pakistan cities outside of FATA. The survey FR Lakki (0.0%), FR Peshawar (1.3%), Khyber Agency 
initially sought to measure the extent to which (3.8%) and Mohmand Agency (3.9%). 
displacement had affected respondents. In 2011, 
747 (18.7%) people out of total sample of 4,000 had Male FGDs
been affected. This was a reduction from the 22.3% Most of the participants from the Bajaur Agency 
recorded in 2010 but remains a troubling statistic, FGD informed the survey team that they had had to 
on average one in five survey participants have leave their homes during the conducting of military 
been forced to leave their homes at some point in operations in their respective areas. Respondents 
the last two years. It must also be stressed that for a from North Waziristan also shared that they had 
large numbers of respondents, this displacement is had to leave because of the threat posed by 
likely to be have been undertaken with other family militants and drone attacks. 
members; therefore it could be argued that the 
Participants from the Frontier Regions of Peshawar, data should be understood as referring to 747 
Khyber Agency and Kohat advised that they had not families and their dependents rather than 
been forced to leave their homes. The findings from individuals in 2011 - depending on the composition 
Peshawar and Khyber were unsurprising given the 
findings in Figure 4.23 but are notable for Kohat, 
given that 20% of those surveyed had been 
displaced in the past year: this implies that 
vulnerability is also unequal within tribal areas. 
Similarly some respondents from Mohamand 
Agency confirmed that they had been forced to 
leave their villages because of military operations, 
showing that again certain areas within a tribal 
region may be more insecure than implied in the 
table above. 
Female FGDs
In contrast to the findings from the male FGDs, 
female participants from the Frontier Region of 
Peshawar and Kohat Agency had been displaced 
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Figure 4.22: Have you been forced to leave your 
home during the past years?
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confidence that internationally assisted training were  inv i ted  to  make  more  than  one  
offered benefit to the Frontier Corps. This is likely recommendation from the options offered to them.
due to the perceived failure, to date, of the Frontier 
The option that received the most support (44.6%) Corps, which has already received some 
was: more troops should be deployed in FATA. This is international assistance to operate with the trust of 
unsurprising given the positive attitude held tribal communities in FATA.
towards the military (see Figure 4.14 and 4.17). In 
This change could also be seen as an endorsement addition, one-third of respondents (35.2%) 
of Pakistani-led training. The success of the Pakistan believed that local communities/Lashkars should be 
Army has possibly indicated that Pakistani strengthened; an outcome that would allow for a 
professionals are just as capable, if not more so, of traditional conflict resolution mechanism to 
training their compatriots. It must be noted adequately face the challenges of the Taliban and 
however, that almost one-third (29.7%) of other militant groups in FATA. A similar number of 
respondents were undecided, so international respondents desired improvements in the training 
assistance may still be supported if implemented and equipment to the Khasadars and Frontier 
well and with apparent successes. Corps services. 
In summary, the people of FATA appear to The possibility of extending a more conventional 
appreciate the value of local forces being active in police system to FATA proved less than popular, as it 
providing security in FATA but there is a recognised was an option only endorsed by 8.4% of 
need for the Frontier Corps to be strengthened. respondents. This signifies that traditional law and 
While international support may be of some actual order mechanisms remain the most legitimate form 
benefit, perceptions appear to show a reversal in of policing in FATA. 
trust regarding its effectiveness.
How could your sense of security be 
improved? 
Following on the question on the present In the previous section it has been narrated that, 
effectiveness of security providers, respondents generally the people of FATA are supportive of the 
were asked how these institutions could improve various security providers that they have interacted 
their performance in FATA. Survey participants with. The survey subsequently looks at the military 
4.5 Support for the military and the 
tactics they employ
Deploy more 
troops in FATA
Strengthen local
communities/
Lakhkars 
Improve the 
capabilities 
of the Frontier 
Corps and Khasadar/
levies forces
Extend 
conventional
police system 
to FATA
Other (specify) No response
2011 (%)
Figure 4.21: How could your sense of security be improved? 
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in greater detail, to elicit the specific aspects of their of the sample. Furthermore, the figure does not 
operations that are perceived to have legitimacy in account for those who remain displaced or have 
FATA, and those aspects that are less approved of. resettled outside of FATA.
To aid this analysis, data is presented per Agency/FR The degree of dislocation varies markedly by 
to illustrate how different tribal areas have reacted Agency/FR - Figure 4.23 shows these statistics for 
to the military and the tactics they have employed. 2011, thus, illustrating which areas have been most 
affected by conflict. 
Forced migration from FATA
From this disaggregation it is clear that some tribal One of the impacts of the conflicts has been forced 
areas are more secure than others. Information migration. Those people who suffered forced 
given by respondents from FR DI Khan (70.0%), migration would be one sub-set to compare with 
Orakzai Agency (59.3%) and FR Tank (53.8%) signify others who had not been forced to leave. This is an 
that these areas have been particularly vulnerable important intervening variable in public opinion.
to internal displacement. Furthermore the areas of 
Due to the on-going insurgency in parts of FATA, Kurram Agency (24.6%), Bajaur Agency (21.8%), FR 
significant numbers of tribal communities have Kohat (20.0%) and FR Bannu (16.3%) all registered 
been forced to flee their homes and settle in either: percentages close to the overall average. The 
IDP camps; host communities in adjacent districts remaining areas appear more secure, particularly in 
or major Pakistan cities outside of FATA. The survey FR Lakki (0.0%), FR Peshawar (1.3%), Khyber Agency 
initially sought to measure the extent to which (3.8%) and Mohmand Agency (3.9%). 
displacement had affected respondents. In 2011, 
747 (18.7%) people out of total sample of 4,000 had Male FGDs
been affected. This was a reduction from the 22.3% Most of the participants from the Bajaur Agency 
recorded in 2010 but remains a troubling statistic, FGD informed the survey team that they had had to 
on average one in five survey participants have leave their homes during the conducting of military 
been forced to leave their homes at some point in operations in their respective areas. Respondents 
the last two years. It must also be stressed that for a from North Waziristan also shared that they had 
large numbers of respondents, this displacement is had to leave because of the threat posed by 
likely to be have been undertaken with other family militants and drone attacks. 
members; therefore it could be argued that the 
Participants from the Frontier Regions of Peshawar, data should be understood as referring to 747 
Khyber Agency and Kohat advised that they had not families and their dependents rather than 
been forced to leave their homes. The findings from individuals in 2011 - depending on the composition 
Peshawar and Khyber were unsurprising given the 
findings in Figure 4.23 but are notable for Kohat, 
given that 20% of those surveyed had been 
displaced in the past year: this implies that 
vulnerability is also unequal within tribal areas. 
Similarly some respondents from Mohamand 
Agency confirmed that they had been forced to 
leave their villages because of military operations, 
showing that again certain areas within a tribal 
region may be more insecure than implied in the 
table above. 
Female FGDs
In contrast to the findings from the male FGDs, 
female participants from the Frontier Region of 
Peshawar and Kohat Agency had been displaced 
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Figure 4.22: Have you been forced to leave your 
home during the past years?
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confidence that internationally assisted training were  inv i ted  to  make  more  than  one  
offered benefit to the Frontier Corps. This is likely recommendation from the options offered to them.
due to the perceived failure, to date, of the Frontier 
The option that received the most support (44.6%) Corps, which has already received some 
was: more troops should be deployed in FATA. This is international assistance to operate with the trust of 
unsurprising given the positive attitude held tribal communities in FATA.
towards the military (see Figure 4.14 and 4.17). In 
This change could also be seen as an endorsement addition, one-third of respondents (35.2%) 
of Pakistani-led training. The success of the Pakistan believed that local communities/Lashkars should be 
Army has possibly indicated that Pakistani strengthened; an outcome that would allow for a 
professionals are just as capable, if not more so, of traditional conflict resolution mechanism to 
training their compatriots. It must be noted adequately face the challenges of the Taliban and 
however, that almost one-third (29.7%) of other militant groups in FATA. A similar number of 
respondents were undecided, so international respondents desired improvements in the training 
assistance may still be supported if implemented and equipment to the Khasadars and Frontier 
well and with apparent successes. Corps services. 
In summary, the people of FATA appear to The possibility of extending a more conventional 
appreciate the value of local forces being active in police system to FATA proved less than popular, as it 
providing security in FATA but there is a recognised was an option only endorsed by 8.4% of 
need for the Frontier Corps to be strengthened. respondents. This signifies that traditional law and 
While international support may be of some actual order mechanisms remain the most legitimate form 
benefit, perceptions appear to show a reversal in of policing in FATA. 
trust regarding its effectiveness.
How could your sense of security be 
improved? 
Following on the question on the present In the previous section it has been narrated that, 
effectiveness of security providers, respondents generally the people of FATA are supportive of the 
were asked how these institutions could improve various security providers that they have interacted 
their performance in FATA. Survey participants with. The survey subsequently looks at the military 
4.5 Support for the military and the 
tactics they employ
Deploy more 
troops in FATA
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communities/
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capabilities 
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Figure 4.21: How could your sense of security be improved? 
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area, close to Hayatabad town. While still remaining higher at between 847,400 - 1,338,000. These 
an important destination, the number of IDPs figures suggest that the people of FATA have been 
seeking sanctuary in Peshawar has reduced from exposed to massive challenges, and that the 
. 20
40 4% in 2010. According to the UNHCR , some insurgency is having a detrimental impact on 
18,789 registered families or 97,052 individuals human and communal development. 
reside in Jalozai camp, with 71% from Bajaur 
Male FGDsagency, 20% from Khyber agency, and 9% from 
Participants from Mohmand stated that when they Mohmand Agency. In addition, an unknown 
had been internally displaced they had moved to number of IDPs from across FATA and KPK are being 
Peshawar or Shabqadar Tehsil in the Charssada hosted in Peshawar. 
District of the KPK where they had spent several 
7.5% of respondents identified Sadda of Kurram months in IDP camps. Focus group participants 
Agency as the destination they moved to during from Bajaur, explained that they had travelled to 
their displacement, which was largely as a result of Lower Dir, Charssada or Mardan districts in the KPK. 
sectarian violence. Over the past four years, 
Additionally, those from the frontier regions of between 1,500 and 2,000 Sunni families from the 
Peshawar and Kohat shared that they had migrated Shia dominated Parachinar in Kurram have been 
to each other’s territory. And respondents from displaced to Sadda, a major town with a Sunni 
South Waziristan stated that they had sought safety majority. Conversely, some 2.5% of the local Shia 
in either DI Khan or Tank districts.population have had to migrate in the opposite 
direction Lower Kurram. 
Female FGDs
Female participants shared similar information to DI Khan was also a popular destination, as identified 
that provided during the male FGDs. by 5.5% of respondents in both 2010 and 2011. This 
internal displacement is likely because of conflict in 
How do you rate the level of support you neighbouring South Waziristan, especially from the 
received from Government of Pakistan areas in and around Mehsud. Also, a similar number 
during your displacement?of survey participants identified the District of 
Bannu, close to North Waziristan, which was Building on this understanding, the 747 
identified by 5.2% of those questioned (an increase respondents who had had been internally displaced 
from the 4.3% in 2010). were asked how they rated the support they had 
received from the Government of Pakistan during 
Outside FATA a minority of respondents identified their period of displacement. 
Karachi in the far south of Pakistan, Balochistan to 
the south of FATA, and cities of Punjab in the East. Of the respondents, 255 rated the support they 
were provided as being at least good, of which only 
To estimate the overall scale of population a very small minority of 18 people (or 2.4% of this 
displacements in 2010 and 2011 and the impact on select study) rated government intervention as 
host communities the survey team has sought to excellent.
compare the sample percentage of 18.7% 
displacement with both the latest official Troublingly, half of the sample (49.1%) held a 
population estimates for FATA (4 million; 1998 negative opinion of governmental initiatives to 
Census) and the estimate provided by local support them during their displacement. Within 
leadership (6 million). Accordingly, at least 716,000 this figure, the majority – constituting 31.5% of the 
- 1,074,000 people (plus families and dependents, total sample – considered the assistance offered to 
where applicable) may have been forced to leave have been very poor. This finding was further 
their homes in 2011. For 2010, the figures are supported by both male and female focus groups – 
20
 UNHCR IDP Operation in Pakistan- Report 2009
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because of military operations. These experiences (24.6%) of the total number of FATA’s internally 
were shared by participants from the Agencies of displaced, in comparison to just 5.3% the previous 
Mohmand, Bajaur and South Waziristan. year - an increase largely resulting from conflict in 
neighbouring Orakzai Agency. Overall, it is believed 
Focus group participants from Khyber and Orakzai that Kohat has largely accepted IDPs from the 
had not had to move because of fighting, as their Agencies of Orakzai and Kurrum. In response the 
homes had not been vulnerable to fighting. government has set up a local IDP camp where IDPs 
from Orakzai and Kurram agencies are residing. In 
If you were displaced: where did you move to?
addition, an unknown number of IDPs have been 
The survey sought to build on the information 
able to find housing, or where possible, live with 
gathered on displacement by asking the 18.7% that 
family in Kohat. 
had been forced to leave their homes: ‘where did 
you move to?’ The respondents identified close to The second major city identified by respondents 
40 towns/villages/districts and provinces, as well as (17.9%) was Peshawar, the administrative centre 
five main towns/cities. for FATA and provincial capital. In response, large 
IDP camps have been established in the Kacha Garhi 
In 2011, Kohat city/district received a quarter 
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Figure 4.23: Have you been forced to leave your home during the past years? (Break down my agency)
Understanding FATA80
area, close to Hayatabad town. While still remaining higher at between 847,400 - 1,338,000. These 
an important destination, the number of IDPs figures suggest that the people of FATA have been 
seeking sanctuary in Peshawar has reduced from exposed to massive challenges, and that the 
. 20
40 4% in 2010. According to the UNHCR , some insurgency is having a detrimental impact on 
18,789 registered families or 97,052 individuals human and communal development. 
reside in Jalozai camp, with 71% from Bajaur 
Male FGDsagency, 20% from Khyber agency, and 9% from 
Participants from Mohmand stated that when they Mohmand Agency. In addition, an unknown 
had been internally displaced they had moved to number of IDPs from across FATA and KPK are being 
Peshawar or Shabqadar Tehsil in the Charssada hosted in Peshawar. 
District of the KPK where they had spent several 
7.5% of respondents identified Sadda of Kurram months in IDP camps. Focus group participants 
Agency as the destination they moved to during from Bajaur, explained that they had travelled to 
their displacement, which was largely as a result of Lower Dir, Charssada or Mardan districts in the KPK. 
sectarian violence. Over the past four years, 
Additionally, those from the frontier regions of between 1,500 and 2,000 Sunni families from the 
Peshawar and Kohat shared that they had migrated Shia dominated Parachinar in Kurram have been 
to each other’s territory. And respondents from displaced to Sadda, a major town with a Sunni 
South Waziristan stated that they had sought safety majority. Conversely, some 2.5% of the local Shia 
in either DI Khan or Tank districts.population have had to migrate in the opposite 
direction Lower Kurram. 
Female FGDs
Female participants shared similar information to DI Khan was also a popular destination, as identified 
that provided during the male FGDs. by 5.5% of respondents in both 2010 and 2011. This 
internal displacement is likely because of conflict in 
How do you rate the level of support you neighbouring South Waziristan, especially from the 
received from Government of Pakistan areas in and around Mehsud. Also, a similar number 
during your displacement?of survey participants identified the District of 
Bannu, close to North Waziristan, which was Building on this understanding, the 747 
identified by 5.2% of those questioned (an increase respondents who had had been internally displaced 
from the 4.3% in 2010). were asked how they rated the support they had 
received from the Government of Pakistan during 
Outside FATA a minority of respondents identified their period of displacement. 
Karachi in the far south of Pakistan, Balochistan to 
the south of FATA, and cities of Punjab in the East. Of the respondents, 255 rated the support they 
were provided as being at least good, of which only 
To estimate the overall scale of population a very small minority of 18 people (or 2.4% of this 
displacements in 2010 and 2011 and the impact on select study) rated government intervention as 
host communities the survey team has sought to excellent.
compare the sample percentage of 18.7% 
displacement with both the latest official Troublingly, half of the sample (49.1%) held a 
population estimates for FATA (4 million; 1998 negative opinion of governmental initiatives to 
Census) and the estimate provided by local support them during their displacement. Within 
leadership (6 million). Accordingly, at least 716,000 this figure, the majority – constituting 31.5% of the 
- 1,074,000 people (plus families and dependents, total sample – considered the assistance offered to 
where applicable) may have been forced to leave have been very poor. This finding was further 
their homes in 2011. For 2010, the figures are supported by both male and female focus groups – 
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because of military operations. These experiences (24.6%) of the total number of FATA’s internally 
were shared by participants from the Agencies of displaced, in comparison to just 5.3% the previous 
Mohmand, Bajaur and South Waziristan. year - an increase largely resulting from conflict in 
neighbouring Orakzai Agency. Overall, it is believed 
Focus group participants from Khyber and Orakzai that Kohat has largely accepted IDPs from the 
had not had to move because of fighting, as their Agencies of Orakzai and Kurrum. In response the 
homes had not been vulnerable to fighting. government has set up a local IDP camp where IDPs 
from Orakzai and Kurram agencies are residing. In 
If you were displaced: where did you move to?
addition, an unknown number of IDPs have been 
The survey sought to build on the information 
able to find housing, or where possible, live with 
gathered on displacement by asking the 18.7% that 
family in Kohat. 
had been forced to leave their homes: ‘where did 
you move to?’ The respondents identified close to The second major city identified by respondents 
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In 2011, Kohat city/district received a quarter 
59.3%
70.0
20.0%
0.0
1.3%
53.8%
3.8%
24.6%
11.8%
9.3%
80.0%
46.3%
96.2%
75.4%
96.1%
88.2%
90.7%
21.8%
16.3%
3.9%
78.2%
83.8%
98.8%
100.0%
30.0%
40.7%
Orakzai Agency 
Bajaur Agency 
FR Bannu 
FR DI Khan
FR Kohat
FR Lakki
FR Peshawar
FR Tank
Khyber Agency
Kurram Agency
Mohmand Agency 
North Waziristan
South Waziristan
Yes No
Figure 4.23: Have you been forced to leave your home during the past years? (Break down my agency)
Understanding FATA80
where concerns about access to basic human reality that encouraged some political parties, such 
necessities, including food, shelter and security, as: Pakistan Muslim League (N), Jamaat-e-Islamai 
were commonly identified. Also there were (JI), Jamiat e Ulema e Islam (JUI) and Pakistan 
concerns that victims were not being sufficiently Tehrek-e-Insaaf (PTI), to pressurise the government 
compensated for damage or loss of property. to start dialogue with the militants. But as shown by 
Figure 4.26, the military and its operations can be 
seen to have grown in legitimacy.
With regard to 2011, two-thirds of respondents 
(66.8%) supported military operations in FATA, of 
which 36.7% were in full support. This is in 
comparison to 18.5% who oppose them to some 
degree; perhaps motivated by the excessive force 
sometimes used in fighting militants. Reports from 
battlefields show that on occasion, innocent people 
have been caught in the cross-fire, leaving many 
killed or injured; also, much of local infrastructure 
has been destroyed; and local economies 
undermined. 
Nonetheless, it seems clear that the military enjoys 
the support of the majority of people in FATA. This 
gives them a mandate to continue operating in 
FATA, and to oppose the Taliban style of governance 
that threatens Pakhtun culture and society. Based Criticism levelled at the government has not been 
on the same question the survey has sought to restricted to IDPs. The media have also noted that 
disaggregate the information based on tribal areas.conditions of support are generally unsatisfactory. 
Based on this, it can be seen that the military retains From the data recorded it appears that levels of 
support in both areas that have been severely support have been dependent on location. IDPs 
affected by fighting and others that have been less from Swat and Malakand appear to have received 
affected. Bajaur Agency, for example, has been the better treatment as they repatriated within six 
months; while those from Bajaur and Mohmand 
continue to be subjected to hardships and living in 
deplorable conditions. 
It is interesting to note that support for military 
operations is strongest among those that have not 
been victim to displacement, while pessimism is 
most strongly held by those that have been forced 
to leave their homes and communities. 
Military operations in FATA
What do you think of the Pakistan army’s military 
offensive in FATA
There have been more than 15 military offensives 
within FATA against the TTP and other militant 
groups. As has been recorded, military operations 
were viewed with scepticism in the beginning – a 
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Figure 4.24: If you were displaced: where did you move to? (selected)
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location of considerable conflict since August 2008 necessitating the military take greater care in 
– resulting in much destruction to property and respecting the human rights of the communities 
communities; however support for the military they are supposed to be protecting. 
remains high with approximately 70% of 
Support for or opposition to military tacticsrespondents offering their backing. This sentiment 
With regard to the military tactics being used in is shared in Kurram Agency, where some 65% of the 
FATA, the survey asked respondents which form local population support the military operation, 
they would consider most legitimate in fighting. and in Orakzai Agency by approximately 80% of the 
The findings are documented in Figure 4.28. The 280 people questioned. These agencies are also 
first option provided to 4,000 male and female both locations of fighting between militants and 
respondents from FATA, was whether or not they government forces.
would support the Pakistani military pursuing 
In Khyber Agency, where there has been only Taliban, Al Qaeda and foreign fighters inside FATA. 
limited conflict, comprising a low intensity More than half of the respondents, 60.0%, 
operation against Mangal Bagh of Lashkar-e-Islam supported the notion while a quarter of the 
in Bara tehsil, the local population remain respondents (26.0%) opposed it. 10.1% did not 
sympathetic. Of the 760 sample size, 365 know the answer and 4.0% did not share their 
respondents declared at least partial support for opinion. 
military operations in FATA. However, it must be 
From the information collected it is clear that the noted that this support is not universal, as a 
FATA population does not wish to have involvement significant minority (18%) oppose the military, and 
of international military in their territory. This is generally have a strong opinion on the matter.
unsurprising as only limited confidence is recorded 
Greatest opposition to military operations appears over international assistance being offered for 
to be in South Waziristan Agency, where the indirect activities, such as training security 
greatest number of respondents fully opposes army providers operating in FATA. International 
offences in FATA. Overall, 50% of respondents from assistance to the Pakistani military was strongly 
this Agency expressed a negative opinion in opposed by 68% of respondents (and supported by 
response to this question. Notable discontent was less than 5%). This figure rises to some 75% at the 
also held in North Waziristan, where 30% (double suggestion of an independent US military 
the regional average) shared the concern of their intervention in FATA (an option supported by less 
neighbour. than 1%). 
Male FGDs The only option that was seen to have legitimacy 
The FGDs generally support the findings outlined was that the Pakistani military continue to pursue 
above, as participants identified that the military insurgents within FATA, as they have been doing, 
had been positive in countering the activities of free from external interference. This was supported 
militants in their respective tribal areas.  However, by 60% of respondents (the majority of whom did 
some voices of discontent were raised in the so strongly) and universally in male and female 
frontier regions of Peshawar and Kohat, as well as in focus groups. In comparison only about a quarter of 
North Waziristan, where participants opined that survey participants opposed this option.  
the military had had a harmful impact on the poor 
Do you support or oppose the presence of the without addressing the issue of militancy in a 
following groups in FATA?meaningful way.
To further understand FATA attitudes to external 
Female FGDs actors, survey respondents were asked the extent 
Female participants were generally in favour of the to which they supported non-traditional influences 
military offensive in FATA. Representatives from in FATA. 
Bajaur Agency did, however, acknowledge that 
It is evident from the survey questionnaire and many civilians had been killed during fighting: 
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Figure 4.27: What do you think of the Pakistan army’s military offensive in FATA? (breakdown by region)
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Figure 4.27: What do you think of the Pakistan army’s military offensive in FATA? (breakdown by region)
international humanitarian laws because they allowing for these strikes to continue unabated in 
perpetrate what could be defined as extrajudicial FATA. It would be inaccurate however, to state that 
killings; they also violate Pakistan’s sovereignty and residents in FATA are universally opposed to drone 
can be indiscriminate: killing innocent people, attacks. Data outlined in Figure 4.29 and 4.30 show 
including women and children. Over the last two that some support is offered for these attacks, but it 
years, following the election of US president Barak is a very marginal perception. In 2011 only 6% of 
Obama, there has been a significant increase in the respondents considered this military option to be 
number of drone attacks in Pakistan killing some justified, largely in exceptional circumstance. This 
21
2,500 people and injuring a further 207.  Most of support is considered to be held largely in areas 
these attacks have taken place in the Agencies of close to Talibanised regions where the Pakistan 
North Waziristan and South Waziristan, areas Army has been unable to effectively oppose 
suffering from considerable interference from militants.  
Afghan Taliban. It is difficult to judge the overall, 
Survey data shows that 63.0% of respondents were 
value of these attacks on militants in FATA.
of the opinion that drone attacks were never 
These attacks have been greeted with much public justified, an opinion likely influenced by the holding 
condemnation, however, it is alleged that a secret of several peaceful protests and rallies against 
deal has been signed between the US and Pakistan drone attacks over the last year; these have often 
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 Between 29 January 2008 and 16 November 2011 CAMP has recorded 283 drone attacks in FATA, CAMP Database of drone 
attacks 
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FGDs that FATA communities do not desire the that supporting US involvement) supported their 
presence of non-traditional actors. This is presence in FATA. Taliban fighters, either from 
unsurprising given documented historical Afghanistan and Pakistan were also resisted by 
opposition to the Pakistani military (before it gained approximately 75% and 70% respectively. 
legitimacy in recent years) and continued mistrust Interestingly, a small but notable minority of 
in the Pakistan Police infrastructure. respondents supported their presence, particularly 
Pakistani Taliban who were approved by 10% of 
The data documented in Figure 4.29 shows that those interviewed. Female focus groups concurred 
some 85% of respondents opposed the presence of with the negative perceptions of these external 
US military in FATA, in comparison to just 3.7% who groups and added that they had been a direct cause 
were supportive. Almost 10% were unsure whether of hardship in FATA.
US intervention would be beneficial.
US Drone attacks in FATA
Similar attitudes were described with regard to 
Opposition to US involvement in FATA may be 
Arab and foreign Al Qaeda fighters, as 
directly linked to the impact and perceived 
approximately 80% of respondents recorded at 
legitimacy of drone attacks in tribal areas, 
least some opposition; male focus groups opined 
especially in North and South Waziristan. 
that this was in part due to its role in undermining 
Islam. A total of 149 survey participants (equal to Drone attacks are very controversial as they violate 
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been led by political parties (especially the PTI) and However, participants from Lower Kurram 
civil society organisations. Considerable opposition supported these attacks, because they felt they 
to drone attacks is also, in part, a direct result of the were addressing the issue of Talibanisation in FATA; 
fear held by over one-third (34.1%) of respondents a phenomenon that had taken the entire 
that this military intervention (see Figure 4.8) was a population hostage. Therefore, there is a sentiment 
threat to individuals’ security. that if the Pakistan Army was unable to address the 
problem then someone else had to take action. This 
Greatest support for drone attacks was recorded in response goes someway to understanding the data 
the Frontier Regions of Bannu, Lakki and Tank, also for Kurram Agency found in Figure 4.31.
Kurram Agency and North Waziristan – otherwise 
only very limited belief in their justification is Nuclear possession and national security
recorded in FATA. Almost one-third of respondents Pakistan, as a nation, is quite defensive of its 
were not able to provide an opinion. nuclear weapons capability. The survey sought to 
explore how secure the respondents felt about 
Male FGDs
possessing these weapons considering their 
Not surprisingly all participants opposed the drone reputation in international relations and with 
strikes and it was opined that what support there regard to international security. 
was came from Peshawar or Islamabad; areas that 
were considered to not have a very clear idea of the Considering the history of conflict and rivalry with 
impact of drone strikes on innocent people and India, the responses recorded are not surprising. 
communities. Nearly three-quarters of respondents (73.2%) 
believed that possessing a nuclear weapon was 
Female FGDs vital for national security; this figure is however, a 
Limited knowledge of the problem was exhibited in continuation of levels of uncertainty, rather than 
female FGDs but for those that were aware, it was growing opposition, recorded since 2008. There is 
commonly believed that the US was irresponsibly no indication whether this trend will continue into 
killing innocent people, including women and the future. Nevertheless, the vast majority of 
children. people from FATA believe that retaining a nuclear 
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capability is essential – a belief almost universally ‘inflation’ being of particular concern. In addition, 
shared by FGD participants, except males from ‘terrorist attacks’ were identified as the major 
South Waziristan, who considered the weapons to threat to individuals’ security. It was also recorded 
be a vital deterrent particularly to threats from that differences of opinion on the impact of military 
India.  operations could be disaggregated based on 
experiences of internal displacement. These 
preliminary findings should be the basis for a more, 
in-depth inquiry and also the subject of policy and 
The overall objective of this chapter was to make post-conflict strategies. 
explicit the impact of conflict in FATA.
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understanding of FATA’s position in the opposed. A finding compounded by data that 
international arena. records that the West – with a few exceptions (for 
example when training the Frontier Corps) - has a 
Also, this chapter allows for external stakeholders in 
poor reputation in FATA. This reality is likely to 
FATA and other interested parties to gain a a strong 
inhibit counter-insurgency. Therefore, it is 
understanding of the region and specifically 
important for the Government of Pakistan to 
community perceptions. Data that should inform 
address the internal issues that are motivating, or at 
policy and allow for the development of strategies 
the very least, enabling acts of terrorism – for 
that are sensitive to local attitudes and aspirations. 
example underdevelopment – which can in part be 
achieved without necessarily requiring overt Primarily, it is essential to recognise that two-thirds 
international support. The reputation of the West is of people interviewed were of the opinion that 
investigated in greater detail in subsequent Pakistan was heading in the wrong direction, with 
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Attitude Towards Religion 
and Militancy
CHAPTER  5
Religiously motivated militancy has a long and oppose religious militancy or simply desire stability.  
significant international history, including in South 
Asia. In Pakistan, Islamic militancy has aided in 
rallying people together in order to help forge an 
Respondents were asked at the beginning of this 
independent nation state. It must therefore be 
study on militancy, to define: ‘How much of a 
acknowledged that militancy, despite its 
threat, if any, does Islamic extremism currently 
contemporary impingement on liberal politics and 
pose to Pakistan?'  
rights to self-determination, has contributed to the 
forging of local and national identities. This It was revealed that in 2011 some 46.0% of survey 
legitimacy has changed as attitudes have evolved: participants believed Islamic extremism to be at 
for example, the 1979 insurgency in Afghanistan - least a fairly great threat to Pakistan, while 21.0% 
against invading Soviet Union forces - was at the were of the opinion that it was not a threat at all. 
time considered a legitimate act of defiance; This appears to show that, while general opinion 
receiving support (albeit as a direct consequence of appears to be the same, attitudes are changing. It is 
the ‘Cold War’) by the West, and in particular the notable that this latter figure, which appears to be 
US. This support enabled religious militants to accepting of Islamic extremism, is comparable to 
achieve great military success and also usurp the information listed in Figure 5.2 and 5.3 of total 
political power of the contemporary liberal positive attitudes towards the Taliban, in its 
sovereign government of Afghanistan. different guises.
Subsequently, these militants have continued to In 2010, approximately 45.0% of respondents 
threaten liberal values and international peace and perceived the threat to be very great and a further 
security by directly training and safeguarding 25.0% to be fairly great. This is a reduction of some 
‘terrorists’ that have exacerbated civil-conflicts quarter of all respondents. Conversely, rejection of 
(e.g. in Somalia) and fought in the ‘War on Terror’. Islamic militancy as a threat was held by only 11.0% 
Nevertheless, describing attitudes towards of people in 2010. Nevertheless, the levels of 
religious militants in Pakistan is often confusing, as concern regarding Islamic extremism are notable as 
propaganda from all sides has created an only 21.5% of respondents had previously declared 
environment within which opinions have become ‘extremism’ to be the primary reason for violence in 
difficult to form. This is because, communities are FATA (see Figure 4.9).  
both being called to fight for the sake of Muslim 
This dramatic shift is, in part, a manifestation of the Kashmir and the Jihad in Afghanistan, while also 
debate that continues over who is responsible for being called to support governmental security 
insecurity in Pakistan. As documented in Figure forces as part of the defence of liberal values and 
4.10: opinion on responsibility for high rates of the ‘War on Terror’. 
suicide bombing in Pakistan is largely split between 
From Chapters 1 and 4, it is evident that insecurity is the West (particularly the US), which was censured 
the primary concern in FATA and that Pakistan’s in excess of 50.0% of respondents, and the religious 
military is for the most part trusted as a provider of militant groups of the Taliban and Al Qaeda, 
law and order. This chapter seeks to examine in censured by approximately 40.0% of people. But 
greater detail the extent to which people either 
Islamic extremism and its threat to Pakistan 
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considered the membership of this organisation to confusion over the root causes of conflict in FATA.
comprise foreign fighters, who, it is assumed are 
Overall, the survey suggests that, although the not fighting for the interests of the FATA 
majority of respondents have a negative perception communities.
of the Pakistani Taliban, a growing minority are 
The most striking difference between 2010 and beginning to provide them with support, or at least 
2011 is the growth in acceptance of the Pakistani recognise the validity of their aims. It is therefore 
Taliban as defenders of Islam. In 2011, 12.1% essential that perceptions of security and 
considered them to be defenders of Islam; this representation (see Chapter 1) be expanded, to 
figure is almost three times greater than that allow for future data to be collected on the extent to 
recorded a year before. This belief was supported which concern in FATA relates to attempts to expel 
by the perceptions held by approximately 9.0% of extremism, particularly if it is considered by some 
respondents who considered their actions to be in to be part of local culture in tribal areas. 
defence of tribal communities and freedom. As 
Male FGDsnoted above, the culmination of these figures is 
Male focus group participants further exemplified similar to those holding the belief that Islamic 
the different views expressed, and gave some extremism is not a threat in Pakistan. Overall, this 
indication of inter-Agency differences. Overall, the finding is surprising as findings outlined in Chapter 
majority viewed the Taliban as a ‘terrorist’ 4, regarding the performance of security providers, 
organisation; however in FR Peshawar and the did not appear to show much hostility to military 
Agencies of North and South Waziristan the view operations on grounds of support for the Taliban. 
was expressed that the Pakistani Taliban had never 
Another notable change is that the number of attacked civilians and were not a threat and that 
people unable to provide an opinion has risen negative attitudes were the result of Western 
sharply to almost one-quarter of respondents from influence on the media. 
14.3% in 2010. This may be a further indication of 
also, as documented by female FGDs, this could be any opinion on the subject, however, those that did 
the result of changing perceptions towards generally were of the opinion that extremists could 
whether extremists can be classified as Muslims. not be classified as being Muslims, as the acts 
perpetrated by the Taliban, Al Qaeda and suicide 
bombers were not true to Islam; it was opined that It is essential that further research be undertaken to 
the targeted killing of Shia or Sunni were not true try and understand why Islamic extremism is 
manifestations of any religion. However, if they growing in acceptance, while perceptions of it 
were to be, then Islamic extremism was agreed to being a threat are reducing - is it, for example, 
be a source of ruin from religious and societal because of increased acceptance of more radical 
norms in Pakistan. forms of Islam in FATA; a reaction to individuals’ 
concerns regarding drone attacks (see Figure 4.8); 
Describing the Pakistani Taliban conflict fatigue; or, the result of local perceptions 
Following on from this, the survey team asked changing towards the motivations of militants (i.e. 
respondents to give their views on two known self-interest instead of Islam). This additional 
groups of insurgents: the Pakistani Taliban and research may also elicit the perceptions of almost 
Afghan Taliban. To begin with, interviewees were one-third of respondents who were unable or 
asked to choose the characterisation that they unwilling to provide an answer. 
thought best described the Pakistani Taliban.
Male FGDs
From the information recorded: there does not 
Male respondents agreed with the view that Islamic 
appear to be a significant change between surveys, 
extremism was a direct threat to Pakistan, as it 
with a few notable exceptions. Accordingly, the 
devalued the very identity of the country. 
majority of respondents continue to possess a 
negative attitude towards the Pakistani Taliban. In However, as noted above, recriminations against 
2011, 30.3% of people considered the Taliban to be Western policies were also evident in motivating, 
terrorists (compared to 27.4% in 2010) and 22.7% and potentially legitimising, extremism as a 
that they were uneducated youths (compared to consequence of their facilitating the ‘occupation’ of 
24.2% in 2010). From this evidence, it is clear that Islam in Afghanistan and Iraq (as well as in Kashmir). 
for the last two years approximately one-half of 
Female FGDs respondents viewed the Pakistan Taliban in less 
than favourable terms. In addition, 12-18% The majority of female respondents did not offer 
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Taliban, there is a lot of indecision, with on average the Afghan Taliban is forlorn and whether the 
approximately one-third of respondents not able to violence that is associated with the organisation is 
characterise their attitude towards these perceived to be of value. Consequently, these 
organisations. It is also apparent that the Afghan perceptions could have a bearing on public support 
Taliban has greater support as representatives of regarding the pursuit of militants by the Pakistani 
Islam than their Pakistani counterparts, but this Army.
does not correspond to their being welcomed in 
This question has been asked since 2008 and the FATA especially as only 12.1% of respondents 
results for those that believe the Afghan Taliban will believe the Pakistani Taliban to be ‘defenders of 
return to power have remained quite constant, Islam’, a further question would be required to 
fluctuating between 25-30%. The greatest elucidate this. However, it must be noted that 
fluctuations have been with regard to those do not support for the Pakistani Taliban does appear to be 
believe they will return and those that do not know. growing.
In 2011, only 15.8% of respondents do not believe Interestingly, 10.0% of respondents consider the 
they will return to power; a figure more than half Afghan Taliban to be explicitly ignorant of Islam (this 
that of 2010 (37.2%) and the lowest value recorded figure should however, not be considered accurate 
to date. Those that were not able to answer as many who view them as terrorists may do so for 
comprised almost 60.0% of respondents, a this same reason): an argument that devalues their 
significant rise in the number represented in the reputation as Islamic heroes. A further 22.0% of 
previous year (34.6%). It is not evident why this respondents considered the Pakistani Taliban to be 
change of opinion has occurred, but it must be uneducated youths, and therefore, it is assumed, 
stated that in spite of the reduction in number of not as indicated before: recognisable ‘defenders of 
those that do not think they will return to power Islam’. 
there has been no increase in the number that think 
In contrast to this view of defenders of they will.
‘Islam’/’freedom fighters’, a very significant 
It is understandable that survey participants are minority viewed the Afghan Taliban (25.0%) and the 
unsure as conflict appears to continue unabated in Pakistani Taliban (30.0%) to be nothing more than 
FATA, with military operations being thus far unable terrorists. This shows that perceptions are changing 
to secure complete control of territory in either and that, for many, these organisations are losing 
FATA or Afghanistan itself.their legitimacy and trust.
Regardless, it appears the Government of Pakistan 
must work with tribal communities to explain the 
political, social and economic reasons that they are 
vigorously pursuing conflict with the Taliban, and 
why it is working with international partners who 
appear to be perceived by many as the enemy. 
Otherwise conflict may continue indefinitely in the 
region. 
On questions regarding the characterisation of the 
Afghan Taliban, the survey team asked respondents 
to state whether they believe the Afghan Taliban 
would return to power in their homeland. This 
question, is important in that it will help to 
determine whether the support being provided to 
Perceptions on the likelihood of the Taliban 
returning to power in Afghanistan
FATA and individuals’ fears of drone attacks and Female FGDs
The majority of female participants were personally suicide bombing.
unsure of the character of the Pakistani Taliban, but 
Male FGDs
they noted (as above) that it was not Islamic to use 
Most participants, in contrast to the perceptions 
violence against other Muslims, or human-beings in 
expressed regarding the Pakistani Taliban, viewed 
general.
the Afghan Taliban positively, with only a minority 
opposing this view. In summary, it was commonly Describing the Afghan Taliban
asserted the Afghan Taliban were freedom fighters, A similar question was asked of the Afghan Taliban. 
fighting against the Western occupation of their 
Arguably, the most startling finding is that in excess homeland.  
of one-third of respondents were unable to answer 
the question, again showing a greater uncertainty. Female FGDs
This common theme has affected both the number Female participants appeared to disagree with the 
of those that perceive the Afghan Taliban to be findings of the male FGDs, particularly in the 
Islamic heroes fighting Western occupation (23.6% Agencies of Kurram, Mohmand and Orakzai, where 
- staying roughly similar, if slightly up from 2010) opinion was negative of the Afghan Taliban; in 
and those that consider them to be terrorists South Waziristan Agency, participants failed to 
(24.8% - down approximately 12% points); express an opinion. The general consensus was that 
interestingly, the perception of the Afghan Taliban the Afghan Taliban had taken against the local 
being Islamic heroes is half that recorded in 2008, population and created numerous hardships within 
while the perception of them being terrorists has FATA. 
doubled in the same amount of time. These 
Conclusions on the Talibanresponses are likely to be directly linked to 
Overall, the data presented in Figure 5.2 and 5.3 perceptions regarding increased trust in objectives 
indicates that, for both the Pakistani and Afghan of the Pakistani military to oppose ‘terrorists’ in 
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Taliban, there is a lot of indecision, with on average the Afghan Taliban is forlorn and whether the 
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Otherwise conflict may continue indefinitely in the 
region. 
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to state whether they believe the Afghan Taliban 
would return to power in their homeland. This 
question, is important in that it will help to 
determine whether the support being provided to 
Perceptions on the likelihood of the Taliban 
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FATA and individuals’ fears of drone attacks and Female FGDs
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unsure of the character of the Pakistani Taliban, but 
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they noted (as above) that it was not Islamic to use 
Most participants, in contrast to the perceptions 
violence against other Muslims, or human-beings in 
expressed regarding the Pakistani Taliban, viewed 
general.
the Afghan Taliban positively, with only a minority 
opposing this view. In summary, it was commonly Describing the Afghan Taliban
asserted the Afghan Taliban were freedom fighters, A similar question was asked of the Afghan Taliban. 
fighting against the Western occupation of their 
Arguably, the most startling finding is that in excess homeland.  
of one-third of respondents were unable to answer 
the question, again showing a greater uncertainty. Female FGDs
This common theme has affected both the number Female participants appeared to disagree with the 
of those that perceive the Afghan Taliban to be findings of the male FGDs, particularly in the 
Islamic heroes fighting Western occupation (23.6% Agencies of Kurram, Mohmand and Orakzai, where 
- staying roughly similar, if slightly up from 2010) opinion was negative of the Afghan Taliban; in 
and those that consider them to be terrorists South Waziristan Agency, participants failed to 
(24.8% - down approximately 12% points); express an opinion. The general consensus was that 
interestingly, the perception of the Afghan Taliban the Afghan Taliban had taken against the local 
being Islamic heroes is half that recorded in 2008, population and created numerous hardships within 
while the perception of them being terrorists has FATA. 
doubled in the same amount of time. These 
Conclusions on the Talibanresponses are likely to be directly linked to 
Overall, the data presented in Figure 5.2 and 5.3 perceptions regarding increased trust in objectives 
indicates that, for both the Pakistani and Afghan of the Pakistani military to oppose ‘terrorists’ in 
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discover if respondents were aware of Al Qaeda. In 
both 2011 and 2010, approximately one-third of 
respondents were aware; the remaining two-
thirds, perhaps, were not. Al Qaeda is often 
mentioned in the media and discussed at hujra 
gatherings, therefore, the discrepancy in 
knowledge may not be as stark as it is recorded: 
instead fear of intelligence agencies, Taliban and Al 
Qaeda informers could have influenced 
respondents. 
Those who answered ‘yes’ they did know about Al 
Qaeda were subsequently asked to express their 
views on the network. As illustrated by Figure 5.7, 
20% of respondents held a favourable view of Al 
Qaeda but the 57.3% viewed them in some 
unfavourable light. 
Again there has been a significant change with 
regard to those that could not provide an answer. 
Foreign Jihadi fighters living in FATAThis is reminiscent of the findings on the Taliban, 
again indicating that a growing confusion has Foreign Jihadi fighters began entering FATA in the 
arisen. It is not clear why this is the case, it could early-1980s, during the Soviet-Afghan War. At its 
perhaps be a result of stalling military progress conclusion, many local tribes offered asylum and 
against Al Qaeda; a loss of support for the ‘War on protection to these fighters under the code of 
Terror’; or, a fear of saying something incriminating.  Pakhtunwali. It is not clear what role these forces 
played during Taliban supremacy in Afghanistan, 
Male FGDs but it is believed that since the US-led intervention 
Based on the present situation in FATA and the they have, along with new international fighters, 
continuing impact of the ‘War on Terror’, the responded to the call of Jihad. 
general feeling was that Al Qaeda is a negative 
Given the influence of international fighters in FATA, network. However, some participants from North 
respondents were asked to express their views on Waziristan declared support for Al Qaeda in their 
how communities should respond, as a fight for Islam against the West. 
consequence of their impact on peace and security 
Female FGDs in the tribal areas. Interviewees were invited to give 
Female participants noted that they were aware of more than one opinion. 
Osama Bin Laden but were not as knowledgeable 
From the information presented in Figure 5.8 it on Al Qaeda. They considered Osama bin Laden to 
appears that the majority desire that these have been a good man, spending much money to 
international fighters leave. In 2011, 72.8% opined provide services for local people. 
that these internationals should be asked to leave; 
From this, it seems the Government of Pakistan is while, 28.5% considered that they should be 
going to need to engage with communities to removed by force. This opinion is a continuation of 
educate them on how Al Qaeda and other religious attitudes expressed in 2010 – respondents were 
militants are devaluing rather than empowering only able to make one selection so the data is not 
communities; thus, why the government is engaged entirely comparable, but approximately 43% of 
in a  ‘War on Terror’ against organisations led by respondents desired the forced eviction of 
individuals such as Osama bin Laden. international fighters and a further 25% opined that 
they should be asked to leave. 
Accordingly, the data appears to be more closely 
linked to the contemporary situation in Afghanistan 
rather than one of excessive bias. Regardless, this 
question is not an endorsement of the violent 
operations used by the Taliban in either FATA or 
Afghanistan. Additional questions would need to be 
asked, in order to understand whether a successful 
return to power can only possibly be achieved by 
violence alone, and whether violence is considered 
a legitimate means of seeking a return to power in 
Afghanistan?
Male FGDs
There were contrasting views expressed in the male 
perception that the Taliban is fighting for Islam (see FGDs. Some participants believed that the Afghan 
Figure 5.3); however, as shown in Chapter 6, this Taliban would return to power, following the defeat 
could equally be an example of the FATA people’s of US forces
desire for Afghan refugees to be repatriated. 
In comparison, other participants opined that the 
Also, understanding of the figures relating to those Taliban would not be able to return to power 
who would feel badly if the Afghan Taliban, because they would not be accepted by the people 
returned to power could either reflect a revulsion to of Afghanistan. 
Islamic fundamentalism (see Figure 5.1) or as 
opined by some members from the male FGDs Female FGDs
could result in a further decline in law and order in The common perception of participants was that 
FATA. Consequently, the answer to this question they did not know whether the Afghan Taliban 
(and that reported in Figure 5.4), while remaining would return to power.
valuable, requires further analysis. 
How would you feel about this if they did?
Al QaedaIn response to a question concerning anticipated 
It has been alleged that local tribes in FATA have feelings should the Afghan Taliban return to power:  
given shelter to Al Qaeda. This survey has sought to again the majority of respondents (41.7%) were not 
able to answer. It is not evident whether this relates 
to a certain level of apathy towards issues outside of 
FATA or an unwillingness/inability to offer an 
opinion. 
Perhaps surprisingly, given attitudes to Islamic 
extremism in Pakistan (see Figure 5.1), a strong 
minority of respondents believe that Afghanistan 
would be better off if the Taliban returned to 
power; this is supported by 19.2% of respondents 
who would feel very good about this and 20.4% who 
would feel somewhat good. In comparison, less 
than 19.0% would feel to some degree: bad. 
The findings of this data are not entirely apparent 
but show that many people support the return of 
the Afghan Taliban to power in Afghanistan, it could 
be argued that this is an endorsement of the 
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discover if respondents were aware of Al Qaeda. In 
both 2011 and 2010, approximately one-third of 
respondents were aware; the remaining two-
thirds, perhaps, were not. Al Qaeda is often 
mentioned in the media and discussed at hujra 
gatherings, therefore, the discrepancy in 
knowledge may not be as stark as it is recorded: 
instead fear of intelligence agencies, Taliban and Al 
Qaeda informers could have influenced 
respondents. 
Those who answered ‘yes’ they did know about Al 
Qaeda were subsequently asked to express their 
views on the network. As illustrated by Figure 5.7, 
20% of respondents held a favourable view of Al 
Qaeda but the 57.3% viewed them in some 
unfavourable light. 
Again there has been a significant change with 
regard to those that could not provide an answer. 
Foreign Jihadi fighters living in FATAThis is reminiscent of the findings on the Taliban, 
again indicating that a growing confusion has Foreign Jihadi fighters began entering FATA in the 
arisen. It is not clear why this is the case, it could early-1980s, during the Soviet-Afghan War. At its 
perhaps be a result of stalling military progress conclusion, many local tribes offered asylum and 
against Al Qaeda; a loss of support for the ‘War on protection to these fighters under the code of 
Terror’; or, a fear of saying something incriminating.  Pakhtunwali. It is not clear what role these forces 
played during Taliban supremacy in Afghanistan, 
Male FGDs but it is believed that since the US-led intervention 
Based on the present situation in FATA and the they have, along with new international fighters, 
continuing impact of the ‘War on Terror’, the responded to the call of Jihad. 
general feeling was that Al Qaeda is a negative 
Given the influence of international fighters in FATA, network. However, some participants from North 
respondents were asked to express their views on Waziristan declared support for Al Qaeda in their 
how communities should respond, as a fight for Islam against the West. 
consequence of their impact on peace and security 
Female FGDs in the tribal areas. Interviewees were invited to give 
Female participants noted that they were aware of more than one opinion. 
Osama Bin Laden but were not as knowledgeable 
From the information presented in Figure 5.8 it on Al Qaeda. They considered Osama bin Laden to 
appears that the majority desire that these have been a good man, spending much money to 
international fighters leave. In 2011, 72.8% opined provide services for local people. 
that these internationals should be asked to leave; 
From this, it seems the Government of Pakistan is while, 28.5% considered that they should be 
going to need to engage with communities to removed by force. This opinion is a continuation of 
educate them on how Al Qaeda and other religious attitudes expressed in 2010 – respondents were 
militants are devaluing rather than empowering only able to make one selection so the data is not 
communities; thus, why the government is engaged entirely comparable, but approximately 43% of 
in a  ‘War on Terror’ against organisations led by respondents desired the forced eviction of 
individuals such as Osama bin Laden. international fighters and a further 25% opined that 
they should be asked to leave. 
Accordingly, the data appears to be more closely 
linked to the contemporary situation in Afghanistan 
rather than one of excessive bias. Regardless, this 
question is not an endorsement of the violent 
operations used by the Taliban in either FATA or 
Afghanistan. Additional questions would need to be 
asked, in order to understand whether a successful 
return to power can only possibly be achieved by 
violence alone, and whether violence is considered 
a legitimate means of seeking a return to power in 
Afghanistan?
Male FGDs
There were contrasting views expressed in the male 
perception that the Taliban is fighting for Islam (see FGDs. Some participants believed that the Afghan 
Figure 5.3); however, as shown in Chapter 6, this Taliban would return to power, following the defeat 
could equally be an example of the FATA people’s of US forces
desire for Afghan refugees to be repatriated. 
In comparison, other participants opined that the 
Also, understanding of the figures relating to those Taliban would not be able to return to power 
who would feel badly if the Afghan Taliban, because they would not be accepted by the people 
returned to power could either reflect a revulsion to of Afghanistan. 
Islamic fundamentalism (see Figure 5.1) or as 
opined by some members from the male FGDs Female FGDs
could result in a further decline in law and order in The common perception of participants was that 
FATA. Consequently, the answer to this question they did not know whether the Afghan Taliban 
(and that reported in Figure 5.4), while remaining would return to power.
valuable, requires further analysis. 
How would you feel about this if they did?
Al QaedaIn response to a question concerning anticipated 
It has been alleged that local tribes in FATA have feelings should the Afghan Taliban return to power:  
given shelter to Al Qaeda. This survey has sought to again the majority of respondents (41.7%) were not 
able to answer. It is not evident whether this relates 
to a certain level of apathy towards issues outside of 
FATA or an unwillingness/inability to offer an 
opinion. 
Perhaps surprisingly, given attitudes to Islamic 
extremism in Pakistan (see Figure 5.1), a strong 
minority of respondents believe that Afghanistan 
would be better off if the Taliban returned to 
power; this is supported by 19.2% of respondents 
who would feel very good about this and 20.4% who 
would feel somewhat good. In comparison, less 
than 19.0% would feel to some degree: bad. 
The findings of this data are not entirely apparent 
but show that many people support the return of 
the Afghan Taliban to power in Afghanistan, it could 
be argued that this is an endorsement of the 
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In 2011, two-thirds of respondents (67.5%) stated were of the opinion that religion should play no role 
that they believed that religion should provide a in politics.  
moral code that every one should follow (for 
Building on these findings, questions were asked of information on the religious practices of 
how respondents view the two issues of: 1) ‘Honour respondents see the Annex on the demography of 
killings’, related to one of the fundamental pillars of the survey). Religion’s utility as a ‘moral code’ is a 
Pakhtun culture and 2) ‘Suicide bombings’, a common expectation,  with respondents 
controversial aspect that is related to extremist increasingly allocating this responsibility (as its 
Islam, as aspects of society in FATA that may be primary role) between 2008 and 2010.  
influenced by religious codes of conduct.   
Additionally, it was maintained by one-third of 
‘Honour killing’participants (34.5%) that religion should dictate 
Since 2008, it appears that perceptions have women’s rights. This attitude is likely to be 
changed. CAMP’s first survey of FATA documented significant if the security concerns of women 
that 61% of respondents felt that ‘honour killing’ (identified in Chapter 1) and concerns about 
was not justifiable compared to the some 33% that community inclusion in governance and 
it may be condoned in certain situations. In 2011, development (see Chapter 3) are to be facilitated. 
this perception had been reversed with Consequently, initiatives will need to be sensitive to 
approximately 45% agreeing that act was the context and not antagonise or marginalise 
condonable compared to just 38% that continued different societal groups. It should be noted that, in 
to believe that it is not. 2010 only 4.6% of interviewees considered this 
control the primary responsibility of religion. 
It is not evident why this change has occurred, but A further 21.0% of people considered that religion 
this increase may be the result of instances of should define criminal and civil laws. This again 
Talibanisation or Islamic extremism influencing would have implications for initiatives to integrate 
social conventions. Nonetheless, it appears that if communities and therefore must be considered, as 
religion is to provide a ‘moral code’ then above. Data recorded also found that 10.8% of 
define how governments are contemporary demands may be more conservative respondents should 
selected than they were in previous years. ; a point of view rejected by 1.3%, who 
In contrast only 3.5% responded that these fighters settling in their host community by 
internationals should be allowed to stay; but this marrying local women and possessing property. 
increased to 10.8% if they agreed to abide by a 
Female FGDsceasefire. This opinion coincides with general 
Female participants were unaware of foreign attitudes towards Afghan refugees (see Chapter 6) 
fighters in FATA. and mistrust of governmental institutions when 
imposed on FATA (see Chapters 1 and 4); as well as 
Role of religion in FATAreinforcing the perception that tribal communities 
Religion plays an important role in political and resent external influences on their culture and 
social life in Pakistan, as well as inspiring, and traditions. 
legitimising, the various stages of Jihad. 
Overall, 12% of respondents did not believe that Consequently, interviewees were  asked to indicate 
there were international fighters in FATA. what role, if any, religion should play in their lives. 
Unlike in previous years, respondents were invited 
Almost half of those questioned did not provide a 
to make more than one choice from those offered 
view on the subject. Therefore, while the 
(only key data is listed in Figure 5.9). 
information documented is compelling, it may not 
be fully descriptive of communal attitudes.
Male FGDs
Male focus groups were in general agreement that 
foreign fighters should be forced to leave because 
they were a violent source of insecurity. However, it 
was considered that the Pakistani military would 
have to intervene to ensure this outcome because 
these fighters were unlikely to leave if asked 
peacefully . 
Other respondents did note that there might be 
some complication as a result of some international 
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In 2011, two-thirds of respondents (67.5%) stated were of the opinion that religion should play no role 
that they believed that religion should provide a in politics.  
moral code that every one should follow (for 
Building on these findings, questions were asked of information on the religious practices of 
how respondents view the two issues of: 1) ‘Honour respondents see the Annex on the demography of 
killings’, related to one of the fundamental pillars of the survey). Religion’s utility as a ‘moral code’ is a 
Pakhtun culture and 2) ‘Suicide bombings’, a common expectation,  with respondents 
controversial aspect that is related to extremist increasingly allocating this responsibility (as its 
Islam, as aspects of society in FATA that may be primary role) between 2008 and 2010.  
influenced by religious codes of conduct.   
Additionally, it was maintained by one-third of 
‘Honour killing’participants (34.5%) that religion should dictate 
Since 2008, it appears that perceptions have women’s rights. This attitude is likely to be 
changed. CAMP’s first survey of FATA documented significant if the security concerns of women 
that 61% of respondents felt that ‘honour killing’ (identified in Chapter 1) and concerns about 
was not justifiable compared to the some 33% that community inclusion in governance and 
it may be condoned in certain situations. In 2011, development (see Chapter 3) are to be facilitated. 
this perception had been reversed with Consequently, initiatives will need to be sensitive to 
approximately 45% agreeing that act was the context and not antagonise or marginalise 
condonable compared to just 38% that continued different societal groups. It should be noted that, in 
to believe that it is not. 2010 only 4.6% of interviewees considered this 
control the primary responsibility of religion. 
It is not evident why this change has occurred, but A further 21.0% of people considered that religion 
this increase may be the result of instances of should define criminal and civil laws. This again 
Talibanisation or Islamic extremism influencing would have implications for initiatives to integrate 
social conventions. Nonetheless, it appears that if communities and therefore must be considered, as 
religion is to provide a ‘moral code’ then above. Data recorded also found that 10.8% of 
define how governments are contemporary demands may be more conservative respondents should 
selected than they were in previous years. ; a point of view rejected by 1.3%, who 
In contrast only 3.5% responded that these fighters settling in their host community by 
internationals should be allowed to stay; but this marrying local women and possessing property. 
increased to 10.8% if they agreed to abide by a 
Female FGDsceasefire. This opinion coincides with general 
Female participants were unaware of foreign attitudes towards Afghan refugees (see Chapter 6) 
fighters in FATA. and mistrust of governmental institutions when 
imposed on FATA (see Chapters 1 and 4); as well as 
Role of religion in FATAreinforcing the perception that tribal communities 
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Figure 5.10: Do you think that a person has the right to kill a relative to protect the honour of their family?
Understanding FATA100 Chapter 5: Attitude Towards Religion and Militancy 101
N
A
recorded for this question in the three years that it Male FGDs
has been asked. The majority of respondents were opposed to the 
practise of ‘honour killing’ as they termed it a 
Aside from these findings, it appears that a 
breach of an individual’s human rights. A few 
considerable number of survey participants are 
respondents were of the opinion that this act was  
unsure of their attitudes. This could be linked to 
deep-rooted in tradition and should be considered 
uncertainty regarding the Taliban and Al Qaeda. 
a cultural undertaking: however, it was considered 
only being legitimate after a properly conducted 
As a consequence, it appears that the moral code of 
investigation into the case. 
participants is strongly against the use of suicide 
bombing; however, for a significant minority it 
Female FGDs:
appears that it can be justified if defending Islam 
Female participants opposed ‘honour killing’, as 
(see female FGDs). 
they asserted it was against human rights standards 
and the principles of Islam. Male FGDs
Participants opined that suicide bombing (and the 
Justification of suicide bombing in Islam
intended targeting of innocent civilians in general) 
In contrast to ‘honour killing’ respondents have 
was against Islam and liberal human standards. 
generally retained a consistently negative attitude 
towards the practice of suicide bombing. In 2011 Female FGDs
the majority of those interviewed (approximately 
Surprisingly, given female focus group participants’ 
60%) declared that this act of terror was never 
attitudes towards Afghan Taliban some conflicting 
justified. This is a marginal increase on data from 
views were apparent. While some agreed with their 
2010 and an increase of some 17% points from 
male counter-parts others stated that because of 
2009 (while this figure is lower it remained the most 
anti-Islamic Western influence in the region ‘their 
significant answer for the year). 
Muslim brothers and sisters in Afghanistan’ needed 
support, including the use of suicide bombings if 
Attitudes in support of suicide bombing remained 
they are targeted at ‘enemies’. 
low as only 2.6% of interviewees thought that 
suicide bombing was justified, and 11.4% rarely 
It is not evident what form of enemy target could be 
justified. This is the lowest level of acceptance 
attacked by suicide bombers; however, since 
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while this remains very significant the total It will also aid governmental initiatives to combat 
continues to show a decline in his influence, as militants if they can understand and then justify 
recorded in all subsequent years to his 2008 high of theological and political opposition to these 
75%. It is not clear why this phenomenon is destructive organisations. 
repeating as the people of Pakistan, including FATA, 
hold Saudi Arabia and the Imam Sudes in high 
regard. 
Dr. Zakir Naik of India, has maintained his 
approximate endorsement of approximately 15% 
for the third consecutive year, while Ayatollah Ali 
Khamene’i of Iran received endorsements from 
13.3% of interviewees: an increase from that 
recorded in recent years.
While it appears there is a greater focal-point for 
religious guidance from abroad, one-third of 
respondents remain unsure. This option which was 
included for the first time in the 2011 survey 
appears to show that there is greater uncertainty 
between these leaders than previously identified 
rather than a show of dissatisfaction, as only 0.3% 
of respondents selected: other. 
From the data it is clear that the people of FATA are 
devout in their beliefs, with the majority of 
respondents opining that Islam should provide a 
compass for people’s moral code of living. However, 
it is equally apparent that there are significant 
differences as to the form of Islam that should be 
predominant; with particular divisions evident 
between conservative and liberal principles. 
That being said, it appears that there is consensus 
regarding attitudes towards international Jihadi 
fighters, with a very strong majority stating that 
they should leave FATA, and by force if necessary.  
Notwithstanding this example of unity, the different 
Islamic values (and/or cultural interpretations) of 
respondents were starkly illustrated with regard to 
perceptions on militancy, particularly in terms of 
legitimacy ascribed to the Taliban in its different 
guises and attitudes towards the threat that Islamic 
extremism poses to Pakistan. This difference in 
values within FATA needs to be recognised and 
studied in greater detail if governance and 
community-inclusion initiatives are to be effective. 
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female focus group participants have stated that it With regard to religious organisations, the TTP 
is anti-Muslim to target (see above) Muslims and received the greatest trust (4.5%), followed by 
civilians, it must be presumed that only military and Sipah-e-Sihaba (4.0%) and Jaish-e-Mohammad 
infrastructure can be attacked. (3.0%). Cumulatively, religious organisations 
included in the survey received some 16% of 
Trusted religious authorities respondent support. This is considered troubling, 
As religion plays such a significant role in social and as these organisations are extremists and currently 
political life in FATA, the survey team sought to engaged in militancy against the Pakistan Army. 
identify which religious authority was the most 
The lack of definitive support for a particular trusted by individuals. This builds on information 
religious focal-point devalues the shared desire for acquired in previous years, but for 2011 extra 
Islam to provide a ‘moral code’ for the people of options were offered to interviewees. 
FATA as there is evidently a lack of consensus as to 
Significantly, approximately one-third of options what values should be prioritised, with both liberal 
did not believe that any authority was trustworthy, and conservative agendas competing with already 
while a comparable number were not able to established sectarian divides. This reality could 
provide an opinion. With regard to the views of result in increased violence as militants seek to 
those that did offer an opinion: no particular impose their generally extreme conservative values 
individual or organisation secured dominant on others.
support. 
Most trusted religious authority outside of 
Amir Liaqat Hussain, a presenter on a religious talk 
Pakistan 
show, leads the list with 7.4% of respondents 
When asked the same question of external religious 
identifying him as being trustworthy; an increase 
authorities, interestingly only 1.1% of respondents 
from the 2.4% that he recorded in 2010. Last years 
declared none – this appears to indicate a strong 
leading authorities: the late Dr. Israr Ahmed and 
influence of international Islamic leaders. Imam 
Tahir-ul-Qadri received endorsements from 6.1% 
Kaba Sudes ur Rehman continues to receive the 
and 5.7% of survey participants respectively, in 
greatest support as identified by 45% of people; 
2011.
Figure 5.13: Most trusted religious authority outside of Pakistan 
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In this section, an examination is undertaken of (7.9%) who supported the presence of ‘Afghan 
FATA perceptions of the 30 year-long presence of Taliban fighters led by Mullah Omar in FATA (see 
Afghan refugees in Pakistan, particularly in the Figure 4.29). This may indicate that those that do 
tribal areas, on the themes of: economy, instability, not support the return of Afghan nationals are also 
repatriation and Talibanisation.  sympathetic to the Taliban; however, this cannot be 
confirmed. It could also reflect elements of 
integration in different communities. Future 
research would have to be undertaken to discern 
Over the last four years respondents have been the meaning of this perspective. 
asked about their opinion on whether Afghan 
The Impact of Afghan Refugees on Pakistan’s refugees should be repatriated. The overwhelming 
response, across all surveys, has been 'yes they Economy
should be repatriated'. In 2011, this majority Following on from the question of Afghan 
comprised 81.4%, a small reduction on the data repatriation, respondents were asked to evaluate 
recorded in 2010. This opinion appears, in large the extent to which Afghan refugees have damaged 
part, to be the result of resentment felt towards the economy of Pakistan. Perhaps surprisingly, 
Afghan refugees, as they are believed to be negative attitudes towards Afghan refugees’ impact 
reducing the employment opportunities of on the economy are not as strongly felt as the desire 
indigenous communities; a viewpoint openly for them to return to their homeland. In 2011, 
argued in both male and female FGDs. approximately half of respondents (48.2%) either 
strongly agreed (29.3%) or agreed (18.9%) that 
Pakistan’s economy had been negatively impacted; 
a reduction in the levels of concern recorded 
historically. 
Moreover, there appears to be an increase in the 
number of respondents that disagree with this 
sentiment. In 2010, some 6.0% of those surveyed 
did not believe that Afghan refugees had had an 
impact on the economy – this has risen to almost 
15.0% in 2011. A further 33.2% of respondents 
either answered: neither agree nor disagree 
(18.3%) or don’t know (14.9%). 
These findings could illustrate that the strongly held 
desire for Afghan repatriation remains heavily 
linked to local concerns (e.g. employment 
competition, threats to security [see Figure 6.4] and Only a minimal percentage of people supported the 
traditional opposition to outside threats to cultural notion of Afghan refugees remaining resident in 
independence in FATA) rather than concerns for Pakistan. It is notable that this support (8.0%) 
Pakistan as a whole. However, further research almost equates to the percentage of respondents 
Repatriation of Afghan refugees to 
Afghanistan
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Instead, the 2010 survey indicated that the majority that Afghan refugees had had a negative impact on 
of respondents were of the opposite opinion: with security in FATA. From these answers it is not 
40.3% saying they agreed with the statement that evident however, what aspects of hosting Afghan 
Afghan refugees were contributing to Pakistan’s refugees they find a source of insecurity. 
economy, and a further 20.3% strongly agreed. 
As previously noted (see Chapter 4) the threats of Only 12.0% supported this attitude in 2011.  While 
Talibanisation and drone strikes are sources of this lower level of recorded support for the 
considerable insecurity in FATA, therefore either, in perception that Afghan refugees are contributing to 
addition to others (e.g. crime, food security, the economy is endorsed by other historical 
economic security) could be seen as a cause for surveys, the data recorded in 2011 is particularly 
refugees to be considered an ‘undermining’ low. Further research is required to discover 
influence. Further research is required to whether this change between 2010 and 2011 will 
understand this question. be sustained.
The reason behind the decrease in positive 
The impact of Afghan refugees on Pakistan’s 
responses against this statement (between 2010 
security
and 2011) is also not very clear because there is no 
In addition to the questions focused on the 
significant increase in the total number of those 
economy, respondents were asked the extent to 
that disagree (12.5%). According, to this, 
which they agreed with the statement: ‘Afghan 
respondents are not generally feeling more secure. 
refugees living in Pakistan are undermining 
Pakistan's security.’ Afghan refugees as a source of tension 
To some extent, uncertainties regarding 
As seen in Figure 6.2, more than half of those 
perceptions of insecurity may be answered by the 
interviewed (52.7%) agreed with this assertion (of 
following question: ‘Afghan refugees living in 
which: 31.5% strongly agreed). While this feeling is 
Pakistan are a source of tension for the local 
similar to the concern expressed towards the 
Pakistani population.’ This question was first 
economic impact, it is a reduction in the concern 
incorporated into the 2010 survey. 
expressed in answer to the same question in 2010. 
In 2010, in excess of 70.0% of respondents believed 
It is evident that, for both years, the majority of 
would be required to investigate this conjecture.   not, with 19.2% strongly disagreeing and 37.4% 
disagreeing. This could not be considered surprising 
Contributing to Pakistan’s economy given the data recorded in Figure 6.1 and 6.2, and 
Building on this question of impact on Pakistan’s focus group comments on livelihood competition – 
economy, respondents were asked their opinion on but it appears to be a reversal of recent survey 
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Instead, the 2010 survey indicated that the majority that Afghan refugees had had a negative impact on 
of respondents were of the opposite opinion: with security in FATA. From these answers it is not 
40.3% saying they agreed with the statement that evident however, what aspects of hosting Afghan 
Afghan refugees were contributing to Pakistan’s refugees they find a source of insecurity. 
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The impact of Afghan refugees on Pakistan’s 
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security
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economy, respondents were asked the extent to 
that disagree (12.5%). According, to this, 
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respondents are not generally feeling more secure. 
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Pakistan's security.’ Afghan refugees as a source of tension 
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Pakistan are a source of tension for the local 
similar to the concern expressed towards the 
Pakistani population.’ This question was first 
economic impact, it is a reduction in the concern 
incorporated into the 2010 survey. 
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respondents agreed with this statement; however, insecurity, but it is not evident the extent to which 
a significant decline can be seen between years. In these concerns motivate the desire for repatriation.
2010, some 80.0% agreed (half of which strongly 
Further research is necessary to map individuals’ agreed) with this notion; in comparison, this figure 
reasons for desiring repatriation – be it, for has dropped to 48.2% in 2011. These figures are 
example: livelihood or development resources roughly comparable with those relating to security. 
competition; economic concerns; security It can therefore be assumed that insecurity and 
concerns; fears for local traditions; concerns tension are linked, but it is not clear what is meant 
regarding Talibanisation; or a belief that the by tension. Further research needs to be carried out 
security situation has improved in Afghanistan so it to enable FATA communities to define what these 
is time for them to go home. Conversely, it may be tensions are. 
useful to ask: why respondents believe Afghan 
Interestingly, a marginal number of respondents refugees want to stay? (e.g. is it because they feel 
disagree that refugees are a source of tension insecure; they are part of the insurgency; they feel 
compared to those who believe that they are a there is greater economic opportunities; or, 
source of insecurity. This change may reflect local because they feel accepted by their hosts). This may 
differences, with community integration marginally help to illustrate some of the barriers to 
reducing tension yet not the overall levels of repatriation and sources of conflict in the future. 
perceived insecurity, but it must be noted that this 
Furthermore, it would be useful for research to be is conjecture. 
commissioned that will contextualise the situation 
of Afghan refugees in FATA – that is, define whether 
Afghan refugees have access to support from 
national and international agencies, and whether From the information recorded, it is evident that 
or not host tribal areas are being afforded access to the people of FATA want to see Afghan refugees 
the same level of support. This will aid in analysing repatriated. What is not so clear is the reason why. 
whether external actors are contributing to these FGD participants note livelihood competition, and 
recorded perceptions. the survey records that: approximately half of 
respondents believe that they have had a 
detrimental impact on Pakistan’s economy and a 
similar percentage that they have increased 
Conclusion
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Since 2008; surveys have sought to track trends in With regard to formal media sources, Pakistani 
FATA relating to access to information. radio remains popular, despite data declining 
Consequently, questions have been asked to elicit between 2011 (49.4%) and 2010 (55.0%) and 
data on how knowledge is gained from external Pakistani TV was identified by 33.4% of 
sources in the region: that is, the readership for respondents. It must be acknowledged that 
newspapers, audience totals for radio programmes fluctuations in these recordings may in part be 
and the viewership of television. Additional influenced by the increased inclusion of women in 
questions sought to identify perceptions of how the survey but also could be influenced by the 
much value individuals ascribe to the media and the destruction of property caused during conflict 
ways media influences social life. between militants and the military.
Pakistani printed media has seen some decrease in Information sources
its popularity in recent years but it remains one of Over the last four years, surveys have mapped 
the leading avenues for news and information. respondents’ preferred sources of accessible 
Inconsistent levels of literacy may account for why information. Figure 7.1 records the patterns of 
this source of information sharing is fluctuating in responses from 2008 onwards. Respondents are 
accessibility (for some indication of literacy see the invited to specify more than one media source.
education level of respondents in the Annex: 
From the data recorded it seems that access to all Demographics of survey and Figure 7.3). However, 
forms of media is not universal, if it is considered in contrast to other visual media, it can still be easily 
that generally respondents will have offered more accessed at times of internal displacement and 
than one answer. Also, as seen in many of the therefore its importance is likely to remain 
female focus group discussions, a significant gender significant.
disparity may also be recorded in terms of access to 
In terms of international influence: Voice of formal news reporting services. That is, in response 
America’s ‘Deewa’ Pakhtu radio service, a US to several questions already documented in this 
government funded organisation, has gained in survey, female participants’ knowledge was 
significance in FATA. In 2010, just 4.2% of dependent on the awareness of male family 
respondents recorded it as being an accessible members. This may account for the high numbers of 
medium but this had risen to almost 20.0% in 2011. respondents that state either - friends and family 
22 British radio has fallen significantly behind US (42.5%) or neighbours (37.7%).  
alternatives but remains steady with an audience of 
Aside from this observation, ‘word of mouth’ approximately 10.0%. However, it should be noted 
remains a significant conduit for information that this figure does not correspond with data 
sharing as the percentage of people recording that regarding BBC radio services identified in Figure 
they access information through work colleagues 7.5: perhaps implying a greater sense of ownership 
has also increased in recent years to a high of 20.8%. of these British supported services. In terms of 
Access to Information 
CHAPTER 7
22
 It is notable that the increased levels of respondents identifying ‘friends and family’ and ‘neighbours’ in 2010 and 2011 
compared to 2008 and 2009 corresponds with increased involvement of women in the survey.
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access to American TV and British TV and the the answer don’t know. 
internet, it remains low as access to necessary 
However, it is reassuring that only 1.4% of people equipment and infrastructure is largely limited to 
state none, therefore information is being shared elites. Furthermore, access to English-language 
but it is not evident if respondents are gaining a print media is understandably low (less than 1.0%) 
holistic perspective of current social, economic and as limitations in those able to read the text are likely 
political issues, or whether access to local news is to be considerable.
sufficient for their needs. Further research would 
be necessary to evaluate this question.Most valued information sources
In order to better evaluate the quality of news that 
With regard to international media radio remains 
respondents believed they were receiving, 
fairly well trusted, however with a greater 
interviewees were subsequently asked to indentify 
correlation between the figures for US radio than 
the information providers that they most valued. 
for British radio. Surprisingly, a greater number of 
people (5.3%) trust the internet, books and film From the data it appears that formal, national 
than access them – perhaps signalling a desire for media outlets are generally trusted by those who 
greater access to these media than is currently access them, with Pakistani radio, TV and print 
available. media receiving endorsements roughly similar, if 
lower, to the total numbers of people that accessed 
Newspaper readership 
them. This indicates that the majority of people 
To gain a stronger understanding of what who access information through these providers 
information respondents were accessing, the 2011 trust what they are being told. This is significant, if 
survey asked interviewees to identify the the government wishes to continue to build 
newspapers they preferred to read. confidence and oppose extremism; however, they 
must similarly be cautious of people gaining 
The most significant change between the 2011 and 
information from inflammatory sources within 
2010 surveys is the dramatic decrease in the 
Pakistan. It must be noted however, that levels of 
number of respondents that were unable to 
literacy may influence the findings regarding trust 
answer. This is not a reflection of changing attitudes 
in radio and TV as other formal sources of 
towards print media but is instead the result of 
information could be inaccessible to those that 
positive change to the survey questionnaire: that is 
cannot read, and therefore they are reliant on these 
the 2011 survey included an additional choices that 
sources. 
enabled respondents to note that they were either 
unable to (32.5%) or chose not to (27.7%) read Levels of trust in informal mechanisms, while 
newspapers. remaining quite significant, is less favourable than 
other services. Data recorded that confidence in 
With regard to the 40.0% of respondents that did 
family and friends, neighbours and work colleagues 
access print media, Mashriq - an Urdu language 
has risen quite considerably since 2010; however it 
daily newspaper - was most popular, read by over 
must be noted that these sources consistently score 
half of these (22.8%). A figure negligibly lower than 
less than 75.0% of the total figure for those who 
that recorded in 2010. This is followed by Aaj - an 
access them. This is concerning as these 
alternative Urdu language daily newspaper – 
information sources are likely to be the primary 
accessed by 16.6% of people
outlets for a significant number of people, 
particularly women. Therefore, for those who are TV audience
dependent on these communication sources many Again, a significant proportion, almost equal to the 
are prevented from the right to form an opinion number of people that did not access newspapers, 
based on information that they trust; a reality that did not have a television (38.8%) or are prevented 
may help explain why significant numbers of from watching / chose not to watch information 
responses have recorded with high percentages for programmes (18.5%). 
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For all respondents with access to a television, all number (28.1%) of people stated that they listened 
Pakistani TV channels are available. The majority of to Deewa – this growth in popularity among all 
television sets are installed in hujras, largely demographic groups in FATA is linked to its mix of 
preventing women and children from accessing both information and entertainment.
them: a further example of gender inequality in 
It is notable that despite radio growing as the most access to information. 
valuable means of learning news, data recorded in 
Despite yearly fluctuations, Pakistan Television Figure 7.5 have for the most part reduced 
(PTV) is the most widely watched TV channel: significantly (even by up to a half), for these leading 
ranging from 25.9% - 55.3% in the previous  radio stations, with the exception of Deewa; 
surveys, recording some 27.6% for 2011. Reasons however no new station has ultimately gained in 
for these yearly changes could, in part, be the result popularity. It can only be assumed that respondents 
of militancy disrupting opportunities for TV are becoming more supportive of particular 
channels (with the Taliban declaring the watching stations and therefore not choosing several as they 
of television to be sinful) or internal displacement were invited to. 
preventing access to programmes. Apart from PTV 
Regarding the remainder of the radio stations: in popularity was the AVT Khyber, a private Pashto 
these are largely local stations servicing the needs channel is the second most watched channel with 
of local communities or tribal areas and therefore coverage inside FATA, interestingly this service has 
do not have the reach of larger radio stations.seen much less disruption in viewing figures, but it 
is unclear why this is the case.
Also, almost 10.0% of respondents indicated a 
From the research it is apparent that there is access preference for Geo News - the most popular private 
to national and international news for significant channel in Pakistan. Because private transmission is 
number of the people of FATA: with radio largely not universally available this figure may be less than 
providing a conduit for this process. The quality of could otherwise be expected. This inability to reach 
these media appears to be strong in the eyes of all households is because satellite is very expensive 
respondents, with Pakistani media, in particular, and not a viable option for many; while cable is not 
gaining strong levels of trust.available in FATA. Limitations in access and 
language are also likely to account for the low 
However, gender disparity appears to be 
numbers of respondents that identif ied 
maintaining some levels of information poverty 
international TV channels.
with women apparently being more dependent on: 
family, friends and neighbours. Radio listenership
Radio is much more accessible medium for 
There also appears to be strong bias for local 
information sharing than newspapers and 
language media, with English-language sources 
television; with only 21.5% of respondents not 
always receiving very low scores; this is not 
possessing a radio at home and 2.7% choosing not 
surprising given the language barriers preventing 
to listen to it. 
greater support. Surprisingly BBC local language 
stations receives a greater audience share than the From the data recorded, it appears that 
value of ‘British radio’ (recorded in Figure 7.1) respondents enjoy greater choice of national and 
would suggest. This may be the result of a perceived internationally-led radio programming. In 2011, 
attitude of local ownership (rather than UK 28.7% of survey participants recorded that they 
ownership) for these stations - but additional listened to Radio Pakistan; a percentage exactly 
research would be necessary to test this equal to the combined figures for BBC Pushto 
supposition. (15.5%) and BBC Urdu (13.2%). While a comparable 
Conclusion
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This contradiction of support versus other attitudes 
expressed is also true with regard to Deewa radio. 
This is because, despite being funded by the US (a 
negatively perceived nation [see Chapter 8]), it 
enjoys a considerable audience. 
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The legacy of 9/11 has defined much of the world’s more confidence in the Frontier Corps (see Figure 
debates around international relations and 4.20). 
interventions, and this is no different in Pakistan. 
The figures documented in Figure 8.1 for 2011 are After exertion of US influence, Pakistan has become 
interesting because they are comparable to those a significant front in ‘War on Terror’. This position 
recorded in 2009, but a reversal of those for 2010. It has afforded the Pakistan Government a strong 
is therefore apparent, from the survey (and FGDs), position to contribute to global political dialogue; 
that there is no strong consensus in FATA acquire infrastructure and inst itut ional  
(particularly as 20.6% of respondents did not know) development assistance; and, aid in supporting 
with opinion continually changing. An outcome, poverty-reduction strategies. 
likely linked to military outputs in FATA at the time 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an analysis of the survey – with successes reducing the 
of FATA perceptions regarding those countries with perceived need for external interference and losses 
whom Pakistan shares a strong relationship. To this compelling desires for greater international 
end the chapter is split into two sections: 1) support. 
Attitudes towards the US and UK; and 2) Attitudes 
These attitudes appear not to be split along gender towards the rest of the world.
lines as, since 2010, surveys have sought to offer 
equal representation of both men and women. 8.1: Attitudes towards aid from the US and the 
Therefore, the increase and subsequent decrease UK
cannot be ascribed to inclusion of greater numbers 
Military aid from the US and the UK of women in the survey process.
As documented in Chapter 4, there is much public 
debate over the effectiveness of military aid from 
the West, and in particular the UK and US, to the 
Frontier Corps (see Figure 4.20). To test these 
differing attitudes further, respondents were asked 
to give an opinion on whether or not Pakistan 
should accept funds from these nations in order to 
develop its military capability.
From the data recorded, it appears that public 
opinion opposes the acceptance of military aid: 
with 45.6% of respondents providing the answer 
no. In contrast only one-third of respondents 
thought that Pakistan should continue accepting 
this support. This figure may be considered 
surprising as military aid – through training - was 
considered by 50.0% of respondents to give them 
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Figure 8.1: Do you think Pakistan should accept 
money from Western countries such as the UK 
and USA for the military build up?
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With regard to the US, following some marginal a reality that has resulted in an exacerbation of 
softening of attitudes, there has again been a mistrust and resentment felt towards US. This 
considerable loss in confidence of the communities should not be read as the expression of support by 
in FATA. In 2011, only 2.7% of people viewed the US the population of Pakistan towards the late Osama 
very favourably and 10.6% somewhat favourably. bin Laden but a statement of disapproval for this 
This compares to 8.8% who perceive them in public show of disregard for Pakistani sovereignty. 
somewhat unfavourable and 58.8% in very Future research will need to discern how this action 
unfavourable terms. While some survey has affected perceptions.
participants did not know or would not provide a 
The reason for this hostility is in large part due to response, the total figures of opposition remains 
the almost universal opinion that the US is pursuing forceful.
policies that are to the detriment of the Muslim 
Improvements in the quality of the Frontier Corps world. As seen in Figure 8.4: almost three-quarters 
and the outputs of FATA development institutions of FATA residents – as represented by the survey – 
may explain why figures for 2011 have improved on shared this negative perception, with the greatest 
those from 2008. Significant policy changes need to proportion (some 68.2%) declaring the US not 
be implemented before any real change in favourable.
confidence is likely; this may include stopping drone 
Opinions on the UKattacks in FATA or openly seeking dialogue with 
This apparent hostility directed towards the US is ethnic Pakhtun, a process possibly allowing for the 
repeated to some degree towards the UK. In 2008, repatriation of Afghan refugees.
hostility towards the US is somewhat evident 
It is interesting to note however, that future towards the UK as well, but not to the same degree. 
attitudes towards the US, as they develop into 2012 In 2008, a strong majority of respondents looked 
and beyond, will equally be influenced by reactions very unfavourably (58.0%) towards the UK, 
to the unilateral operation conducted by the US however, in 2011 this has reduced to a significant 
against Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad: Pakistan, 37.2%. This combined with the figure of those who 
in May 2011. This operation, while successful in are somewhat unfavourable (10.7%) means that for 
finding the leader of Al Qaeda was undertaken by the first time a survey can document a combined 
US military personnel without the prior knowledge figure of less than 50%. 
or political approval of the Government of Pakistan; 
Overall, this question requires further study to see 
what trend occurs in the long-term.
Male FGDs
The majority of focus group participants were of the 
opinion that military aid placed Pakistan at a 
disadvantaged position because of the stringent 
conditions that are believed to be associated with 
this aid and should therefore not be accepted. It is 
not clear what these conditions are but they are 
possibly linked to the consistent demand from 
international partners to continue to support and 
champion the ‘War on Terror’; a perspective that 
may be opposed because considerable minority of 
people look favourably on the Afghan Taliban (see 
Chapter 6).
However, in contrast respondents from the Frontier 
Regions of Bannu, Lakki, Tank and DI Khan thought 
However, given cultural opposition to external 
that Pakistan would be better able to face 
interference perhaps this is not surprising. 
challenges if it was equipped using aid from the US 
and UK. Male FGDs
As it may be expected, opinions expressed by male 
Female FGDs
focus group participants were commonly 
Female participants were largely unable to provide 
supportive of Pakistan receiving aid  from the US 
an opinion but when they were forthcoming no 
and/or UK for development; it was believed that 
consensus was formed. Some, like their male 
assistance would better enable Pakistan to alleviate 
counterparts,  thought that mil itary aid 
poverty, generate employment and change the 
disadvantaged Pakistan, while females from 
lives of the people of Pakistan for the better, if used 
Orakzai Agency opined that military aid allowed the 
effectively. 
Pakistani military to better oppose their enemies. 
Female FGDs
Developmental aid from US and/or UK
Female respondents’ echoed the responses of  
The survey also sought to elicit opinions on whether 
male FGDs. It was thought that aid would help to 
development aid, in contrast, should be accepted 
develop Pakistan and thus meet the aspirations of 
from the US and/or UK. 
people in FATA. 
Regarding this question, opinion favoured the 
Opinions on the US 
statement: Pakistan should accept developmental 
The potentially favourable desire of respondents to 
aid from the US and/or UK. Consequently, 48.4% of 
accept assistance from either the US and/or UK 
respondents answered yes while 32.0% said no. 
appears to somewhat contradict overall  
Again this view is comparable to 2009 and a 
impressions of these two states.  General attitudes 
variation on 2010. In 2010, almost three-quarters 
towards the US and UK are recorded in Figure 8.3 
answered yes. 
and 8.5 respectively. 
This drop in support for international aid regarding 
The data is compelling, with only a small minority of 
poverty-reduction strategies again signals that 
respondents looking towards these countries 
there is no clear consensus of opinion, particularly 
favourably; and the majority taking the opposite 
as almost 20.0% did not provide an opinion. 
perspective. 
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hostility towards the US is somewhat evident 
It is interesting to note however, that future towards the UK as well, but not to the same degree. 
attitudes towards the US, as they develop into 2012 In 2008, a strong majority of respondents looked 
and beyond, will equally be influenced by reactions very unfavourably (58.0%) towards the UK, 
to the unilateral operation conducted by the US however, in 2011 this has reduced to a significant 
against Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad: Pakistan, 37.2%. This combined with the figure of those who 
in May 2011. This operation, while successful in are somewhat unfavourable (10.7%) means that for 
finding the leader of Al Qaeda was undertaken by the first time a survey can document a combined 
US military personnel without the prior knowledge figure of less than 50%. 
or political approval of the Government of Pakistan; 
Overall, this question requires further study to see 
what trend occurs in the long-term.
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possibility is the resignation of Tony Blair in 2007 example: security or the media [see Chapter 7]) 
and the subsequent loss by Labour of the 2010 would increase a positive union between the two 
general-election. However, this change of opinion nations. 
has not been reciprocated towards the US following 
the election of President Barak Obama in 2008. 
The UK general-election was comprehensively 
covered in Pakistan by the media, and followed by 
the people of FATA, because of local interests – with 
reference to – UK’s attitudes towards fighting the 
‘War on Terror’. It will be interesting to see how 
these changes continue following the ‘Arab Spring’ 
vocally supported by the West, and direct 
intervention in Libya.
Despite some need for conjecture, the 2011 survey 
has endeavoured to better understand the reason 
for these changing perceptions. As a consequence, 
respondents were asked what they considered to 
be the strongest links between the UK and Pakistan. 
Disappointingly, the majority (almost two-thirds) of 
respondents were unable to provide an answer. 
However, from what opinions that could be 
extracted, the greatest links were seen with regard 
to higher education (13.5%) and development 
assistance (16.5%). From this it seems that activities 
Also respondents were asked to define what type of 
linked to empowerment in FATA are most 
relationship Pakistan has with the UK. Again, a 
noticeable. Nevertheless, increased research is 
noteworthy finding is that one-third of respondents 
required to better understand what issues (for 
were not able to express an opinion. Thus, it 
Attitudes in favour of the UK have also improved that their perspective had worsened. While this 
with the UK maintaining the gains it acquired during response is troubling it remains part of a constant  
the 2010 survey. decline in this point of view since 2008; moreover 
this reduction does not appear to have damaged 
To try and further clarify the information presented overall perceptions. It is difficult to interpret the 
about the UK in Figure 8.3: respondents were asked significance of no change as it is not evident 
to state whether their current attitude had changed whether these respondents possessed a positive or 
in the last year. From the information recorded, negative attitude in the past.
some 10% considered their attitude to have 
improved. A change roughly comparable to the Reason for changing attitudes 
reduction in unfavourable attitudes recorded in Reasons for this change in opinion are unclear, but a 
Figure 8.5.  However, 22.5% were of the opinion 
1
.5
5
.4
5
.5 6
.2
1
.3 4
.6
8
1
.1
8
.0
5
.0
2
.3 5
.9
6
8
.2
1
0
.4
1
3
.3
9
.6
7
8
.1
7
.9
7
4
.5
8
.6
2
.9
Most favourable
attitude towards Islam
Less favourable
attitude towards Islam
Not favourable
 towards Islam
No opinion No Response
2008 (%)  2009 (%)  2010 (%) 2011 (%) 
Figure 8.4: US attitude towards the Islamic world
5
.4
5
8
.0
7
.8
4
.9
1
6
.2
8
.2
2
0
.6
1
8
.2
3
8
.4
6
.7
7
.9
6
.1
2
3
.8
1
0
.7
3
7
.2
1
1
.6
1
0
.5
1
2
.7
1
1
.4
6
.1
4
2
.7
1
4
.3
9
.51
1
.3
Very Favourable Somewhat
Favourable
Somewhat
Unfavourable
Very Unfavourable No Response Don’t Know
2008 (%)  2009 (%)  2010 (%) 2011 (%) 
Figure 8.5: Thinking now about world affairs, do you have a very favourable, somewhat favourable, somewhat 
unfavourable, or very unfavourable opinion of the government of UK?
4
.9
2
5
.8
1
.5 2
.76
.0
3
4
.7
2
9
.5
2
9
.8
N
A
1
0
.1
2
2
.5
2
9
.8
3
7
.6
N
A
5
5
.5
1
2
.4
4
0
.2
2
2
.0 2
6
.0
9
.1
More Favourable Less Favourable Stayed the same Don't Know No Response
2008 (%) 2009 (%) 2010 (%) 2011 (%)
Figure 8.6: Is your opinion of the UK generally getting more favourable, less favourable or stayed the same?
13.5
16.5
2.3
62.2
0.8
4.7
L
in
k
s
 w
it
h
 t
h
e
 U
K
 
in
 h
ig
h
e
r
S
p
o
rt
s
 l
in
k
s
 b
e
tw
e
e
n
P
a
k
is
ta
n
 a
n
d
 t
h
e
 U
K
F
a
m
il
y
 t
ie
s
D
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t
a
s
s
is
ta
n
c
e
O
th
e
r 
(s
p
e
c
if
y
)
D
o
n
’t
 k
n
o
w
2011 (%)
Figure 8.7: What do you consider to be the 
strongest links between the UK and Pakistan?
Understanding FATA130 Chapter 8: Attitudes Towards Pakistan’s International Relations Policies 131
possibility is the resignation of Tony Blair in 2007 example: security or the media [see Chapter 7]) 
and the subsequent loss by Labour of the 2010 would increase a positive union between the two 
general-election. However, this change of opinion nations. 
has not been reciprocated towards the US following 
the election of President Barak Obama in 2008. 
The UK general-election was comprehensively 
covered in Pakistan by the media, and followed by 
the people of FATA, because of local interests – with 
reference to – UK’s attitudes towards fighting the 
‘War on Terror’. It will be interesting to see how 
these changes continue following the ‘Arab Spring’ 
vocally supported by the West, and direct 
intervention in Libya.
Despite some need for conjecture, the 2011 survey 
has endeavoured to better understand the reason 
for these changing perceptions. As a consequence, 
respondents were asked what they considered to 
be the strongest links between the UK and Pakistan. 
Disappointingly, the majority (almost two-thirds) of 
respondents were unable to provide an answer. 
However, from what opinions that could be 
extracted, the greatest links were seen with regard 
to higher education (13.5%) and development 
assistance (16.5%). From this it seems that activities 
Also respondents were asked to define what type of 
linked to empowerment in FATA are most 
relationship Pakistan has with the UK. Again, a 
noticeable. Nevertheless, increased research is 
noteworthy finding is that one-third of respondents 
required to better understand what issues (for 
were not able to express an opinion. Thus, it 
Attitudes in favour of the UK have also improved that their perspective had worsened. While this 
with the UK maintaining the gains it acquired during response is troubling it remains part of a constant  
the 2010 survey. decline in this point of view since 2008; moreover 
this reduction does not appear to have damaged 
To try and further clarify the information presented overall perceptions. It is difficult to interpret the 
about the UK in Figure 8.3: respondents were asked significance of no change as it is not evident 
to state whether their current attitude had changed whether these respondents possessed a positive or 
in the last year. From the information recorded, negative attitude in the past.
some 10% considered their attitude to have 
improved. A change roughly comparable to the Reason for changing attitudes 
reduction in unfavourable attitudes recorded in Reasons for this change in opinion are unclear, but a 
Figure 8.5.  However, 22.5% were of the opinion 
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This intervention, combined with the diplomatic requiring additional research on the extent to 
support offered during the ‘Arab Spring’ may also which: direct military acts; training initiatives; 
influence the long held view that the UK is anti-development assistance projects; and/or 
Islam. As seen in Figure 8.10, it is a strongly held diplomatic overtures are considered positive or 
conviction that the UK is not favourably disposed negative. 
towards Islam by some 56.7% of respondents (with 
It is worth noting that this survey was conducted an additional 14.4% who considered this attitude to 
be less favourable); a viewpoint opposed by only before the successful, UN-mandated ‘no-fly zone’ 
3.4%.was imposed over Libya. This outcome, supported 
in large part by the UK, may affect attitudes towards 
Male FGDsUK’s prestige as a source of global peace and 
Male participants opined that (along with the US) security in 2012. 
UK’s actions and continued presence in Iraq and 
appears that, for a great many people, attitudes Attitudes towards UK international policy
In addition to these questions regarding the direct formed towards the UK are dependent on shared 
influence of the UK on Pakistan, survey participants perceptions of external UK activity rather than in 
were invited to give their opinions on the regard to its activities in Pakistan. 
international policies of the UK. This will also go 
Of those attitudes that did inspire opinion, the 
towards helping to understand what has improved 
prominence of perceived inequality in a UK-
attitudes towards these historically allied countries. 
Pakistan partnership is troubling as it may generate 
resentment, an outcome that would result in Global peace and stability
unfavourable attitudes and polices being formed Firstly, opinions were documented on the extent to 
and championed. Nevertheless, support appears to which the UK was perceived to have improved 
remain consistent from the approximate one-third peace and stability. Attitudes recorded in 2008 
of respondents who view the UK as either a partner mirror the dissatisfaction with the UK as recorded in 
or ally. Figure 8.5: that is over 60% of respondents 
disagreed and only 7% agreed. This implies that 
unfavourable attitudes are closely linked to Male FGDs
perceptions of harm recorded during the ‘War on Male respondents were quite vocal on this issue: 
Terror’ and not on diplomatic actions through the they stated that the UK (and US) is putting too much 
United Nations Security Council or other pressure on Pakistan to act beyond its capacity. And 
multilateral diplomatic initiatives. that greater appreciation is needed  because of the 
human losses and continued action despite an 
Although, in recent years perceptions appear to be 
unstable economy (which has struggled to find 
looking more favourably towards the UK, the 
international investment).  
dominant opinion remains that it is not improving 
global peace and security. In 2011: 19.3% of people Female FGDs 
thought the UK was contributing to global peace Female respondents were not as aware on the issue 
compared to 37% who thought it was not. It is not and remained uncertain. 
clear what aspects of UK policy are approved of, 
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This intervention, combined with the diplomatic requiring additional research on the extent to 
support offered during the ‘Arab Spring’ may also which: direct military acts; training initiatives; 
influence the long held view that the UK is anti-development assistance projects; and/or 
Islam. As seen in Figure 8.10, it is a strongly held diplomatic overtures are considered positive or 
conviction that the UK is not favourably disposed negative. 
towards Islam by some 56.7% of respondents (with 
It is worth noting that this survey was conducted an additional 14.4% who considered this attitude to 
be less favourable); a viewpoint opposed by only before the successful, UN-mandated ‘no-fly zone’ 
3.4%.was imposed over Libya. This outcome, supported 
in large part by the UK, may affect attitudes towards 
Male FGDsUK’s prestige as a source of global peace and 
Male participants opined that (along with the US) security in 2012. 
UK’s actions and continued presence in Iraq and 
appears that, for a great many people, attitudes Attitudes towards UK international policy
In addition to these questions regarding the direct formed towards the UK are dependent on shared 
influence of the UK on Pakistan, survey participants perceptions of external UK activity rather than in 
were invited to give their opinions on the regard to its activities in Pakistan. 
international policies of the UK. This will also go 
Of those attitudes that did inspire opinion, the 
towards helping to understand what has improved 
prominence of perceived inequality in a UK-
attitudes towards these historically allied countries. 
Pakistan partnership is troubling as it may generate 
resentment, an outcome that would result in Global peace and stability
unfavourable attitudes and polices being formed Firstly, opinions were documented on the extent to 
and championed. Nevertheless, support appears to which the UK was perceived to have improved 
remain consistent from the approximate one-third peace and stability. Attitudes recorded in 2008 
of respondents who view the UK as either a partner mirror the dissatisfaction with the UK as recorded in 
or ally. Figure 8.5: that is over 60% of respondents 
disagreed and only 7% agreed. This implies that 
unfavourable attitudes are closely linked to Male FGDs
perceptions of harm recorded during the ‘War on Male respondents were quite vocal on this issue: 
Terror’ and not on diplomatic actions through the they stated that the UK (and US) is putting too much 
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multilateral diplomatic initiatives. that greater appreciation is needed  because of the 
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international investment).  
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did value the UN; in contrast, 28.9% disagreed and towards improving global prosperity, although 
opined that the UK did not. attitudes appear to be losing their prominence. In 
2011, approximately one-third of respondents 
With regards to this question the most favourable considered that the UK was not adding value, while 
answer has been don’t know. This implies that there only 18.4% believed that they were. 
is a general lack of knowledge on UK values and a 
lack of awareness of international relations outside Reasons for this prominent negative attitude may 
of issues of direct concern to Pakistan, FATA and the be quite diverse: with attitudes possibly being 
Muslim world. To some extent this is unsurprising as linked to concern surrounding development 
international organisations are often controversial activities failing to improve economic opportunities 
and divide opinion within countries, let alone when in FATA or the apparent lack of support offered by 
trying to evaluate the perceptions of others. the UK for the general economy of Pakistan.
Promotion of global prosperity Efforts to safeguard the environment
Surprisingly perhaps, negative agreement is more With regard to UK initiatives to support the 
convincing with regard to the UK’s contributions conservation of the global environment, 
Afghanistan, combined with its uncompromising greater than those that support the UK’s actions. 
policy towards Iran, were inflammatory towards 
To some extent, this data needs to be treated with the Islamic world. Perceptions of the UK providing 
caution, as attitudes to development are relative unconditional support for Israel was also seen as 
(i.e. respondents values may not mirror those devaluing global peace and security, an outcome 
supported by the UK or the Pakistan community in that will result in increased global conflict. 
general). In FATA a significant minority sympathise 
These attitudes show that the West (including the (see Chapter 5) with the Taliban and support their 
UK) needs to work harder at ensuring greater public right to return to power in Afghanistan; that is, 
dialogue with Muslim nations to dispel inaccurate democracy would be better served by their defeat 
attitudes, and further, to ensure greater co- of the international forces in their homeland rather 
operation from Islamic countries when intervening than supporting the publicly-elected political 
in nations perceived to be within Muslim spheres- system that is supported by the UK. 
of-influence. 
Promotion of respect for Human Rights
Female FGDs Another pillar of UK foreign policy and tradition is 
Female respondents were unsure what role the UK support for Human Rights, but again perceptions 
was playing in peace-building initiatives so could roughly mirror those relating to democracy. 
not provide an opinion.
Again a certain amount of cultural relativism will 
have influenced respondents as differing attitudes Promotion of respect for democratic values
to what constitutes a breach of human rights is Following the question on peace and stability, 
visible among the FATA population, for example the respondents were asked to what extent they 
subjects of suicide bombing and ‘honour killing’ believed the UK contributed to the protection and 
(see Chapter 5). Also, attitudes are likely to be promotion of democratic values. The preservation 
influenced by the perceived anti-Islamic actions of and enrichment of democracy has always been a 
the UK around the world.key aspect of the UK’s foreign policy.  This aim, and 
ability to fulfil it, was not viewed with particular 
Support for the United Nations (UN)
support by interviewees. Since 2008, through to 
In addition to the questions above, respondents 2011, an approximate 20% of survey participants 
were further asked: did they think the UK values the have agreed that the UK has promoted respect for 
UN. The results show that beliefs are divided. In democratic values. This is opposed by, a continually 
2011, 22.3% of respondents considered that the UK decreasing, segment of society that is equal to or 
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did value the UN; in contrast, 28.9% disagreed and towards improving global prosperity, although 
opined that the UK did not. attitudes appear to be losing their prominence. In 
2011, approximately one-third of respondents 
With regards to this question the most favourable considered that the UK was not adding value, while 
answer has been don’t know. This implies that there only 18.4% believed that they were. 
is a general lack of knowledge on UK values and a 
lack of awareness of international relations outside Reasons for this prominent negative attitude may 
of issues of direct concern to Pakistan, FATA and the be quite diverse: with attitudes possibly being 
Muslim world. To some extent this is unsurprising as linked to concern surrounding development 
international organisations are often controversial activities failing to improve economic opportunities 
and divide opinion within countries, let alone when in FATA or the apparent lack of support offered by 
trying to evaluate the perceptions of others. the UK for the general economy of Pakistan.
Promotion of global prosperity Efforts to safeguard the environment
Surprisingly perhaps, negative agreement is more With regard to UK initiatives to support the 
convincing with regard to the UK’s contributions conservation of the global environment, 
Afghanistan, combined with its uncompromising greater than those that support the UK’s actions. 
policy towards Iran, were inflammatory towards 
To some extent, this data needs to be treated with the Islamic world. Perceptions of the UK providing 
caution, as attitudes to development are relative unconditional support for Israel was also seen as 
(i.e. respondents values may not mirror those devaluing global peace and security, an outcome 
supported by the UK or the Pakistan community in that will result in increased global conflict. 
general). In FATA a significant minority sympathise 
These attitudes show that the West (including the (see Chapter 5) with the Taliban and support their 
UK) needs to work harder at ensuring greater public right to return to power in Afghanistan; that is, 
dialogue with Muslim nations to dispel inaccurate democracy would be better served by their defeat 
attitudes, and further, to ensure greater co- of the international forces in their homeland rather 
operation from Islamic countries when intervening than supporting the publicly-elected political 
in nations perceived to be within Muslim spheres- system that is supported by the UK. 
of-influence. 
Promotion of respect for Human Rights
Female FGDs Another pillar of UK foreign policy and tradition is 
Female respondents were unsure what role the UK support for Human Rights, but again perceptions 
was playing in peace-building initiatives so could roughly mirror those relating to democracy. 
not provide an opinion.
Again a certain amount of cultural relativism will 
have influenced respondents as differing attitudes Promotion of respect for democratic values
to what constitutes a breach of human rights is Following the question on peace and stability, 
visible among the FATA population, for example the respondents were asked to what extent they 
subjects of suicide bombing and ‘honour killing’ believed the UK contributed to the protection and 
(see Chapter 5). Also, attitudes are likely to be promotion of democratic values. The preservation 
influenced by the perceived anti-Islamic actions of and enrichment of democracy has always been a 
the UK around the world.key aspect of the UK’s foreign policy.  This aim, and 
ability to fulfil it, was not viewed with particular 
Support for the United Nations (UN)
support by interviewees. Since 2008, through to 
In addition to the questions above, respondents 2011, an approximate 20% of survey participants 
were further asked: did they think the UK values the have agreed that the UK has promoted respect for 
UN. The results show that beliefs are divided. In democratic values. This is opposed by, a continually 
2011, 22.3% of respondents considered that the UK decreasing, segment of society that is equal to or 
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of respondents (double that recorded in 2010) have against UK actions, with 51.5% considering 
the potential to either escalate opposition to the UK themselves to not be in favour; a further 11.4% 
or increase its legitimacy in supporting stability (as were less favourable. While the strength of 
c o n s i d e r e d  b y  4 . 2 %  i n  2 0 1 1 )  a n d  opposition remains compelling, it is however 
rebuilding/developing Afghanistan (as considered reducing (from almost 90% in 2008). This change is 
by 4.9%). in the most part the result of increased indecision 
on the subject. According to male FGDs these 
To further investigate these perceptions, the survey concerns will be maintained as shared opinion 
asked the participants to define exactly how continues to be that international forces in 
favourably they viewed UK intervention in Afghanistan are impacting on the overall security 
Afghanistan. Unsurprisingly, the number of those situation in Pakistan, especially in FATA, an outcome 
that looked most favourable on UK activities that has caused internal displacement, loss of life 
equalled only 4.6%; while this is to be expected it is and destruction of property. 
troubling that this figure is approximately half that 
recorded in 2010 (and the lowest figure since 2008).  Attitudes towards the US are equally poor (see 
Figure 8.18) but with a concerning decrease of 
The majority of respondents had strong feelings support from those that would consider their Towards the end, respondents were asked to respondents were again split on the issue, but 
indicate how they would define the UK’s approximately half of those surveyed were not able 
involvement in Afghanistan: although one-quarter to provide an answer.
of respondents were unsure, the most common 
UK involvement in Afghanistan perceptions offered by interviewees were negative. 
While international involvement in Afghanistan and In total, almost one-third of respondents stated 
Iraq, led by the US and UK, are often discussed as that either the UK should not be Afghanistan at all 
one and the same, this survey sought to extract (20.3%) or they were engaged in an attack on Islam 
attitudes towards Afghanistan in isolation. This is (18.1%). However, it should be noted that these 
because Afghanistan is inextricably linked figures are considerably lower than those recorded 
ethnically and geographically with the people of in 2008.
FATA, while Iraq is a state that has little impact on 
As the survey was conducted before the death of 
the tribal areas; however, it would be naïve to think 
Osama bin Laden the answer: the UK will leave 
that news about the conflict has not to some extent 
Afghanistan as soon as Osama bin Laden is found 
influenced or reinforced individuals’ attitudes. 
has taken on increased significance as these 16.1% 
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of respondents (double that recorded in 2010) have against UK actions, with 51.5% considering 
the potential to either escalate opposition to the UK themselves to not be in favour; a further 11.4% 
or increase its legitimacy in supporting stability (as were less favourable. While the strength of 
c o n s i d e r e d  b y  4 . 2 %  i n  2 0 1 1 )  a n d  opposition remains compelling, it is however 
rebuilding/developing Afghanistan (as considered reducing (from almost 90% in 2008). This change is 
by 4.9%). in the most part the result of increased indecision 
on the subject. According to male FGDs these 
To further investigate these perceptions, the survey concerns will be maintained as shared opinion 
asked the participants to define exactly how continues to be that international forces in 
favourably they viewed UK intervention in Afghanistan are impacting on the overall security 
Afghanistan. Unsurprisingly, the number of those situation in Pakistan, especially in FATA, an outcome 
that looked most favourable on UK activities that has caused internal displacement, loss of life 
equalled only 4.6%; while this is to be expected it is and destruction of property. 
troubling that this figure is approximately half that 
recorded in 2010 (and the lowest figure since 2008).  Attitudes towards the US are equally poor (see 
Figure 8.18) but with a concerning decrease of 
The majority of respondents had strong feelings support from those that would consider their Towards the end, respondents were asked to respondents were again split on the issue, but 
indicate how they would define the UK’s approximately half of those surveyed were not able 
involvement in Afghanistan: although one-quarter to provide an answer.
of respondents were unsure, the most common 
UK involvement in Afghanistan perceptions offered by interviewees were negative. 
While international involvement in Afghanistan and In total, almost one-third of respondents stated 
Iraq, led by the US and UK, are often discussed as that either the UK should not be Afghanistan at all 
one and the same, this survey sought to extract (20.3%) or they were engaged in an attack on Islam 
attitudes towards Afghanistan in isolation. This is (18.1%). However, it should be noted that these 
because Afghanistan is inextricably linked figures are considerably lower than those recorded 
ethnically and geographically with the people of in 2008.
FATA, while Iraq is a state that has little impact on 
As the survey was conducted before the death of 
the tribal areas; however, it would be naïve to think 
Osama bin Laden the answer: the UK will leave 
that news about the conflict has not to some extent 
Afghanistan as soon as Osama bin Laden is found 
influenced or reinforced individuals’ attitudes. 
has taken on increased significance as these 16.1% 
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possibilities offered in Table 8.16. Possible not automatically mean they are positive towards 
alternative reasons to those listed are: shared their immigration policies, because of bad personal, 
culture and religious values or Talibanisation. familial or community experiences. Also, general 
attitudes, when expressed, are likely to be based on 
In spite of this, some did opine that the UK had less than adequate information (e.g. rumour) as 
invested Afghanistan’s infrastructure development direct interaction with these immigration policies is 
and were therefore working to improve the long- unlikely for the majority of respondents.
term stability of Afghanistan. 
Notwithstanding these caveats, it appears that 
Female FGDs respondents to some extent possess a negative 
Exclusion of women from political debate again point of view – a claim that is however, significantly 
denied female participants the opportunity to limited by over 50% of respondents not being able 
provide information on this issue. to provide an answer, of which some 30% had no 
opinion and this could represent a certain 
Attitudes towards the immigration policies of 
ambivalence to the domestic policy of the UK that 
the US and UK could be swayed either way by actual interaction 
As was seen in Chapter 1 (Figure 1.8 – 1.13): there with relevant processes. Only 5.9% of respondents 
appears to be some desire from the people of FATA were most favourable in their opinion of UK’s 
to leave the tribal areas. The majority would prefer immigration policy. Similar findings regarding 
to remain within Pakistan but some would consider favourability, if more exaggerated, can be seen with 
the US (1.4%) or the UK (2.4%). This interest has regard to the US.
encouraged the survey to make a study of general 
perceptions towards the immigration policies of Male FGDs
these two developed nations. In contrast to the findings recorded above, the 
majority of male respondents were favourable 
It must be noted that the number of respondents 
towards emigration to either the UK or US, possibly 
that previously identified US or UK as preferred 
showing that while these destinations are not the 
destinations are likely to have a positive attitude 
first choice of many, they remain an attractive 
towards the policies of these countries but it does 
involvement to be favourable: from 8% in 2010 to favourable variables are combined. 
less than 3% in 2011. 
Male FGDs
Similar reductions in the number of people that are As seen in Chapter 5, attitudes towards Afghanistan 
not favourable can be seen to those enjoyed by the and the Afghan Taliban are very important to 
UK, but attitudes towards the US are improving at a respondents; consequently, it was unsurprising 
slower rate. Also, it appears that the strength of that it inspired strong arguments in the male FGDs. 
feeling opposing US intervention is greater than 
Generally, respondents opposed UK involvement in that for the UK, with 62% of respondents stating 
Afghanistan: the reasons for this were not entirely they were not favourable, a figure that is equalled 
clear as respondents did not fully engage with the by UK dissenters if the not favourable and less 
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possibilities offered in Table 8.16. Possible not automatically mean they are positive towards 
alternative reasons to those listed are: shared their immigration policies, because of bad personal, 
culture and religious values or Talibanisation. familial or community experiences. Also, general 
attitudes, when expressed, are likely to be based on 
In spite of this, some did opine that the UK had less than adequate information (e.g. rumour) as 
invested Afghanistan’s infrastructure development direct interaction with these immigration policies is 
and were therefore working to improve the long- unlikely for the majority of respondents.
term stability of Afghanistan. 
Notwithstanding these caveats, it appears that 
Female FGDs respondents to some extent possess a negative 
Exclusion of women from political debate again point of view – a claim that is however, significantly 
denied female participants the opportunity to limited by over 50% of respondents not being able 
provide information on this issue. to provide an answer, of which some 30% had no 
opinion and this could represent a certain 
Attitudes towards the immigration policies of 
ambivalence to the domestic policy of the UK that 
the US and UK could be swayed either way by actual interaction 
As was seen in Chapter 1 (Figure 1.8 – 1.13): there with relevant processes. Only 5.9% of respondents 
appears to be some desire from the people of FATA were most favourable in their opinion of UK’s 
to leave the tribal areas. The majority would prefer immigration policy. Similar findings regarding 
to remain within Pakistan but some would consider favourability, if more exaggerated, can be seen with 
the US (1.4%) or the UK (2.4%). This interest has regard to the US.
encouraged the survey to make a study of general 
perceptions towards the immigration policies of Male FGDs
these two developed nations. In contrast to the findings recorded above, the 
majority of male respondents were favourable 
It must be noted that the number of respondents 
towards emigration to either the UK or US, possibly 
that previously identified US or UK as preferred 
showing that while these destinations are not the 
destinations are likely to have a positive attitude 
first choice of many, they remain an attractive 
towards the policies of these countries but it does 
involvement to be favourable: from 8% in 2010 to favourable variables are combined. 
less than 3% in 2011. 
Male FGDs
Similar reductions in the number of people that are As seen in Chapter 5, attitudes towards Afghanistan 
not favourable can be seen to those enjoyed by the and the Afghan Taliban are very important to 
UK, but attitudes towards the US are improving at a respondents; consequently, it was unsurprising 
slower rate. Also, it appears that the strength of that it inspired strong arguments in the male FGDs. 
feeling opposing US intervention is greater than 
Generally, respondents opposed UK involvement in that for the UK, with 62% of respondents stating 
Afghanistan: the reasons for this were not entirely they were not favourable, a figure that is equalled 
clear as respondents did not fully engage with the by UK dissenters if the not favourable and less 
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quarters that held a degree of hostility towards Opinion on major Muslim countries
Pakistan’s larger neighbour. 
Iran
China With regard to fellow Muslim nations, the survey 
In contrast to the ethnic/tribal links between firstly sought to document FATA perceptions 
Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the rivalry between regarding Iran. As seen in Figure 5.13: Ayatollah Ali 
Pakistan and India, relations with China are linked Khamene'i is seen as a trustworthy religious leader 
to more traditional strategic-diplomacy (i.e. trade, by a little over 13% of respondents; it is therefore, 
security  co-operation and development unsurprising that given his influence on the social 
23
and political direction of Iran that two-thirds of assistance).  This relationship is looked on very 
respondents were favourable towards the Islamic positively by respondents, with some three-
Republic: also, Iran’s inflammatory stance towards quarters describing ties between the two nations as 
very favourable somewhat favourable the West is also likely to have influenced (42.7%) or 
perceptions. The majority (37.9%) describes their (32.1%). This compares to only 10% that disagree. 
opinion as being somewhat favourable. 
Th is  dynamic  i s  s ign i f icant ,  in  that  i t  
While this endorsement of Iran is compelling, a comprehens ive ly  shows  that  b i - latera l  
stronger base of opposition is apparent than was relationships can be forged without reference to 
recorded for China – i.e. the strength of positive interactions with Islam and the Muslim world; 
attitudes appear to have reduced (with the number however, it is possible that China’s attitude towards 
of those providing a considerable endorsement Iran and Syria in the UN Security Council may have 
24
increased the strength of support for some. reducing by some 40%) – therefore support 
remains but with some reservations for the 
proposition for a larger proportion. With regard to Afghanistan
immigration policies, they were however, of the Over the last four years, opinion from FATA 
opinion that to gain entry would be very difficult, respondents appears to be improving. In 2011, a 
especially to the US, and therefore this positive clear majority of survey participants (63.8%) looked 
attitude cannot be reflected in the findings of the favourably on their neighbour; an increase on the 
survey as participants need to be recorded as at approximate 40% - 45% documented in between 
least less than favourable. 2008 and 2010. A changing of opinion that has also 
seen an equal but opposite change in unfavourable 
Female FGDs attitudes: with the combined number of 
In Pakhtun tribal society, women are not permitted interviewees with a negative perception reducing 
to emigrate for education or employment so female by half since 2010 to under one-quarter (23.5%). 
respondents were largely apathetic towards 
It is unclear whether respondents’ attitudes are immigration policy. 
based on support for Taliban operations – i.e. 
whether a resurgent militancy in Afghanistan has 
inspired greater support – or for the stabilisation 
This section of the chapter is divided into various and development activities of international actors 
parts, namely: geographically close nations; other improving opportunities (e.g. creating an 
Islamic nations; and other Western nations. In environment conducive to the return of refugees or 
general, these nations have sizable Pakistani trade). 
populations, but the survey team was unable to 
Indiadiscern if family ties linked respondents with any of 
Understandably, given regional tensions, these countries. 
particularly over Kashmir, and continual diplomatic 
Opinion on geographically close nations instability – e.g. following the 2008 (or 26/11) 
The 2011 survey has sought to map respondents’ Mumbai attacks by Pakistani Islamist insurgents – 
opinion using a scale that allows for greater insight favourability towards India is very low. In 2011, only 
into levels of favourability than those for the US and 8.2% of respondents looked on India with some 
UK. degree of approval. This is in contrast to the three-
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 See ‘China-Pakistan relations’, Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/china/china-pakistan-relations/p10070, 
accessed 8/12/2011
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 See for example ‘Analysts: Russia, China ready to block new UN sanctions on Iran’, Voice of America, 11/11/2011, 
http://www.voanews.com/english/news/middle-east/Analysts-Russia-China-Ready-to-Block-New-UN-Sanctions-on-Iran-
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http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/oct/05/russia-china-veto-syria-resolution, accessed 8/12/2011
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quarters that held a degree of hostility towards Opinion on major Muslim countries
Pakistan’s larger neighbour. 
Iran
China With regard to fellow Muslim nations, the survey 
In contrast to the ethnic/tribal links between firstly sought to document FATA perceptions 
Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the rivalry between regarding Iran. As seen in Figure 5.13: Ayatollah Ali 
Pakistan and India, relations with China are linked Khamene'i is seen as a trustworthy religious leader 
to more traditional strategic-diplomacy (i.e. trade, by a little over 13% of respondents; it is therefore, 
security  co-operation and development unsurprising that given his influence on the social 
23
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into levels of favourability than those for the US and 8.2% of respondents looked on India with some 
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majority. And almost 20% of respondents looked on opposition is held in FR DI Khan (47.5%); South 
Iran with mistrust, with half of this number Waziristan Agency (40.4%). FR Kohat (34.4%); FR 
considering their attitude to be very unfavourable. Lakki (30.0%); Kurram Agency (26.0%); and, FR 
Bannu (18.6%) contain above average levels of 
When attitudes were disaggregated by Agency/FR opposition. This in part is the result of sectarian 
however it can be seen that perceptions appear to differences between Sunni majority FATA and Shia 
be overly biased towards certain tribal areas: that majority Iraq. 
is, support is centred in Bajaur Agency (95.0%); FR 
Tank (87.5%); Khyber Agency (72.5%); and, Orakzai 
Agency (71.4%) – while in contrast significant 
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team asked respondents to give their opinions on banded together as one-and-the-same. Favourable 
other Western countries. perceptions towards the ‘West’ fluctuate between 
approximately 27% and 30%; this favourability is 
The survey accordingly focused on three countries very similar to that documented on the UK (6.1%: 
that had historically welcomed immigrant Muslims very favourable and 23.9%: somewhat favourable 
members, including those from the Pakhtun [see Figure 8.5]). The ‘West’ also mirrors the UK in 
Diaspora; namely: Canada, France and Germany. terms of numbers holdings a somewhat 
unfavourable attitude, with the ‘West’ scoring 
The findings are almost completely uniform 
between 10.0% and 12.0% compared to 
suggesting that, outside of the US, the West is 
approximately 11.0% for the UK.
Differences between the ‘West’ and the UK appear 
greatest with regard to very unfavourable opinions: 
the UK is perceived in a particularly negative light by 
some 37.0% compared to an approximate 17.0%-
18.0% for the ‘West’. This indicates that there is a 
greater deal of uncertainty about perceptions 
towards Canada, France and Germany than is 
apparent for the US and UK. 
Overall, the US appears to be treated apart from the 
‘West’ and UK, with perceptions being significantly 
more negative than other like-minded nations. 
However, as shown by the UK, attitudes towards 
Western nations may decline if greater numbers of 
people are engaged in debate.
25
comprising some 60% Muslims  - was generally Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia is the sight of two of the most holy positive. In 2011, some 60% of respondents looked 
cities of Islam. Making the Haj to Mecca and visiting on the country with some level of favourability, a 
Medina are personal goals for Muslims and to do so noteworthy rise in that recorded in 2009 and 2010. 
will earn individuals the right to add the title Haji to In comparison only approximately 20% of 
their name. Saudi Arabia is also a favoured city for respondents were unfavourable. The reason 
emigration, as reported in Figure 1.13, because of behind this attitude was illustrated in both male 
opportunities for employment. Some members of and female FGDs, where despite limited knowledge 
the male FGDs also felt that Pakistan should follow of the country, it was perceived that strong 
the example of Saudi Arabia and impose Sharia law. development had meant that Malaysia was a 
country that Pakistan should aspire to emulate.
Over the course of surveys, data shows that more 
than 80.0% of respondents are positively favoured What is interesting to highlight is that the number 
towards Saudi Arabia: and within this over three- of people that were not able to provide a response 
quarters are very favourable. In contrast just 4.5% was relatively low compared to other Figure in this 
are, to different degrees, unfavourable. These chapter, particularly those referring to the US and 
respondents are largely ‘progressive’ or ‘leftist’ in UK; therefore, it appears that respondents were 
their values, and they believe Saudi Arabia has used more confident in supplying an opinion on a Muslim 
FATA to fulfil their national agenda. country than one where social and religious 
differences may be more stark. 
Malaysia 
Opinion on Western countries: Canada, With regard to a Muslim country that is not of direct 
influence to Pakistan or a source of global political France, Germany
scrutiny, to the degree of other nations identified in To further understand FATA perceptions relating to 
this survey: it is found that respondents attitudes the US and UK, as well as those relating to 
towards Malaysia - a country with a population geographically close and Islamic nations, the survey 
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 ‘Malaysia’, CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/my.html, accessed 
8/12/2011
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26
 This lower level of support for France may be the result of the public debate and subsequent legislation banning the wearing 
of veils in public.
Understanding FATA144 Chapter 8: Attitudes Towards Pakistan’s International Relations Policies 145
team asked respondents to give their opinions on banded together as one-and-the-same. Favourable 
other Western countries. perceptions towards the ‘West’ fluctuate between 
approximately 27% and 30%; this favourability is 
The survey accordingly focused on three countries very similar to that documented on the UK (6.1%: 
that had historically welcomed immigrant Muslims very favourable and 23.9%: somewhat favourable 
members, including those from the Pakhtun [see Figure 8.5]). The ‘West’ also mirrors the UK in 
Diaspora; namely: Canada, France and Germany. terms of numbers holdings a somewhat 
unfavourable attitude, with the ‘West’ scoring 
The findings are almost completely uniform 
between 10.0% and 12.0% compared to 
suggesting that, outside of the US, the West is 
approximately 11.0% for the UK.
Differences between the ‘West’ and the UK appear 
greatest with regard to very unfavourable opinions: 
the UK is perceived in a particularly negative light by 
some 37.0% compared to an approximate 17.0%-
18.0% for the ‘West’. This indicates that there is a 
greater deal of uncertainty about perceptions 
towards Canada, France and Germany than is 
apparent for the US and UK. 
Overall, the US appears to be treated apart from the 
‘West’ and UK, with perceptions being significantly 
more negative than other like-minded nations. 
However, as shown by the UK, attitudes towards 
Western nations may decline if greater numbers of 
people are engaged in debate.
25
comprising some 60% Muslims  - was generally Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia is the sight of two of the most holy positive. In 2011, some 60% of respondents looked 
cities of Islam. Making the Haj to Mecca and visiting on the country with some level of favourability, a 
Medina are personal goals for Muslims and to do so noteworthy rise in that recorded in 2009 and 2010. 
will earn individuals the right to add the title Haji to In comparison only approximately 20% of 
their name. Saudi Arabia is also a favoured city for respondents were unfavourable. The reason 
emigration, as reported in Figure 1.13, because of behind this attitude was illustrated in both male 
opportunities for employment. Some members of and female FGDs, where despite limited knowledge 
the male FGDs also felt that Pakistan should follow of the country, it was perceived that strong 
the example of Saudi Arabia and impose Sharia law. development had meant that Malaysia was a 
country that Pakistan should aspire to emulate.
Over the course of surveys, data shows that more 
than 80.0% of respondents are positively favoured What is interesting to highlight is that the number 
towards Saudi Arabia: and within this over three- of people that were not able to provide a response 
quarters are very favourable. In contrast just 4.5% was relatively low compared to other Figure in this 
are, to different degrees, unfavourable. These chapter, particularly those referring to the US and 
respondents are largely ‘progressive’ or ‘leftist’ in UK; therefore, it appears that respondents were 
their values, and they believe Saudi Arabia has used more confident in supplying an opinion on a Muslim 
FATA to fulfil their national agenda. country than one where social and religious 
differences may be more stark. 
Malaysia 
Opinion on Western countries: Canada, With regard to a Muslim country that is not of direct 
influence to Pakistan or a source of global political France, Germany
scrutiny, to the degree of other nations identified in To further understand FATA perceptions relating to 
this survey: it is found that respondents attitudes the US and UK, as well as those relating to 
towards Malaysia - a country with a population geographically close and Islamic nations, the survey 
7
4
.2
1
.1 5
.6
2
.6
4
.9
7
7
.8
1
0
.7
2
.5 5
.8
1
.4
1
.8
6
6
.7
1
8
.8
2
.5
2
.0 5
.9
4
.0
1
3
.7
3
.0
9
.3
5
.0
3
.8
2
.7
7
4
.3
Very Favourable Somewhat
Favourable
Somewhat
Unfavourable
Very Unfavourable No Response Don’t Know
2008 (%) 2009 (%) 2010 (%) 2011 (%)
Figure 8.25: Opinion on relations with Saudi Arabia
25
 ‘Malaysia’, CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/my.html, accessed 
8/12/2011
1
6
.0
1
3
.6 1
8
.4
1
7
.1
2
3
.6
1
8
.6
4
0
.2
9
.7
8
.4
1
1
.8
1
1
.5
2
7
.1
7
.9
2
3
.8
4
.9
1
3
.0
1
2
.6
2
2
.2
Very Favourable Somewhat
Favourable
Somewhat
Unfavourable
Very Unfavourable Don’t Know No Response
2009 (%) 2010 (%) 2011 (%)
Figure 8.26: Opinion on relations with Malaysia
6
.8
1
1
.5
1
1
.9
1
0
.2
1
6
.7 1
8
.1
1
7
.3
2
6
4
.4 6
.2
2
2
.3
2
3
.3
2
2
.7
Canada France Germany 
Very favourable Somewhat favourable
Somewhat unfavourable Very unfavourable
Figure 8.27: Opinion on relations with Canada,
France, Germany
26
 This lower level of support for France may be the result of the public debate and subsequent legislation banning the wearing 
of veils in public.
Understanding FATA144 Chapter 8: Attitudes Towards Pakistan’s International Relations Policies 145
Conclusion
This chapter has investigated the people of FATA's 
perception on countries that have an influence on 
the politics, social and religious traditions and 
development. From the evidence it is clear that 
Islamic countries and those that are considered to 
be neutral to the affairs of Pakistan are more 
favourably perceived. However, from the attitudes 
disaggregated on Iran, certain tribal areas may be 
more supportive than others. 
With regard to those countries that are seen to be 
unfavourably influencing Pakistan more caution is 
evident; and, in the cases of India and the US, and to 
some extent the UK, particular hostility. Future 
research may wish to analyse how specific, 
significant events impact on these perceptions: for 
example, in 2011 the incidents of Quran burning in 
the US and UK, and the release of graphic photos 
reportedly showing abuses of Afghan civilians by 
ISAF forces; and what trust is placed in the reporting 
of incidents by media – with particular emphasis on 
whether the positive and negative actions of the 
Western world are reported in FATA.
As shown by the different issues questioned in the 
case of the UK this attitude persists regardless of 
international relations subjects. It is also apparent 
that the countries of the ‘West’, with the exception 
of the US are perceived in a generally universal way: 
consequently, activities to soften relationships 
should perhaps be undertaken at a multi-lateral 
level to holistically improve attitudes.
It is however, of some note that FATA is very 
defensive of its culture and traditions and therefore 
perceptions of hostility may not be universal to 
Pakistan (and Muslims), but it is likely to be an 
effective, if potentially exaggerated, guide. Further 
research would be required to test this supposition.
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perceptions of hostility may not be universal to 
Pakistan (and Muslims), but it is likely to be an 
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Because of neglect and political marginalisation, also reducing social space for militants and 
FATA remains one of the most under-developed extremists to justify their acts. 
areas of Pakistan. However, its prestige has grown 
Based on the findings of this year’s study, we in recent years following its prominent position in 
propose the following recommendations based on the ‘War on Terror’; a reality that has resulted in the 
three basic concepts: cultural appropriateness; Government of Pakistan allocating some PKR 15 
development of local capabilities; and community billion in the fiscal year 2010-11 to improve 
participation and tribal involvement. development and increase stability. This funding 
has been supported by additional aid and support 
Cultural Appropriateness: This survey has placed a 
from the international community for poverty 
great deal of emphasis on understanding the 
alleviation, infrastructure development, industrial 
culture of the Pakhtun; on customs, beliefs and 
development and growth and supporting local 
traditions. The key to solving perceived problems 
economies through the creation of employment 
and engaging the people in a grand project of 
opportunities (especially targeting the youth). 
inclusive nationhood is through respect and 
recognition of their traditions.  In spite of this investment of resources, the survey 
continues to map substantial mistrust directed 
Developing Local Capacities: In keeping with the 
towards those government officials and politicians 
concept of respecting culture and traditions, it is 
that are responsible for implementing reform, by 
crucial to have programmes that develop local 
the population of FATA. This evaluation of the FS 
capacity to assume the responsibilities of local 
and FDA is based on the direct experiences of 
governance and effective law enforcement; a 
people being excluded from making decisions and 
development that would allow for a transfer from 
monitoring the management of projects that are 
archaic colonial structures to contemporary 
supposed to be for their benefit. In not 
institutions. Experience indicates that even in the 
incorporating the views of local populations in the 
most challenging situations qualified local capacity 
government led FATA Sustainable Development 
has been able to negotiate with insurgents to 
Plan the activities are likely to be insensitive to local 
enable the continued implementation of 
dynamics and ignorant of communal aspirations. 
programmes under certain acceptable conditions. 
This in part, is the direct result of continued support 
for the archaic colonial structures that support the Community Participation and Tribal Involvement: 
status quo. As with all development interventions, community 
participation at the field level is crucial for social 
To reverse this discontent and to ensure greater 
change. Development partners must ensure that 
efficiency of project planning and implementation, 
community at large is taken into confidence to 
development activities must seek to empower the 
better ensure ownership of the programme, and to 
disenchanted in FATA, so that issues concerning 
aid in the monitoring and evaluation of the 
security (in both terms of ‘freedom from fear’ and 
performance of the leadership that is responsible 
‘freedom from want’) and prosperity can be 
for the collective priorities established in the 
championed. This outcome will improve trust in the 
proposed participatory planning process.  
government, and its international partners, while 
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through the olasi jirga. As compared to FCR jirga, to the protection of human rights
olasi jirga is widely respected, trusted and • Ensure that, if jirga is to continue, that a basic 
legitimised in FATA. A recent CAMP study on the code of conduct be agreed and adhered to
jirga system [Understanding Jirga: Legality and • Extend the jurisdiction of the higher judiciary 
Legitimacy in Pakistan’s Federally Administered into the FATA to protect those that feel 
Tribal Areas’] establishes the fact that more than mistreated by the jirga system
70% FATA population prefer olasi jirga – in • Consider installing a modern legal system as is 
comparison to just 12% of respondents that trusted the case in other Pakhtun dominated areas 
28
FCR jirga.   • Evaluate the value of demands by some 
participants for Sharia law 
Pakhtuns have historically preferred jirga to formal 
justice because: 1) it is conducted by respected 
elders with established social status and a 
knowledge of valued local traditions/values Strengthening the Frontier Corps: There is 
29
(customary law) reputations for piety and fairness;   international, national, and importantly local 
2) it dispenses quick justice; 3) it is cheap; 4) it is support for the Frontier Corps, as a culturally 
considered less susceptible to corruption or bias; representative security provider that is able to 
and, 5) it has an element of compensation for the effectively communicate and empathise with the 
victim. communit ies  that  they are  protect ing.  
Consequently, the recruitment and training of 
Although the jirga may be preferred for the reasons 
these paramilitaries should continue with the 
cited above, it is devalued by various systemic 
medium-term goal that these men would become 
weaknesses. It is of particularly concern that 
local law-enforcement officers after their security 
internationally endorsed human rights can be 
role has ended; it is therefore, essential that plans 
violated, especially with regard to women and 
be developed for their future so that they do not 
minorities; also, in cases of murder, jirga may 
become a further source of militancy or conflict 
30
recommend direct vengeance or badal, or swara.   
between tribes. 
Furthermore, despite perceptions of objectivity (as 
the decision maker is nominated by both sides) The future development of the Frontier Corps as a 
critics believe that decisions are made based on conventional law enforcement body could also be 
changing societal values rather than a fair and preferable as the Pakistan Police is not a desired 
impartial code of law. Victims also lack the institution in FATA. Furthermore, it will enable 
opportunity to appeal as under the Constitution in historical community organisations to take on new 
Article 247(7): the jurisdiction of the higher positive roles. The formation of Lashkars, could 
judiciary, that is to say the provincial High Courts perhaps, be re-focused on meeting humanitarian 
and the Supreme Court, does not extend to the emergencies (e.g. Red Crescent, emergency 
FATA.  rescue). 
Under international human rights law, Pakistan is To this end, the Government of Pakistan must:
obligated to ensure that, for all those living within • Instigate a review, in conjunction with 
its jurisdiction, their rights are protected. community representatives, of the cultural role 
Consequently, the jirga infringes on this. played by and aspirations for the Frontier 
Corps, Lashkars and Khasadars
To this end, the Government of Pakistan must: 
• Evaluate the potential law enforcement 
• Fully implement its responsibilities with regard 
potential of the Frontier Corps, and if 
Security
Political reform
Legal reforms - Reforming jirga
However, these reforms cannot be allowed to stall, 
as fundamental changes to administrative system 
Over a century ago, the highland Pakhtun tribes of of FATA (and its constitutional status) need to be 
Frontier [today’s FATA], represented by few maliks, debated and implemented. It remains, that the 
signed an agreement with the British Raj, which need for drastic change is absolute. 
comprised their civil liberties on so called freedom 
To this end, the Government of Pakistan must:
to practice their customs and traditions. This 
• Implement the Frontier Crimes Regulation 
article, served the interests of British and a small 
(FCR) (Amended) 2011 and Political Parties 
number of maliks who were privileged by the 
Ordinance 
British Raj through allowances. When Pakistan 
• Debate necessary reforms to FATA’s  
gained independence, and inherited the FATA 
administrative structures and put into practice 
region, the few privileged maliks negotiated the 
identified development opportunities
retention of their privileges. 
• Empower communities to exert greater 
The issue of administrative reforms, a process oversight of local governance
necessary for FATA to be in a stronger position to • Ensure all elements of society are sensitively, 
mainstream into Pakistan, has never been debated represented  
properly in parliament. Extension of the Adult • Champion political education to increase trust 
Franchise Act to FATA in 1996 was the first and better enable communities to engage with 
legislative change to FATA since the FCR was political parties 
enacted in 1901. • Enable opportunities for peaceful campaigning 
by disengaged and underrepresented 
Since the ‘War on Terror’ has focused international communities, social groups and minorities
attention on the region, the Government of • Use popular media to stimulate debate within 
Pakistan has been under immense pressure from and between communities to promote greater 
the international community, as well as civil society public monitoring and evaluation of local 
in Pakistan, to bring drastic governance reforms to governance institutions
the conflict-zones of FATA. To its credit, the 
Government of Pakistan led by the Pakistan 
People’s Party has shown its commitment when on 
12th August 2011 the President of Pakistan, Mr. Asif Jirga is a traditional justice system that has 
Ali Zardari, signed two regulations i.e. 1) FCR historically been practiced by Pakhtun communities 
(Amended) 2011 and 2) Political Parties Ordinance in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Under the Frontier 
for FATA. Crimes Regulation (FCR), Jirga is the only formal 
mechanism for dispensing justice and resolving 
These amendments, once implemented, will help 
conflicts in the FATA. Jirga in every day practice 
address several local grievances and will also help in 
refers to a tribal institution of decision-making and 
creating a supporting environment for the 
dispute settlement that incorporates the prevalent 
stakeholders to undertake development and 
local customary law, institutional rituals and a body 
conflict resolution initiatives. Besides, political 
of village elders whose collective decision about the 
parties will need to take greater consideration of 
resolution of a dispute (or local problem) is binding 
the aspirations of FATA communities and engage in 
27
on the parties involved.  
campaigns that will involve local people, especially 
youth, in a productive way, reducing space for the 
At present, justice dispensation services in FATA 
militant groups to exploit the already aggrieved 
operate through two structures: the official FCR 
young.
jirga and community-based dispute resolution 
27
 Ali Wardak, University of Glamorgan, UK, (2002 b). Note: The Pashtun/Pukhtun jirga system is almost the same on both sides 
of the Afghan-Pakistan border.
28
 ‘Understanding Jirga: Legality and Legitimacy in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas’, by Naveed Ahmad Shinwari, 
Published by CAMP, July 2011 (www.camp.org.pk) 
29
 Building a Post-War Justice System in Afghanistan:  Ali Wardak, University of Glamorgan, UK. 
30
 Swara means marriage of a woman from the offender’s family/tribe to the victim’s close relative without her consent
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areas, and then by extension FATA as a whole. One 
of the potential side effects of this strategy may be 
the potential to develop tools that would enable 
c loser  bi- lateral  relat ions between the 
Governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan. 
Another theme of this chapter has been the need 
for development strategies and the strengthening 
of the Frontier Corps, as part of efforts to counter 
the insurgency.  Moreover, the government must 
ensure that non-combatants are better protected 
from excessive force from the military to counter 
the insurgency. Consequently, military operations 
must be deliberately calculated, with long-term 
gains being prioritised over short-term expediency 
(a potential cause of disaffection and social and 
political hostility). 
The ‘Way Forward’ may be our concluding chapter, 
but it should be the beginning of a new chapter in 
Pakistan, the international community, and, most 
importantly, for the Pakhtun on both sides of the 
border. 
applicable prepare training mechanisms for A fg h a n i s t a n  t o  i m p r o v e  e c o n o m i c  
this role o p p o r t u n i t i e s  a m o n g  a n d  b e t w e e n  
• Prepare policies for either integration of communities
Frontier Corps into formal security sector or • Work with Afghanistan partners to improve 
reintegration into civilian life positive political education 
• Support improved civil society co-operation to 
Military strategies and tactics: As we have seen in aid in activities such as the education of the 
the survey data, the FATA population supports role FATA population to better reduce the efficacy of 
and efforts of the Pakistan Army to combat Afghan and Pakistani Taliban
militancy in FATA but the Government of Pakistan 
must:
• Investigate how excessive force has 
exacerbated internal displacement and the The ‘Way Forward’ provides a substantial agenda 
destruction of property for addressing the development, law and order, and 
• Evaluate the role international aid can play in international issues identified by the people of 
improving military efficiency and capacity, FATA. Importantly, based on the cultural foundation 
while remaining sensitive to local attitudes to of the Pakhtun, the proposed 'Way Forward’ 
external intervention includes a methodology for the effective 
• Analyse the value of drones in the ‘War on engagement of government with the people of 
Terror’ FATA, in formulating a lasting solution to archaic 
governance structures.
The agenda proposed is a grand project that, 
In both FATA and Afghanistan substantial unfortunately, does not have any short cuts for 
international and national commitments have been success. As described, it will require bold steps on 
undertaken regarding development. Similar social the part of the Government of Pakistan, 
and economic conditions present on both sides of accompanied by dedicated and unwavering 
the border, enable (just as that which has occurred support from the international community, as well 
with security) the potential for co-ordinated as the commitment of tribal cultures to relax their 
activities. At present, the dislocation of activities long-held traditions. 
has led to some incidents of resentment. 
It is clear from the opinions expressed that 
Furthermore, the economies of Pakistan and ‘engagement’ of the people is desired. The platform 
Afghanistan have often benefitted from informal for that engagement should be devolution in three 
trade relations: therefore, where security permits, key areas: 1) governance; 2) the rule of law; and 3) 
a more co-operative border would provide greater strengthening of FATA security mechanisms. The 
opportunities for the communities of both FATA and first recommendation would require radical change 
Afghanistan. in the FATA Secretariat, because, in its place the 
recommendation is for elected leadership and 
To this end, The Government of Pakistan must: publicly accountable local administration 
• Seek to facilitate, where appropriate, greater infrastructure.  As described and pointed out in the 
co-ord inat ion  of  act iv i t ies  between report, the second and third key areas are 
communities in FATA and Afghanistan, through important culturally and are respected local 
representative and accountable bi-lateral civil institutions.   
commissions, to improve the sensitivity of 
development projects In keeping with the historical analysis and the 
• Consider, in consultation with tribal structures, strategic role that the cross border transportation 
implementation of development corridors, routes can, and do play in the business and 
across the border employment of the people of FATA, development 
• Improve trade routes between FATA and corridors may stimulate the economy of border 
Conclusion
Cross-border solidarity
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This research report is based on both qualitative seeking this equal division of opinions the survey 
and quantitative data. Supporting material was sought to address the cultural tendency of 
used, where appropriate, from desk-based marginalizing women.
research of published studies, newspapers articles 
and the historical experiences of CAMP 
programmes. 
Qualitative information was gathered from 
Focus-group discussions (FGDs)eighteen focus-group discussions. Minutes were 
The organising of focus groups, as a qualitative recorded and analysed, before being contrasted 
research tool, is a helpful means of documenting with the data recorded in the quantitative 
the views of locally-respected informants. All questionnaire. 
sections of the FATA society were included in these 
Quantitative data was collected through the use of 
discussions: with participants chosen in order to 
a structured questionnaire. The objective of this 
provide a diversity of political, social, technical and 
process is to sample both adult males and females 
religious backgrounds. 
to record their perceptions of key issues related to 
FGDs were designed to provide a forum for their lives in FATA. As gender plays such an 
informants to express their points-of-view, in order important role in public opinion, the sample was 
to represent and explain key perspectives on the designed to interview equal numbers of males and 
different issues related to the FATA region.  A total females in each community; this was the case 
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The themes discussed included: the constitutional Stratified Sampling Method (PSSM) to ensure the 
status of FATA; Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR); most representative sample. One of the advantages 
Presidential Ordinances/regulations and their of quantitative sampling is that a small proportion 
impact on the governance systems of FATA; present of people can be used to make assumptions for 
social, political, economic and administrative communities as a whole. Framework M.2 shows the 
structures;  pace of  development;  local  resultant sample size by area:
opportunities for contributing to development 
Margin of Error: The estimated margin of error for activities; law and order in FATA; governmental 
this survey – based on single questions of a ‘Yes/No’ decisions in a post-9/11 context; the crackdown on 
for the ’people of FATA’ as a whole - is approximately militant groups in FATA and Swat; US drone attacks 
1.5%, equalling a 95% confidence level.  That is, if a in FATA and their impact; and the inclusion of 
random sample were taken 100 times, in 95 cases women in decision-making.
the expectation would be that differences in 
answers would be plus or minus less than 1.5%. 
However, at the local level (i.e. looking at a specific In addition to having a well-structured 
agency or frontier region) then the margin of error questionnaire, successful social research requires a 
increases because it will comprise a smaller sensitive sampling framework: one that is 
proportional sample size.manageable and positively representative. Overall, 
the quantitative survey aimed to sample all of FATA 
31
with only a minimal margin for error.  It was 
considered that for an area with an estimated 
Accessibility32
population of four million  a sample of 4,000 
At the beginning of this project CAMP evaluated 
people was necessary.  
information on the accessibility of areas within 
FATA resulting in a list of villages, towns and tehsils Accordingly, 3,480 people were selected from the 7 
that were considered unreachable because of any Agencies of FATA, the remainder being taken from 
of the following concerns: security, governmental the 6 frontier regions, using a Proportionate 
II. Quantitative
Sampling Plan and Field Implementation
31
 The desired margin of error for the whole of FATA was less than 2% but it is acknowledged that in areas of smaller sample size 
then the margin of error may exceed this.   
32
 As there is no up-to-data data for FATA, this figure is based on the 1998 census.  
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imposed curfew and/or extreme weather FATA was limited because of different concerns.  
conditions. In total, 403 locations (42%) in FATA This, it must be acknowledged, inevitably limits 
were considered out-of-reach of the survey team. perceptions recorded to more peaceful areas in 
Of the remaining 557 population centres, 400 were each Agency and FATA in general.  This omission 
sampled. may well have affected the findings contained 
within the survey, for, as seen by the perceptions of 
These 400 locations were selected using a two- those who had been victims of internal 
stage process. Firstly, CAMP randomly selected a displacement and those who had not, differences 
sample of accessible tehsils, within which the 400 can arise because of life experiences.  
villages/towns were indiscriminately selected 
during the second stage. Aside from what could be discerned from areas that 
have suffered similar insecurity to those areas that 
A total of 10 interviews were conducted in each remain closed to the survey team, it is not clear how 
location, with half of the respondents representing these 42% of the approximately 690 villages in FATA 
male perspectives and the other female. In keeping would have perceived different subjects in FATA. 
with local culture: female enumerators interviewed What is known is that participants from these 
women, and male enumerators interviewed men. largely rural areas would have (if included) changed 
the demographic and cultural perspectives of the 
The resulting quantitative research structure is 
survey.
shown in Framework M.3:
This omission of insecure locations should not 
Limitations because of inaccessibility: As 
reduce the value of the findings for decision-makers 
previously noted, access to all population centres in 
Framework M.2
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and key stakeholders, as the information presented on their contact sheet.
is still very illustrative of the thoughts and feelings 
Limitations in using the ‘starting point’ of a significant number of people in FATA. 
methodology: The starting points in each village Consequently, they should still be used as a guide 
were local landmarks, from which enumerators on the direction of a more peaceful tribal area in the 
would interview respondents by targeting those future.
behind every third door or compound. This 
approach, it must be noted, created bias in the 
sample towards the centre of each location; Within each selected location enumerators were 
residents in these urban areas are more typically divided into four areas (i.e. two for male 
wealthy, educated and/or from more established enumerators and two for female enumerators) 
families. This reality is likely to have influenced the from which either two or three interviews were 
findings of the survey as perceptions are likely to conducted (comprising a total of five men and five 
have been influenced by experiences within this women). In each area, interviewees were targeted 
e n v i r o n m e n t :  a l s o  i t  m a y  p r o v i d e  a  around significant local landmarks (or ‘starting 
disproportionate sample of literacy levels, access to points’), such as: hujra of a prominent Malik, 
media and educational status than might otherwise mosques, Imam Bargah in Shia communities, 
have been expected in FATA.successful shops, schools and hospitals. 
Again, this limitation should not diminish the value From these areas interviewees were selected 
of the data presented, as the aspirations of those randomly, with male enumerators selecting 
interviewed still positively reveal the development unknown households from one side and female 
trends desired by a substantial proportion of the enumerators selecting unknown households on the 
FATA population, and also reveals how the interests other. In areas where this rule could not be properly 
of ‘elites’ in society may impact on the future applied, enumerators made note of this difficulty 
Selection of interviewees
Framework M.3
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direction of life in the tribal areas, outcomes that incorporated both open and closed response 
will affect the region as a whole, regardless of status questions, replicating those used in 2008, 2009 and 
or geographical location. 2010, with some new questions for the year 2011 
survey.    
Method of respondent selection 
Prior to conducting an interview, the enumerators 
ensured that potential respondents were at least 18 Prior to the commencement of the survey, CAMP 
years old, indigenous to FATA and that they were Enumerators were trained by independent 
from the location under investigation. Enumerators consultants, under the supervision of CAMP senior 
also ensured that interviewees had not participated management, on the questionnaire methodology 
in any survey during the six months prior to the date and on security. This process was accompanied by a 
of questioning. pre-testing of the questionnaire. 
The Kish-grid methodology was used for selecting Pre-testing aimed to:
respondents from within a sampled house, if • Determine the time length of the interview 
33
applicable.  If the selected respondent was • Check questionnaire content  
unavailable a ‘substitute’ could be interviewed • Check the skipping and coding patterns 
using a predefined rule. • Correct and improve translation
It is believed that this sampling method provides a Pre-tests were conducted with the support of adult 
robust quantitative survey with only limited margin Pakistani males and females, aged 18 and over, in 
of error, but with some caveats as defined above. suburbs of Peshawar on 4 July 2011. The average 
time of each interview, during these pre-tests, was 
55 minutes: with the minimum time taken being 45 
The questionnaire used for this 2011 survey minutes and the maximum being 65 minutes. 
Questionnaire 
Interviewer training
Box M.1
Some alterations to selected survey locations had to be undertaken during the conducting of the 
research. These are summarised below:
• In Bajaur, the survey team were unable to access Mamund Tehsil because of cross-border attacks 
on security forces. In consultation with CAMP’s Survey Management, enumerators changed 
focus to alternative villages in Bajaur.
• Military operation in Central Kurram prevented the survey team from accessing the local 
population of the intended sample village. CAMP’s Survey Management advised enumerators to 
seek relevant participants from IDP camps located in Lower Kurram. 
• The survey team was unable to access the Mehsud areas of South Waziristan because of the 
internal displacement of the local community following military operation: which started in 
2009.  
• Ongoing drone attacks in North Waziristan also limited activities as the survey team felt unable 
to take all their equipment for fear that local communities may mistake them for US spies.  
33 
Kish-grid is a form of equal probability sampling that follows a set of protocols where potential interviewees are listed by the 
enumerator, for example according to their age, and then selected by a predefined rule. 
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Based on the pre-tests CAMP is confident that 
enumerators possessed a strong general 
understanding of the questionnaire and that they 
were able to able to professionally read the 
questions to respondents as written and without 
bias. Furthermore, the survey team sought to 
employ enumerators that would be sensitive to 
local traditions by employing interviewers who 
were culturally local to the areas within which they 
were working.
Throughout the sampling, supervisors ensured that 
standards were maintained by utilising different 
consultancy; of the remainder, the majority 2,381 checking methods. At the conclusion of the survey, 
(59.5% of the total number) were thoroughly back-feedback collected on the substance and structure 
checked by supervisors revisiting the villages and of the questionnaire was shared with the senior 
confirming details with respondents, their families management of CAMP. 
or locals. In addition, the finding of a further 240 
interviews (6.0%) were confirmed via telephone 
Upon the completion of the survey, CAMP recorded conversations from CAMP’s regional office in 
the answers to all the 4,000 questionnaires using a Peshawar. 
database entry program.  The data was then 
Only 18.3% of the interviews were not back-checked and cleaned using SPSS, a statistical 
checked. As problems were not identified during analysis computer program. 
the confirmation process, CAMP confidently 
presumes that these responses are accurate.
Management and co-ordination of the survey was 
shared between CAMP’s Islamabad based Project 
Coordinator and its Survey Manager based in the 
Peshawar regional office. The responsibilities of 
these officials included: co-ordinating training of 
enumerators, pre-testing of the questionnaire and 
field implementation. 
During the conducting of the survey, CAMP’s head 
office provided additional coverage of the process, 
along with field offices in the Agencies of Bajaur, 
Mohmand, Khyber, Orakzai, Kurram, North 
Waziristan and South Waziristan of FATA. 
Framework 4 below provides a breakdown of the 
number of questionnaires that were subject to a 
back-check. Back-checking was undertaken by one 
of CAMP’s field offices, as well as from the CAMP 
regional office in Peshawar. 
Back-checking of data was undertaken using a 
variety of methods. 647 (16.2%) interviews were 
observed by supervisors at the time of the 
Data entry and cleaning
Survey Management and Monitoring
Back-checking 
Framework M.4
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Conclusion
Although some compromises have had to be made 
during the conducting of the survey (i.e. in 
calculating the total population and accessing only 
secure locations), which may have resulted in some 
distortion to the findings, it is believed that the data 
remains valuable and that the sampling framework 
employed was appropriate. The professional 
execution of the survey also provides confidence 
that the information on FATA is within the margin of 
error desired. 
Framework M.5
Contact sheet and response rate
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Gender Equality Age group
The survey has been designed to document the 
different perceptions and concerns of male and 
female respondents in FATA. Graph A.1 below 
shows that over subsequent years CAMP has 
gradually worked to decrease gender disparity, a 
benefit gained from historical experience of 
fieldwork and increased access in FATA. 
All surveys appear to have consistently targeted a 
range of age groups. Within these age groups, those 
of 18-29 years and 30-49 remain dominant; in 2011, 
these groups accounted for 39.2% and 46.1% 
respectively. These figures roughly correspond with 
those that were recorded in the past.
Respondents from 50+ year age groups remained 
relatively low. This should not be taken as a visual 
display of youth gaining greater influence over 
decision making, as tribal elders retain much 
influence, but instead is likely to be a 
representation of a national demographic fact: that 
is, Pakistan has experienced a growth in the number 
of youths within its population. Furthermore, it is 
not evident how many elders were substituted 
because they were absent during quantitative 
research. Sampling was simply targeted at adults 
over 18 years of age, with interviews being selected 
by the Kish-grid mechanism.
The most under-represented age group was 65 + 
years. In 2011, only 2.2% of respondents fell within 
this age group. While, data on 50-65 years shows 
that they comprised 12.5% of the 2011 sample. 
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Education university educations where 6.7% of respondents 
The following data shows the educational level of had attained a bachelor’s degree and 2.9% a 
respondents between 2008 and 2011. Following master’s degree. 
the implementation of the Kish-Grid methodology 
Other figures remained largely consistent from 
in 2009, the education levels of respondents have 
between surveys undertaken using the Kish-Grid 
been roughly comparable. The 2008 survey appears 
method. 
to show that an above average level of education 
was represented by the survey.
In 2011 a significant number of respondents Education of the head of the family
(39.5%) were not schooled and a further 8.8% were If the respondent was not the head of the family 
only schooled up to a primary level, a negligible then they were asked what level of education the 
34decrease in the combined total (49.0%) recorded in head of the family possessed.  The data shows that 
2010. Furthermore, 9.4% of interviewees were heads of households outside of those that were 
found to have received religious education only, an survey respondents were generally lower educated 
increase of the 7.8% in 2010 but below the 2009 than respondents, with 60% possessing an 
high of 11.8%. This means that the majority of education below a mid-level. However, it does 
respondents did not possess a mid-level or higher appear that this figure is a reduction to those 
education. recorded in 2009 and 2010.
Encouragingly the number of respondents Overall, the data implies that education is growing 
educated up to secondary school certificate in importance in FATA with respondents showing 
continues to grow, albeit very slowly. In 2011, 14.0% greater levels of secondary school qualifications, as 
of respondents had attained this level of education, well as university education, than their elder family 
up from 13.5% in 2010 and 12.5% in 2009, a members. This may help to explain why education is 
phenomenon that is repeated with regard to growing in importance as detailed in Chapter 1. 
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 It is notable that it is very rare for a female to be head of a household therefore these statistics will largely refer to male 
education levels of what could be expected to be older generations.
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Gender Equality Age group
The survey has been designed to document the 
different perceptions and concerns of male and 
female respondents in FATA. Graph A.1 below 
shows that over subsequent years CAMP has 
gradually worked to decrease gender disparity, a 
benefit gained from historical experience of 
fieldwork and increased access in FATA. 
All surveys appear to have consistently targeted a 
range of age groups. Within these age groups, those 
of 18-29 years and 30-49 remain dominant; in 2011, 
these groups accounted for 39.2% and 46.1% 
respectively. These figures roughly correspond with 
those that were recorded in the past.
Respondents from 50+ year age groups remained 
relatively low. This should not be taken as a visual 
display of youth gaining greater influence over 
decision making, as tribal elders retain much 
influence, but instead is likely to be a 
representation of a national demographic fact: that 
is, Pakistan has experienced a growth in the number 
of youths within its population. Furthermore, it is 
not evident how many elders were substituted 
because they were absent during quantitative 
research. Sampling was simply targeted at adults 
over 18 years of age, with interviews being selected 
by the Kish-grid mechanism.
The most under-represented age group was 65 + 
years. In 2011, only 2.2% of respondents fell within 
this age group. While, data on 50-65 years shows 
that they comprised 12.5% of the 2011 sample. 
Male Female
2008 (%) 2009 (%) 2010 (%) 2011 (%)
5
0
.0
5
0
.0
5
9
.6
5
0
.4
4
0
.0
6
0
.0
2
9
.1
7
1
.0
80.0
70.0
60.0
50.0
40.0
30.0
20.0
10.0
0.0
18-29 Years
3
7
.5
50.0
40.0
30.0
20.0
10.0
0.0
2008 (%) 2009 (%) 2010 (%) 2011 (%)
39-40 Years 50-65 Years 65 + Years
3
7
.0
3
5
.5
3
9
.2
4
4
.4
3
9
.1
4
6
.9
4
6
.1
1
4
.5
1
6
.2
1
5
.3
1
2
.5
3
.7 7
.7
2
.3
2
.2
Demographics of survey
APPENDIX II
Graph A.1
Graph A.2
Understanding FATA164
Education university educations where 6.7% of respondents 
The following data shows the educational level of had attained a bachelor’s degree and 2.9% a 
respondents between 2008 and 2011. Following master’s degree. 
the implementation of the Kish-Grid methodology 
Other figures remained largely consistent from 
in 2009, the education levels of respondents have 
between surveys undertaken using the Kish-Grid 
been roughly comparable. The 2008 survey appears 
method. 
to show that an above average level of education 
was represented by the survey.
In 2011 a significant number of respondents Education of the head of the family
(39.5%) were not schooled and a further 8.8% were If the respondent was not the head of the family 
only schooled up to a primary level, a negligible then they were asked what level of education the 
34decrease in the combined total (49.0%) recorded in head of the family possessed.  The data shows that 
2010. Furthermore, 9.4% of interviewees were heads of households outside of those that were 
found to have received religious education only, an survey respondents were generally lower educated 
increase of the 7.8% in 2010 but below the 2009 than respondents, with 60% possessing an 
high of 11.8%. This means that the majority of education below a mid-level. However, it does 
respondents did not possess a mid-level or higher appear that this figure is a reduction to those 
education. recorded in 2009 and 2010.
Encouragingly the number of respondents Overall, the data implies that education is growing 
educated up to secondary school certificate in importance in FATA with respondents showing 
continues to grow, albeit very slowly. In 2011, 14.0% greater levels of secondary school qualifications, as 
of respondents had attained this level of education, well as university education, than their elder family 
up from 13.5% in 2010 and 12.5% in 2009, a members. This may help to explain why education is 
phenomenon that is repeated with regard to growing in importance as detailed in Chapter 1. 
34
 It is notable that it is very rare for a female to be head of a household therefore these statistics will largely refer to male 
education levels of what could be expected to be older generations.
Table A.1: Education (General)
Appendix II: Demographics of Survey 165
Occupation tailoring (4.1%).
In addition to education levels, respondents were 
The data also clearly shows a gradual decrease in 
asked to define their primary occupation. In recent 
the number of agriculture-based employment.  
years, the largest source of ‘employment’ has been 
Since 2008 the number of agricultural labourers 
as a housewife, however this figure has reduced for 
and farm owners has consistently fallen; in 2011 
the 2011 survey. The percentage however, shows 
only 7.1% and 0.2% were employed in these roles 
that of female respondents interviewed a very 
respectively. This in part, is due to internal 
significant proportion are employed within the 
displacement forcing rural areas to be evacuated 
home and do not possess ‘careers’. This is in keeping 
for military operations and resulting in the loss of 
with cultural traditions but may also explain the 
livestock and land. Also, to some extent, it may be 
demands for female empowerment recorded in 
an example of global trends in rural-urban 
Chapter 1. 
economic migration. 
Another leading occupation was that of home-
Of the remaining categories, it is interesting to note 
based worker, which has dramatically increased to 
that business ownership has more than doubled 
22.1% (2011) from 2.7% in 2010. While it is not clear 
since 2010. In 2011, 9.4% of respondents described 
what the job description of home-based worker 
their occupation as small business owner and 4.7% 
comprises, it is notable that the approximate 20.0% 
as a large business owner – by comparison, the 
increase in this occupation is similar to the 
figures were 5.1% and 1.5% respectively in 2010. 
reduction in the housewife category. Consequently, 
it may be that female respondents are re-classifying 
It is discouraging however, to see that levels of 
their roles within the home. If this possibility is 
unemployment have risen to 8.1% in 2011. It is also 
correct, it reaffirms the marginalised position of 
notable that the information contained within 
women in terms of employment outlined above. 
Table A.3 does not provide an effective analysis for 
However, this is conjecture, and no real information 
hours of employment – that is, it is not clear the 
is available to understand this change. 
extent to which respondents may consider 
themselves to be under-employed. 
Female dominated occupations also include.; 
women’s health workers (0.8%), teachers (4.8%) 
and some skilled trades, including embroidery and 
Table A.2: Education of head of the household
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Occupation by gender 
From the survey result it is apparent that men are From the data it appears that the income levels of 
more likely to be unemployed than women, which respondents remain lower than could be expected 
may have implications for family incomes as males in other urban centres across Pakistan. This 
generally provide the greatest economic contrasts with the perception that the people of 
contribution in FATA. FATA are prospering due to black market 
opportunities made available because of the 
In rural tribal areas, some women are owners of conflict (e.g. smuggling of heroine and opium and 
small businesses or farmland. This is interesting illicit arms manufacturing). 
because, in tribal society, female inheritance is 
discouraged. In these circumstances, it is likely that In 2001, approximately one-third of respondents 
the female respondent was also the head of their earned PKR 10,000 or less, one-third earned 
family.  between PKR 10,001 and 15,000, and one-third 
Income level of the respondents
Table A.3: Occupation (General)
Appendix II: Demographics of Survey 167
Occupation tailoring (4.1%).
In addition to education levels, respondents were 
The data also clearly shows a gradual decrease in 
asked to define their primary occupation. In recent 
the number of agriculture-based employment.  
years, the largest source of ‘employment’ has been 
Since 2008 the number of agricultural labourers 
as a housewife, however this figure has reduced for 
and farm owners has consistently fallen; in 2011 
the 2011 survey. The percentage however, shows 
only 7.1% and 0.2% were employed in these roles 
that of female respondents interviewed a very 
respectively. This in part, is due to internal 
significant proportion are employed within the 
displacement forcing rural areas to be evacuated 
home and do not possess ‘careers’. This is in keeping 
for military operations and resulting in the loss of 
with cultural traditions but may also explain the 
livestock and land. Also, to some extent, it may be 
demands for female empowerment recorded in 
an example of global trends in rural-urban 
Chapter 1. 
economic migration. 
Another leading occupation was that of home-
Of the remaining categories, it is interesting to note 
based worker, which has dramatically increased to 
that business ownership has more than doubled 
22.1% (2011) from 2.7% in 2010. While it is not clear 
since 2010. In 2011, 9.4% of respondents described 
what the job description of home-based worker 
their occupation as small business owner and 4.7% 
comprises, it is notable that the approximate 20.0% 
as a large business owner – by comparison, the 
increase in this occupation is similar to the 
figures were 5.1% and 1.5% respectively in 2010. 
reduction in the housewife category. Consequently, 
it may be that female respondents are re-classifying 
It is discouraging however, to see that levels of 
their roles within the home. If this possibility is 
unemployment have risen to 8.1% in 2011. It is also 
correct, it reaffirms the marginalised position of 
notable that the information contained within 
women in terms of employment outlined above. 
Table A.3 does not provide an effective analysis for 
However, this is conjecture, and no real information 
hours of employment – that is, it is not clear the 
is available to understand this change. 
extent to which respondents may consider 
themselves to be under-employed. 
Female dominated occupations also include.; 
women’s health workers (0.8%), teachers (4.8%) 
and some skilled trades, including embroidery and 
Table A.2: Education of head of the household
Understanding FATA166
Occupation by gender 
From the survey result it is apparent that men are From the data it appears that the income levels of 
more likely to be unemployed than women, which respondents remain lower than could be expected 
may have implications for family incomes as males in other urban centres across Pakistan. This 
generally provide the greatest economic contrasts with the perception that the people of 
contribution in FATA. FATA are prospering due to black market 
opportunities made available because of the 
In rural tribal areas, some women are owners of conflict (e.g. smuggling of heroine and opium and 
small businesses or farmland. This is interesting illicit arms manufacturing). 
because, in tribal society, female inheritance is 
discouraged. In these circumstances, it is likely that In 2001, approximately one-third of respondents 
the female respondent was also the head of their earned PKR 10,000 or less, one-third earned 
family.  between PKR 10,001 and 15,000, and one-third 
Income level of the respondents
Table A.3: Occupation (General)
Appendix II: Demographics of Survey 167
over PKR 15,000. From this information, it is 
In spite of the young demographic largely apparent that average levels of income are 
represented in the survey, a large majority of improving in FATA, with some shifts from low 
respondents were married. This is in keeping with income towards higher incomes being recorded. 
traditions in rural Pukhtun where early marriage is 
However, it must be recognised that because of 
common. Only 16.0% of respondents were single 
inflation these data results are to some extent 
and had never been married.
misleading; this is because it is questionable 
whether these higher income figures are sufficient Family size (of a household)
to fulfil basic human needs for the majority of In FATA it is traditional for extended family units to 
live together. It is common for the head of the family respondents. In the future it may be necessary to 
and their spouse to share their home with their redefine the incomes levels illustrated, to better 
sons (whether married and unmarried), their reflect inflation rates. This will allow for a closer 
unmarried daughters, their daughters-in-law and examination of the number of respondents that are 
their grandchildren.  This can result in households under-employed or unable to secure sufficient 
becoming very large. economic opportunities (a concern expressed in 
Chapter 1). 
Marital status
Table A.4: Monthly income of family (PKR)
Table A.5: Marital status
Table A.6: Family size of household (2011)
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(PKR)
It is assumed that in response to this question, belonged to; for all three years the average ratio 
respondents provided information on the number describes the Shia population FATA comprising 
of people in their compound. From the information 13.2% and the Sunni population 86.8%. 
recorded by enumerators it seems that it is not 
Shia populations are largely confined to the uncommon for households to be home to 6-10 
Agencies of Kurram and Orakzai. people, and often 11-15 people.
Saying prayers regularly
It is evident from the data recorded by CAMP that FATA is a predominantly a Muslim society, with only 
people in FATA regularly perform/say their prayers. a few exceptions – including: Christians, Hindus, 
It can be established that only a minority of people and Sikhs. The insurgency has further diminished 
do not conform to this assertion, with only 10.0% of non-Muslim traditions, as they have fled the region 
respondents on average (but in some instances in order to avoid the conflict and potential hostility 
dropping to as low as 5.6%) declaring that they only towards them. 
sometimes say their prayers. 
Proportion of Shia and Sunni Muslims in FATA 
Less than 1.0% of respondents in FATA did not say 
Respondents who identified themselves as Muslim 
prayers or failed to provide a response.
were also asked to designate which sect they 
Religion
Table A.7: Religion
Table A.8: Propotion of Shia & Sunni Muslims in FATA
Table A.9: Frequency of saying prayers
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performed Haj or Umra in Saudi Arabia.  Fasting
Similarly strong support was recorded with regard 
to fasting during the Islamic month of Ramadan. On 
At the end of each interview respondents were average, since 2008, 96.6% of survey participants 
asked whether they would be interested in taking replied that they regularly adhered to this religious 
part in another survey in the future. In 2008, 92.4% practise, in contrast only 2.0% stated that they 
respondents stated that they would like to be part either sometimes or never partook of fasting. This 
of a survey in the future, yet in subsequent years level of support is expected, as Pakhtun society 
this enthusiasm has reduced. In 2011, just over half considers non-adherence to be very embarrassing.
of respondents thought they would be interested in 
participating in another survey. Attend mosque
In Pakhtun society it is rare for women to attend 
However, surveys remain a vital way of identifying 
mosque for prayers, therefore it is unsurprising that local issues, highlighting possible solutions and 
43.5% of female respondents stated that they never providing opportunities for policy-makers to 
attend mosque. Of those women who do attend interact with communities on areas of tribal 
mosque, they do so occasionally because they have concern. 
Interest in participating in another survey
Table A.10: Fasting
Table A.11: Attend mosque
Understanding FATA170
Table A.12: Interest in participating in another survey
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MAIN QUESTIONNAIRE
SECTION A: SOURCES OF INFORMATION
Q.1 What sources of information do you have access to? (Don’t read the list – check appropriate box - 
Multiple responses are allowed)
Understanding FATA172
OPINION POLL 2011 
QUESTIONNAIRE
APPENDIX III
Response Code Response Code
Pakistani press 1 Friends & family 11
Pakistani radio 2 Work colleagues 12
Pakistan TV 3 Neighbours 13
British press 4 Friday sermon 14
British TV channels 5 Communal gathering 15
British radio 6 Government officials 16
American press 7 Tribal elders 17
American TV 8 None 66
American radio 9 Other (specify) 77
Internet, books and films 10 Don’t know 88
Q.2 Which sources of information do you trust the most? (Don’t read the list – check appropriate box - 
Multiple responses are allowed)
Response Code Response Code
Pakistani press 1 Internet, books and films 10
Pakistani radio 2 Friends & family 11
Pakistan TV 3 Work colleagues 12
British press 4 Neighbours 13
British TV channels 5 Friday sermon 14
British radio 6 Communal gathering 15
American press 7 Government officials 16
American TV 8 Tribal elders 17
American radio 9 Other (specify) 77
Q.3 Which newspapers do you read regularly? (Don’t read the list – check appropriate box - Multiple 
responses are allowed)
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Response Code Response Code
Ausaf 1 Pakistan 13
Daily Times 2 The Post 14
The Dawn 3 Aaj Kal 15
The Frontier Post 4 Aaj 16
Jang 5 Mashriq 17
Khabrain 6 Wahdat 18
The Nation 7 UK newspapers 19
Nawa-e-Waqt 8 Afghan newspapers 20
The News 9 None 66
Observer 10 Other (specify) 77
The Statesman 11 Don’t know 88
Express 12
Q.4 What television stations do you watch regularly? (Don’t read the list – check appropriate box - Multiple 
responses are allowed)
Response Code Response Code
Aaj  1 Bolan 14
ARY 2 CNBC 15
AVT Khyber 3 Star 16
AVT 4 Century TV 17
Pakistan Television (PTV) 5 Al Jazeera 18
Hum 6 BBC 19
Dunya 7 CNN 20
Samma 8 Sky News 21
Express News 9 Geo Super 22
Din 10 None 66
Dawn News 11 Other (specify) 77
Geo News 12 Don’t know 88
Waqt 13
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Q.5 Which radio stations do you listen to regularly? (Don’t read the list – check appropriate box - Multiple 
responses are allowed)
Response Code Response Code
BBC Pushto 1 FM 100 10
Radio Pakistan 2 FM 103 11
BBC Urdu 3 BBC English 12
FM 104 Buraq 4 Dewa (Voice of America) 13
FM 88 Lakki 5 Khyber Agency 91 MHZ 14
RADIO Pak MW 6 Razmak 1584 KHZ 15
FM 106 7 Other (specify) 77
Miranshah, 1593 KHZ 8 Don’t know 88
FM 101 9
SECTION A: SOURCES OF INFORMATION
GENERAL
Q.6 Do you think things in Pakistan are going in the right direction? 
Response Code
Yes 1
No 2
Don’t know 88
Q.7 In your opinion, what is the biggest problem facing Pakistan? (Don’t read the list – check appropriate 
box - Multiple responses are allowed)
Response Code Response Code
Law and order 1 Human rights violation 11
Bad governance 2 Lack of good roads and transportation 12
Corruption 3 Taliban fighters 13
Political instability 4 Foreign fighters 14
Bad economy 5 People fleeing from the area as refugees 15
Inflation 6 Afghan refugees coming into the area 16
Energy crisis 7 Lack of jobs 17
American influence 8 Other (specify) 77
Bomb blasts 9 Don’t know 88
Poverty 10
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Q.8 In your opinion, what is the biggest problem facing FATA? (Don’t read the list – check appropriate box - 
Multiple responses are allowed)
Response Code Response Code
Law and order 1 Human rights violation 11
Bad governance 2 Lack of good roads and transportation 12
Corruption 3 Drone attacks 13
Political instability 4 Taliban fighters 14
Bad economy 5 Foreign fighters 15
Inflation 6 People fleeing from the area as refugees 16
Energy crisis 7 Afghan refugees coming into the area 17
American influence 8 Lack of jobs 18
Bomb blasts 9 Other (specify) 77
Poverty 10 Don’t know 88
Q.9.1 If Yes: why would you prefer to live outside? (Don’t read the list – check appropriate box - Multiple 
responses are allowed)
Response Code
Because FATA is no more a peaceful place to live 1
Because in FATA there are not many economic opportunities available 2
Because of constant military engagement in FATA, forcing people to leave 3
Because of drone attacks 4
Because of Taliban brutal treatment 5
Because of presence of Al-Qaeda and its associated foreign fighters 6
Because development conditions in FATA are not conducive 7
Because there are many opportunities available outside FATA 8
Other (specify)     77
Q.9 Would you live outside the FATA, if given the option to? 
Response Code
Yes 1
No 2
Don’t know 88
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Q.9.2 If yes, where would you prefer to live? (Don’t read the list – check appropriate box - Multiple 
responses are allowed)
Response Code Response Code
Peshawar 1 Saudi Arabia 8
Other cities of Pakistan 2 Afghanistan 9
USA 3 Dubai 10
UK 4 Other Middle Eastern Countries 11
Germany 5 Other European countries 12
Canada 6 Other (specify) 77
Iran 7 Don’t know 88
Q.10 Which of the following are the most important service that the GoP should provide to your district? 
(Don’t read the list – check appropriate box - Multiple responses are allowed)
Response Code Response Code
Security 1 Electricity supply 10
Justice 2 Political education of the masses 11
Policing 3 Good governance 12
Education/schools 4 New jobs 13
Health services/hospitals 5 Land reform to allow for local ownership 14
Water and sanitation 6 Better agriculture assistance 15
Roads 7 Other (specify) 77
Tackling terrorism 8 Don’t know 88
Food supply 9
Q.9.3 If no, why would you prefer to live in the FATA? (Don’t read the list – check appropriate box - 
Multiple responses are allowed)
Response Code
I like to live within my own village and community 1
I like the way we live in our tribal culture and tradition 2
I feel more secure in FATA 3
We have been living in FATA since long 4
Other (specify) 77
Don’t know 88
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Q.11 Who are you most in contact with? (Don’t read the list – check appropriate box - Multiple responses 
are allowed)
Response Code Response Code
Political Agent 1 Tribal elders 10
Pakistan Army 2 Mullah 11
Frontier Corps 3 NGOs 12
MNAs 4 Government Officials 13
Teachers 5 Foreign fighters 14
Doctors 6 None 66
Senator 7 Other (specify) 77
Taliban 8 Don’t know 88
Media 9
Q.12 Which of the following do you trust the most? (Don’t read the list – check appropriate box - Multiple 
responses are allowed)
Response Code Response Code
Political Agent 1 Tribal elders 10
Pakistan Army 2 Mullah 11
Frontier Corps 3 NGOs 12
MNAs 4 Government Officials 13
Teachers 5 Foreign fighters 14
Doctors 6 None 66
Senator 7 Other (specify) 77
Taliban 8 Don’t know 88
Media 9
Q.13 What do you want for your children? (Single response only, divided by gender) 
For Boys Code For Girls Code
More education 1 More education 1
More security 2 More security 2
Employment opportunities 3 Employment opportunities 3
Marriage 4 Marriage 4
Religious education 5 Religious education 5
Other (specify) 77 Purdah (veil) 6
Don’t know 88 Other (specify) 77
Don’t know 88
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Q.9.2 If yes, where would you prefer to live? (Don’t read the list – check appropriate box - Multiple 
responses are allowed)
Response Code Response Code
Peshawar 1 Saudi Arabia 8
Other cities of Pakistan 2 Afghanistan 9
USA 3 Dubai 10
UK 4 Other Middle Eastern Countries 11
Germany 5 Other European countries 12
Canada 6 Other (specify) 77
Iran 7 Don’t know 88
Q.10 Which of the following are the most important service that the GoP should provide to your district? 
(Don’t read the list – check appropriate box - Multiple responses are allowed)
Response Code Response Code
Security 1 Electricity supply 10
Justice 2 Political education of the masses 11
Policing 3 Good governance 12
Education/schools 4 New jobs 13
Health services/hospitals 5 Land reform to allow for local ownership 14
Water and sanitation 6 Better agriculture assistance 15
Roads 7 Other (specify) 77
Tackling terrorism 8 Don’t know 88
Food supply 9
Q.9.3 If no, why would you prefer to live in the FATA? (Don’t read the list – check appropriate box - 
Multiple responses are allowed)
Response Code
I like to live within my own village and community 1
I like the way we live in our tribal culture and tradition 2
I feel more secure in FATA 3
We have been living in FATA since long 4
Other (specify) 77
Don’t know 88
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POLITICAL ISSUES
Q.14 Should Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas:
Response Code
Be fully integrated into KPK 1
Keep its current governing arrangements 2
Be established as a separate province of Pakistan 3
Be established as a FATA Council 4
Other (specify) 77
Don’t know 88
Q15: What is the reason for your answer?
Q.15.1 Be fully integrated into KPK because: (Don’t read the list – check appropriate box - Multiple 
responses are allowed)
Response Code
It was historically one and the same area 1
It is geographically linked to each other 2
It is ethnically linked to each other 3
It would be easy to govern 4
We would have better economic/social and political opportunities 5
Other (specify) 77
Don’t know 88
Q.15.2 Keep its current governing arrangements because (Don’t read the list – check appropriate box - 
Multiple responses are allowed)
Response Code
The system of FCR suits to our culture and environment 1
The system in the rest of the country is not a very good example 2
We are living with this system since long 3
Other (specify) 77
Don’t know 88
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Q.15.3 Be established as a separate province of Pakistan because: (Don’t read the list – check appropriate 
box - Multiple responses are allowed)
Response Code
We want to be mainstreamed into Pakistan but want to keep our cultures and traditions intact 1
Domination from KPK would not be acceptable 2
We want control over our own resources 3
Other (specify) 77
Don’t know 88
1
Q.15.4 Be established as a FATA Council because:   (Don’t read the list – check appropriate box - Multiple 
responses are allowed)
Response Code
Dealing with one decision maker (President of Pakistan) is easier than dealing with the                  
whole Parliament 1
It would be a gradual shift from old to new system 2
This will prepare us for the future political change 3
Other (specify) 77
Don’t know 88
1
 In this case, the President would retain his powers under Article 247 of the Constitution
Q.16 Do you agree with the President’s decision of August 2009 allowing the political parties to organise 
and operate in FATA?
Response Code
Yes 1
No 2
Don’t know 88
Q.17 What do you think of FCR?
Response Code
It should be abolished 1
Fundamentally reformed 2
Partly reformed 3
Retain in its present form 4
No opinion 55
Don’t know 88
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Q.17.1   What aspects are most important to change in the FCR? (Multiple responses are allowed)
Response Code
Powers of the Political Agent should be curtailed considerably 1
Fundamental rights should be addressed in the FCR 2
Collective responsibility/arrest clause should be removed 3
Territorial responsibility clause should be removed 4
Demolition of property clause should be removed 5
The right to appeal against PA’s decision should be given to the FATA residents 6
Jirga under FCR should be free of PA’s influence 7
Other (specify) 77
Don’t know 88
Q.17.2   What aspects are most important to retain in the FCR? (Multiple responses are allowed)
Response Code
The jirga system under FCR should remain intact 1
Maliks/tribes should remain responsible for law and order 2
FATA people should be given the right to practice their customs and traditions without any 
interference 3
Other (specify) 77
Don’t know 88
Q.18 What do you think of the Government of Pakistan’s 2009 proposals for reform of the FCR?
Response Code
Fully support 1
Partly support 2
Fully oppose 3
Partly oppose 4
No opinion 55
Don’t know 88
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Q.19 Which would you participate most in the following? (Multiple responses are allowed)
Response Code
The activities of political parties 1
Elections 2
Citizen forums to discuss local issues 3
Agency councils 4
Monitoring of government service delivery 5
Process of development 6
None 66
Other (specify) 77
Don’t know 88
Q.19.1 Which of these activities do you think would be most effective in bringing a positive change in the 
lives of FATA residents? (Multiple responses are allowed)
Response Code
The activities of political parties 1
Elections 2
Citizen forums to discuss local issues 3
Agency councils 4
Monitoring of government service delivery 5
Process of development 6
None 66
Other (specify) 77
Don’t know 88
Q.20 Are you on the voters register?
Response Code
Yes 1
No 2
Don’t know 88
Q.21 Do you have a National Identity Card (NIC)?
Response Code
Yes 1
No 2
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Yes 1
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Q.21 Do you have a National Identity Card (NIC)?
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Q.22 Which living politician do you admire the most? 
Don’t know    88            None   66  
Q.23 What is your assessment of the performance of the political administration in FATA?
Excellent Good Poor Very poor Don’t know
1 2 4 5 88
Q.24 How has this performance changed over the past 12 months
1) Improved a lot 3) Stayed the same 5) Worsened a lot
2) Improved a little 4) Worsened a little
Q.25 What could the political administration do to improve your perception of their performance? 
(Multiple responses are allowed)
Response Code
Improve living conditions in the area 1
Improve law and order situation 2
Improve the justice dispensation system 3
Generate employment 4
Improve education and health conditions 5
Improve the human rights situation 6
Make sure the community participation in decision-making process 7
Other (specify) 77
Q.26 Who best represents your needs? (Multiple responses are allowed)
Response Code
Maliks/elders 1
Political Agent 2
Pakistan Army 3
NGOs/Civil society 4
Religious leaders (Mullah) 5
Political leadership 6
Taliban or other groups 7
Other (specify) 77
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SECURITY ISSUES
Q.27 What can Pakistan Government do to deal with suicide bombers and other terrorists? (Don’t read 
the list – check appropriate box - Multiple responses are allowed)
Response Code
Use the army to defeat them 1
Negotiate with the terrorists 2
Dialogue with local political/tribal authorities 3
Empower moderate Islamic voices 4
Enforce bans on terrorist organisations 5
Provide employment 6
Stop following the instructions of the West 7
Ask for more help from the West 8
Other (specify) 77
Don’t know 88
Q.28 Some people support or oppose each of the following. What is your opinion? Do you support or 
oppose:
Response Strongly 
support
Somewhat 
support
Somewhat 
oppose
Strongly 
oppose
Don’t 
know
a. The Pakistani military 
pursuing  Taliban, Al Qaeda 
and foreign fighters inside 
FATA
No 
Response
1 2 3 4 88 99
b. The U.S. military working 
with the Pakistani military 
to pursue Taliban ,Al Qaeda 
and foreign fighters inside 
Pakistan
1 2 3 4 88 99
c. The U.S. military pursuing 
Taliban, Al Qaeda and 
foreign fighters by itself 
inside Pakistan, without 
working with the Pakistani 
military 
1 2 3 4 88 99
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SECURITY ISSUES
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Q.29 How much of a threat, if any, does Islamic extremism pose to Pakistan these days?
Response Code
Very great 1
Fairly great 2
Not a threat at all 3
Don’t know 88
No response 99
Q.30 Who/what is to blame for the high rates of suicide bombing in Pakistan? (Don’t read the list – 
check appropriate box - Multiple responses are allowed)
Response Code Response Code
Afghan Taliban 1 Saudi Arabia 10
Tehrek-e-Taliban Pakistan 2 USA 11
Other Pakistani Taliban groups 3 Western Influence Countries 12
Lashkar-e-Toiba 4 India 13
Jash-e-Mohammad 5 Iran 14
Pakistan Army 6 Israel 15
Lashkar-e-Islam (Mangal Bagh group) 7 Other (specify) 77
Ansar-ul-Islam 8 Don’t know 88
Al Qaeda 9 No response 99
Q.31 Who/what is to blame for not doing enough to stop high rates of suicide bombing in Pakistan? 
(Don’t read the list – check appropriate box - Multiple responses are allowed)
Response Code Response Code
Police department’s lack of capacity 1 Poverty 7
Intelligence agencies failing to intercept  2 Lack of political will 8
Pakistan’s Army lack of capacity 3 Western influence 9
Lack of education 4 Other (specify) 77
Unemployment 5 Don’t know 88
Lack of social development 6 No response 99
Appendix III: Public FATA Opinion Poll 2011 185
Q.32 Where do the bombers come from? (Don’t read the list – check appropriate box - Multiple 
responses are allowed)
Response Code Response Code
Afghanistan 1 Punjab 6
Kashmir 2 Other parts of Pakistan 7
West 3 Other (specify) 77
India 4 Don’t know 88
FATA 5 No response 99
Q.33 Do you think possessing nuclear weapons enhances Pakistan’s security?
Response Code
Yes 1
No 2
Don’t know 88
Q.34 Which of the following agencies do you believe should be primarily responsible for security in 
FATA? (Multiple responses are allowed)
Response Code
The tribal communities/Lakhkars 1
The Khassadars and levies(Political administration) 2
The military 3
The Frontier Corps 4
Other (specify) 77
Don’t know 88
Q.35 How do you rate the performance of each of the organisations above in providing security in 
FATA?  (Eg. very good, good, neutral, poor, very poor)
Q.35.1 Tribal Communities / Lakhkars
Excellent Good Poor Very poor Don’t know
1 2 3 4 88
Excellent Good Poor Very poor Don’t know
1 2 3 4 88
Q.35.2 Khasadar and levies
Understanding FATA184
Q.29 How much of a threat, if any, does Islamic extremism pose to Pakistan these days?
Response Code
Very great 1
Fairly great 2
Not a threat at all 3
Don’t know 88
No response 99
Q.30 Who/what is to blame for the high rates of suicide bombing in Pakistan? (Don’t read the list – 
check appropriate box - Multiple responses are allowed)
Response Code Response Code
Afghan Taliban 1 Saudi Arabia 10
Tehrek-e-Taliban Pakistan 2 USA 11
Other Pakistani Taliban groups 3 Western Influence Countries 12
Lashkar-e-Toiba 4 India 13
Jash-e-Mohammad 5 Iran 14
Pakistan Army 6 Israel 15
Lashkar-e-Islam (Mangal Bagh group) 7 Other (specify) 77
Ansar-ul-Islam 8 Don’t know 88
Al Qaeda 9 No response 99
Q.31 Who/what is to blame for not doing enough to stop high rates of suicide bombing in Pakistan? 
(Don’t read the list – check appropriate box - Multiple responses are allowed)
Response Code Response Code
Police department’s lack of capacity 1 Poverty 7
Intelligence agencies failing to intercept  2 Lack of political will 8
Pakistan’s Army lack of capacity 3 Western influence 9
Lack of education 4 Other (specify) 77
Unemployment 5 Don’t know 88
Lack of social development 6 No response 99
Appendix III: Public FATA Opinion Poll 2011 185
Q.32 Where do the bombers come from? (Don’t read the list – check appropriate box - Multiple 
responses are allowed)
Response Code Response Code
Afghanistan 1 Punjab 6
Kashmir 2 Other parts of Pakistan 7
West 3 Other (specify) 77
India 4 Don’t know 88
FATA 5 No response 99
Q.33 Do you think possessing nuclear weapons enhances Pakistan’s security?
Response Code
Yes 1
No 2
Don’t know 88
Q.34 Which of the following agencies do you believe should be primarily responsible for security in 
FATA? (Multiple responses are allowed)
Response Code
The tribal communities/Lakhkars 1
The Khassadars and levies(Political administration) 2
The military 3
The Frontier Corps 4
Other (specify) 77
Don’t know 88
Q.35 How do you rate the performance of each of the organisations above in providing security in 
FATA?  (Eg. very good, good, neutral, poor, very poor)
Q.35.1 Tribal Communities / Lakhkars
Excellent Good Poor Very poor Don’t know
1 2 3 4 88
Excellent Good Poor Very poor Don’t know
1 2 3 4 88
Q.35.2 Khasadar and levies
Understanding FATA186
Excellent Good Poor Very poor Don’t know
1 2 3 4 88
Q.35.3 The military
Excellent Good Poor Very poor Don’t know
1 2 3 4 88
Q.35.4 The Frontier Corps
Q.36  Which do you trust the most to provide security? (Multiple responses are allowed)
Response Code
The tribal communities/Lakhkars 1
The Khassadars and levies(Political administration) 2
The military 3
The Frontier Corpse 4
Other (specify) 77
Don’t know 88
Q.37 Do you think the FC plays a valuable role in providing security in FATA?
Response Code
Yes 1
No 2
Don’t know 88
Q.38 If trained with international assistance, would you have more or less confidence in their ability to 
do their job?
Response Code
More confidence 1
Less confidence 2
Don’t know 88
Q.39 What are the main reasons of conflicts in FATA? (Multiple responses are allowed)
Response Code Response Code
Conflict over land 1 Crime 5
Family 2 Extremist 6
Tribal 3 Other (specify) 77
Political 4 Don’t know 88
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Q.40 How secure do you feel in your daily life?
Response Code
Very secure 1
Somewhat secure 2
Somewhat insecure 3
Very insecure 4
No opinion 55
Don’t know 88
Q.41 Compare to last year, do you feel your security is getting better or worse?
Response Code
Much better 1
Somewhat better 2
No difference 3
Somewhat worse 4
Much worse 5
No opinion 55
Don’t know 88
Q.42 How could your sense of security be improved? (Multiple responses are allowed)
Response Code
Deploy more troops in FATA 1
Strengthen local communities lakhkars 2
Capacitate the FC and Khasadar/levie forces 3
Extend proper police system to FATA 4
Other (specify) 77
Q.43 What are the biggest threats to your security? (Don’t read the list – check appropriate box - 
Multiple responses are allowed)
Response Code Response Code
Conflict 1 Crime and banditry 6
Terrorist attacks 2 Inadequate food 7
Army activity 3 Inadequate healthcare 8
Sectarianism 4 Other (specify) 77
Drone attacks 5 Don’t know 88
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Q.44 Have you been forced to leave your home during the past years?
Response Code
Yes 1
No 2
Q.45 If yes, where did you go? (Please note the city/town or district) 
Q.46 What is your view of the level of support you received from GOP?  (eg. very good, good etc)
Excellent Good Poor Very poor Don’t know
1 2 4 5 88
Q.47 What is the most important issue that affects your and your family’s quality of life? (Don’t read 
the list – check appropriate box - Multiple responses are allowed)
Response Code Response Code
Unemployment 1 Insecurity 7
Inflation 2 Access to justice 8
Poverty 3 Infrastructure 9
Access to education 4 Housing 10
Access to health services 5 Other (specify) 77
Access to food 6 Don’t know 88
Q.48 How do you rate the performance of the FATA Secretariat? 
Response Code
Excellent 1
Good 2
Fair 3
Poor 4
Very poor 5
Don’t know 88
Appendix III: Public FATA Opinion Poll 2011 189
Q.49 What is the reason for your answer?
Q.49.1 FATA Secretariat (FS) has performed well because: (Don’t read the list – check appropriate box - 
Multiple responses are allowed)
Response Code
FS involves FATA people in the planning process 1
FS has been implementing successful projects in FATA 2
The staff of FS is cooperative with FATA people 3
The projects FS has implemented have long-term impact 4
FS utilises grants it receives for FATA’s development 5
Other (specify) 77
Don’t know 88
Q.49.2 FATA Secretariat (FS) has performed badly because: (Don’t read the list – check appropriate box - 
Multiple responses are allowed)
Response Code
FS never involved FATA people in the planning process 1
FS has implemented badly planned projects in FATA 2
FS staff do not cooperate with FATA people 3
FS does not have FATA representation at the policy and mid-management level 4
The projects FS has implemented have long-term impact 5
FS does not utilise grants it receives for FATA’s development 6
Other (specify) 77
Don’t know 88
Q.50 How do you rate the performance of the FATA Development Authority? 
Response Code
Excellent 1
Good 2
Fair 3
Poor 4
Very poor 5
Don’t know 88
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Q.51:  What is the reason for your answer?
Q.51.1 FATA Development Authority (FDA) has performed well because: (Don’t read the list – check 
appropriate box - Multiple responses are allowed)
Response Code
FDA involves FATA people in the planning process 1
FDA has been implementing successful projects in FATA 2
The staff of FDA is cooperative with FATA people 3
The projects FDA has implemented have long-term impact 4
FDA utilises grants it receives for FATA’s development 5
Other (specify) 77
Don’t know 88
Q.51.2 FATA Development Authority (FDA) has performed badly because: (Don’t read the list – check 
appropriate box - Multiple responses are allowed)
Response Code
FDA never involved FATA people in the planning process 1
FDA has implemented badly planned projects in FATA 2
FDA staff do not cooperate with FATA people 3
FDA does not have FATA representation at the policy and mid-management level 4
The projects FDA has implemented have long-term impact 5
FDA does not utilise grants it receives for FATA’s development 6
Other (specify) 77
Don’t know 88
Q.52 Various foreign countries, including US and UK, have expressed an interest in providing 
development assistance for FATA. How do you think that assistance could be most valuable? (Don’t 
read the list – check appropriate box - Multiple responses are allowed)
Response Code Response Code
Roads 1 Security 8
Electricity 2 No international assistance is needed 9
Education 3 No assistance is needed from US or UK 10
Health 4 No opinion 55
Livelihoods 5 Other (specify) 77
Supporting employment 6 Don’t know 88
Humanitarian assistance 7
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Q.53 Do you understand how development priorities are decided in FATA and projects selected?
Yes No Don’t Know No Response
1 2 88 99
Q.54 How could this process be improved? (Multiple responses are allowed)
Response Code
Government and NGOs should involve communities in the process 1
Proper baseline surveys should be conducted before making development priorities 2
The political administration role should be minimized in making decisions on selection of 
communities and projects 3
Process should be inclusive of all stakeholders 4
Other (specify) 77
Q.55  Do you support or oppose the presence of the following groups inside FATA today?
Response Strongly 
support
Somewhat 
support
Somewhat 
oppose
Strongly 
oppose
Don’t 
know
a. The United States military
No 
Response
1 2 3 4 88 99
b. Arab and Foreign Al 
Qaeda fighters
1 2 3 4 88 99
c. Afghan Taliban fighters 
(led by Mullah Omar)
1 2 3 4 88 99
d. Pakistani Taliban fighters 1 2 3 4 88 99
Q.56 What do you think of the Pakistan army’s military offensive in FATA?
Response Code
Fully support 1
Partly support 2
Fully oppose 3
Partly oppose 4
No opinion 55
Don’t know 88
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Q.57 How would you describe Pakistani Taliban? (Don’t read the list – check appropriate box - Multiple 
responses are allowed)
Response Code Response Code
Are they freedom fighters 1 Foreign fighters 6
Defenders of Islam 2 No opinion 55
Defenders of tribal communities 3 Other (specify) 77
Terrorists 4 Don’t know 88
Uneducated youth 5
Q.58 Do you know what Al-Qaeda is?
Response Code
Yes 1
No 2
Don’t know 88
Q.58.1 If yes, what do you think of Al-Qaeda?
Response Code
Very favourable 1
Partly favourable 2
Unfavourable 3
Very unfavourable 4
No opinion 55
Q.59 What should happen to any foreign fighter/Jihadi currently living in FATA? (Multiple responses are 
allowed)
Response Code
They should be allowed to stay 1
They should be allowed to stay but only if they cease violence 2
They should be asked to leave  3
They should be forced to leave by the Pakistani military 4
There are no such people in FATA 5
No opinion 55
Don’t know 88
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Q.60 What do you think of US drone strikes in FATA?
 Response Code
Always justified 1
Sometimes justified, if properly targeted and excessive civilian casualties are avoided 2
Never justified 3
No opinion 55
Don’t know 88
SECTION C: RELIGION & POLITICS
Q.61 Which religious authority do you trust the most? (Multiple responses are allowed)
Response Code Response Code
Javed Ghamdi 1 Sipah-e-Sihaba 9
Prof. Anees 2 Lashkar e Islam 10
Amir Liaqat Hussain 3 Tehrek e Taliban Pakistan 11
Tahir Ul Qadri 4 Jash e Mohammad 12
Dr. Israr Ahmed 5 Mulana Sofi Mohammad 13
Al – Huda 6 None 66
Jamaat Ud Dawa 7 Other (specify) 77
Laskar e Tayyaba 8 Don’t know 88
Q.62 Which religious authority outside of Pakistan do you trust the most? (Multiple responses are 
allowed)
Response Code Response Code
Imam Kaba Sudes ur Rehman 1 Imam Khumenae 4
Hamza Yousaf 2 Other (specify) 77
Dr. Zakir Naik 3 Don’t know 88
2
Q.63 Is there any justification in Islam for suicide bombing ?
Response Code Response Code
Justified 1 Don’t know 88
Rarely justified 2 No response 99
Never justified 3
2
 Some people think that suicide bombings and other forms of violence against civilian targets are justified to defend Islam from 
its enemies. Other people believe that, no matter what the reason, this kind of violence is never justified. 
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Q.64 Should religion ……   (Multiple responses are allowed)
 Response Code
Provide a moral code that everyone should follow 1
Play no role 2
Dictate women’s rights 3
Define criminal and civil laws 4
Define how governments are chosen 5
Other (specify) 77
Don’t know 88
Q.65 In your opinion what is the most important human rights issue in Pakistan today? (Multiple 
responses are allowed)
 Response Code
Violence against women 1
Violence against children 2
Violation of minority rights 3
Lack of Freedom of expression 4
Lack of Freedom of movement 5
State’s inability to provide basis amenities of life 6
 Lack of education and health                                                             7
Excessive violence by the state                                    8
Other (specify) 77
Don’t know 88
Q.66 Do you think that a person has the right to kill a relative to protect the honour of their family?
 Response Code
Yes 1
No 2
Don’t know 88
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Q.67 What phrase best describe the Afghan Taliban? (Multiple responses are allowed)
Response Code
Islamic heroes fighting Western occupation 1
Ignorant of Islamic values / teaching 2
A terrorist group 3
A political group 4
An anti-women group 5
Other (specify) 77
Don’t know 88
Q.68 If you could vote for any party or group in a Pakistani election, which one of the following would 
you vote for?
Q.69 Will the Taliban return to power in Afghanistan?
Response Code
Yes 1
No 2
Don’t know 88
 Response Code
Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) 1
Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N) 2
Pakistan Muslim League (PML-Q) 3
Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) 4
Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) 5
Awami National Party (ANP) 6
Jamaat-e-Islami (JI)                                                             7
Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI)                                    8
Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) (Pakistani Taliban) 9
Al Qaeda 10
Independents 11
Will not vote 12
None 66
Other (specify) 77
Don’t know 88
No response 99
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Very good Somewhat good Very bad Somewhat bad Don’t know
1 2 3 4 88
Q.69.1How would you feel about this if they did?
Q.70 What would be the impacts in FATA if the Afghan Taliban come into power? (Multiple responses 
are allowed)
 Response Code
Pakistani Taliban groups will be strengthened and we may have Talibani Style Sharia law                       
in FATA 1
It will have very bad impact on the security of FATA 2
Female education and health in FATA will suffer 3
Shia community may be forced to leave the area 4
People with progressive thinking may be forced to leave 5
IDPs may not be able to return 6
Religious minorities in FATA will suffer 7
The situation for NGOs and government both will not be conducive to work and at the                      
end people in FATA will suffer 8
Other (specify) 77
Don’t know 88
AFGHAN REFUGEES
Q.71 Should all Afghan refugees living in Pakistan return to Afghanistan?
Yes       1  No      2  Don’t Know      88  
Q.72  To what extent do you agree or disagree that Afghan refugees living in Pakistan? (Ask separately 
for each statement)
Response
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SECTION D: OPINIONS ON OTHER COUNTRIES
Q.73 Do you think Pakistan should accept money from Western countries such as the UK and USA for the 
military build up?
Response Code
Yes 1
No 2
Don’t know 88
Q.74 Do you think Pakistan should accept money from Western countries such as the UK and USA for 
development?
Response Code
Yes 1
No 2
Don’t know 88
Q.75 Thinking now about world affairs, do you have a very favourable, somewhat favourable, 
somewhat unfavourable, or very unfavourable opinion of the following countries:
Response Very 
Favourable
Somewhat 
Favourable
Somewhat 
Unfavourable
Very 
Unfavourable
No 
Response
Afghanistan
Don’t 
Know
1 2 3 4 8899
India 1 2 3 4 8899
Iran 1 2 3 4 8899
China 1 2 3 4 8899
Saudi Arabia 1 2 3 4 8899
Canada 1 2 3 4 8899
France 1 2 3 4 8899
Germany 1 2 3 4 8899
Malaysia 1 2 3 4 8899
The United States 1 2 3 4 8899
The United Kingdom 1 2 3 4 8899
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SECTION E: OPINION ABOUT PAKISTAN AND UNITED KINGDOM RELATIONS AND 
POLICIES 
Q.76  Do you think that the UK: (Ask separately for each statement)
Response Yes No Don’t know
Helps to make the world more peaceful & stable
No Response
1 2 88
Values the United Nations (UN) 1 2 88
Helps to make the world more prosperous 1 2 88
Helps to safeguard the global environment 1 2 88
Promotes respect for democratic values 1 2 88
Promotes respect for Human Rights 1 2 88
99
99
99
99
99
99
Q.77 Which of the following best describes the UK’s relationship with Pakistan? (Read list and circle 
only one)
Response Code
Unequal 1
Partners for peace and progress 2
Close allies in the war against terror 3
A left over from colonial days 4
Partners in development and dealing with emergencies 5
Home of many British Pakistanis 6
Other (specify) 77
Don’t know 88
Q.78 Which of the following best describes the UK’s involvement in Afghanistan? (Read list and circle 
only one)
Response Code
Committed in the long term to a stable Afghanistan 1
Will leave Afghanistan now Osama Bin Laden is dead 2
Should not be in Afghanistan at all 3
Engaged in an attack on Islam 4
Is a partner in rebuilding and developing Afghanistan 5
Other (specify) 77
Don’t know 88
No response 99
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Q.79 Is your opinion of the UK generally becoming more favourable, less favourable or stayed the 
same?
Response Code
More favourable 1
Less favourable 2
Stayed the same 3
Don’t know 88
Q.79.1: What is the reason for this?
Response Code
Links with UK in higher education 1
Sports link between Pakistan and UK/ UK sports personalities 2
Family links 3
Development assistance. 4
Other (specify) 77
Don’t know 88
Q.80 What is your opinion of the UK and USA on the following? (Ask separately for each statement)
Response UK Code USA Code
Role in Afghanistan Most favourable 1 Most favourable 1
Less favourable 2 Less favourable 2
Not favourable 3 Not favourable 3
No opinion 55 No opinion 55
No response 99 No response 99
Attitude towards the Most favourable 1 Most favourable 1
Islamic world Less favourable 2 Less favourable 2
Not favourable 3 Not favourable 3
No opinion 55 No opinion 55
No response 99 No response 99
Immigration policy Most favourable 1 Most favourable 1
Less favourable 2 Less favourable 2
Not favourable 3 Not favourable 3
No opinion 55 No opinion 55
No response 99 No response 99
Role in Pakistan
Development assistance 
in Pakistan
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SECTION F: DEMOGRAPHICS 
D 1: Gender of respondents (On observation): 
Male          1            Female            2   
D 2: Age group of respondent
Response Code Response Code
18 – 29 years 1 50 – 64 years 3
30 – 49 years 2 65 + years 4
D 3: Education level of respondent
Response Code Response Code
Not schooled 1 Schooled upto Bachelor level 7
Religious education only 2 Master degree 8
Schooled upto Primary level 3 Specialisation: MBBS/doctor 9
Schooled upto Middle level 4 Specialisation: Engineering 10
Schooled upto Secondary Certificate level 5 Those upto professional education 11
Schooled upto Intermediate level 6
D 3a: Education level of head of the household
Response Code Response Code
Upto PKR 3000 1 PKR 7001 – PKR 10000 4
PKR 3001 – PKR 5000 2 PKR 10001 – PKR 15000 5
PKR 5001 – PKR 7000 3 More than PKR 15000 6
Response Code Response Code
Not schooled 1 Schooled upto Bachelor level 7
Religious education only 2 Master degree 8
Schooled upto Primary level 3 Specialisation: MBBS/doctor 9
Schooled upto Middle level 4 Specialisation: Engineering 10
Schooled upto Secondary Certificate level 5 Those upto professional education 11
Schooled upto Intermediate level 6
D 4: Monthly income of respondent’s family in PKR?
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D 5: Occupation of respondent
Response Code Response Code
Agricultural labourer 1 Provincial civil servant 11
Chowkidar (watchman) 2 Skilled labourer 12
Civil servant of FATA 3 Small business owner 13
Clerical employee 4 Teacher 14
Farm owner 5 Technician 15
Home-based worker 6 Unskilled labourer 16
Lady health worker (LHW) 7 White colour employee 17
Large business owner 8 Unemployed 18
Management/supervisor 9 Other (specify) 77
Military, police, security personnel 10
D 6: Marital status of respondent
Response Code Response Code
Married 1 Single 4
Widowed 2 No response 99
Divorced 3
D 7: How many people live in your household/compound?
Number of People:
Male (adult) Code Female (adult) Code Male children Code Female 
children
1 1-5 persons 3 1-5 children 1-5 children5
Code
71-5 persons
2 6 and above 
persons
4 6 and above 6 and above6 86 and above 
persons
D 8: Religion of respondent
Response Code Response Code
Christian 1 Hindu 4
Sikh 2 Other (specify) 77
Muslim 3 No response 99
(Ask if answer is 3 in D8)
Shiite         1 Sunni          2
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(Ask if Answer is 3 in D8)
D 9: Please tell me whether you regularly, sometimes, or never engage in the following religious 
practices
Response Sometimes Never Not Asked No Response
Pray five times a day 2 3 4 99
Regularly
1
Fast during Ramadan 2 3 4 991
(Ask if Answer is 3 in D8)
D 10: How often do you pray at the mosque?
Response Code Response Code
Five times a day/daily 1 Several times a year 5
Several times a week 2 Once a year or less 6
Once a week 3 Never 7
Monthly 4 No response 99
D 11: Would you be willing to participate in another survey later in this year?
Response Code Response Code
Yes 1 No 2
Don’t know 88
Read Closing Statement to the Respondent: "Thank you for participating in our survey. Do you have 
any questions?  In the next few days my supervisor may 
contact you to evaluate the quality of my work and answer 
any other questions you may have about the interview. To 
help him do that, could I have your telephone number?"
Respondent Information: Name:  _______________
Address:______________________________
Tel No. _______________
NIC Number ___  ___  ___  ___
Interviewer Certification: “I certify that I have completed this interview according to 
the instructions provided to me. 
Name:  _______________
Signed: _______________
Date: _______________
To be completed by the Supervisor:
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Interview subject to Back-check/Control 
1.  Yes
2.  No
Method of Back-check/Control  
1.  Direct supervision during interview
2.  Back-check in person by supervisor
3.  Back-check by telephone by supervisor or the central office  
4.  Not subject to back-check 
Initial Questions (for Interviewer only)
Name of surveyor ---------------------------------------- Date of interview ---------------------------------------
Agency/FR ------------------------------------------------- Tehsil ----------------------------------------------------- 
[1] Rural. [2] Urban
Appendix III: Public FATA Opinion Poll 2011 203
Understanding FATA202
(Ask if Answer is 3 in D8)
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Agency/Tehsil/FR-Wise List of Villages 
Tehsil Khar
1 Aman Kot
2 Khar 
3 Anayat Qilla
4 Gandaw
5 Lar Raghgan
6 Yousuf Abad
7 Falang 
8 Jar
9 Molla Kalai
10 Haj Lawang
11 Maminzo
12 Shin kot
13 Sadiq Abad
14 Qazi Derai
15 Gulshan Abad
16 Mehrosa
17 Banda
18 Shekhan
19 Sabandi
Tehsil Utman Khel
1 Soor Hando
2 Gardai
3 Qazafi
4 Sikandara
5 Hayati
6 Ghazi Baba
7 Swal Qilla
8 Bagh Barang
9 Mego Shah
10 Naraji
Tehsil Salarzo
1 Kotkai
2 Redawno
3 Baro
4 Dag Qilla
5 Tallai
6 Chewatra
7 Dagai
8 Bar Raghan
9 Khan Abad
10 Yarani Khandaro
11 Chargo
12 Tabai
13 Tandai
14 Sarazghai
15 Rasha Dehrai
16 Nazakai
17 Gullu Shah
18 Ghakhe
19 Chergori
Tehsil Nawagai
1 Main Nawagai
2 Mammazo
3 Khona Kalay
4 Kamangara
5 Doda
6 Gud Khel
7 Shinger
8 Zorbandar
9 Nari
10 Mashkanro
11 Charming
12 Tangi
13 Inzari
14 Loesame
15 Meagano
16 Parmakhai
17 Malkana
Bajaur Agency
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 Teshil Haleem Zai
1 Biki Khel 
2 Nasrat Kor
3 Khwaidad Khel
4 Surdagy
5 Prata
6 Kasai
7 Malook Kor
8 Shati Khel
9 Yousuf Khel
10 Dara 
Teshil Prang Ghar
1 Kirra 
2 Khadikas
3 Dawederai
4 Oiaw Khan
5 Monda Saparay
6 Spina Khawra
7 Navi Kalay
8 Srazerak Bocha
9 Tor Zarak Bocha
10 Bakaro Delai
Teshil Kamli 
Haleem Zai
1 Ghazibaig
2 Ali Hassan Kalay
3 Nahqi Yousufkhel 
Kalay
4 Alam Beg Kalay
Teshil Ekka 
Ghund
1 Shaheed Banda
2 Aqrab Dag 
3 Hafeez Korona
Mohmand Agency
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Tehsil Jamrud
1 Ali Masjid
2 Bakkar Kalai
3 Ganj GarhiJalal din
4 Jalal Din
5 Khan Moh Kalai
6 Inayat Khan Mastal Khel
7 Sarfaraz Khan
8 Shah Alam/ Ibrahim Khel
9 Moh Wali Khan/Mashin 
Wala Kalai
10 Mula Juma Gul Wali Khel
11 Lala China
12 Sultan zai Kapan Tangai
13 Mado Khel
14 Malik Ismail Nawab Kalai
15 Meram Khan 
16 Chenar Kalai
17 Sumer Bagh
18 Gul Rehman
19 Godar
20 Sur Qamar
21 Ghreeza 
22 Speelana kas
23 Husay Khula
24 Jamal Khel
25 Burj Kalai
26 Sikander Khel
27 Wazir Dhand
28 Sakhi PolTalab Ghara
29 Talab Ghara
30 Malak Abad
Tehsil Landi Kotal 
1 Dargai/ Regha
2 Kam Shelman
3 Muhammad Akbar Kalai 
Ghani Khel
4 Pero Khel Barha Malik Kalai
5 Mirdad Khel Chengai Kalai
6 Chenar Khan Kalai
7 Toti Khel
8 Malqana
9 Saidgai
10 Mados Khel
11 Abdur Rauf Kalai
12 Chinarona
13 Shudan Khel
14 Shaheed Kalai
15 Kandow Khel
16 Khan Khel Kalai
17 Khan Khel Kalai
18 Kharigar Kalay
19 Mirdad Khel Mulagan
20 Haji Gulab Noor
21 Ashiq Kali
22 Lagad Khel
23 Taisan Khel
24 Ashkhel
25 Mulagoii
26 Pasaid Khel
Tehsil Mulagori
1 Pendi Lalma
2 Gari Doulat Khel
3 Main Morcha
4 Goghar Dand
5 Sher Burj
6 Lowra Main
7 Aba Khel
8 Muradi Khel
9 Haji Shah Alam
10 Tor Tapay
11 Naher Ghara
12 Sher Khanu Kalay
13 Ganji Kalai
14 Zagh Kalai
15 Shaheed Mena
16 Khwar Ghara
17 Jando Baba
18 Haji Dadwali Kalai
19 Shekhanu Kalai
20 Haji Jandar Kalay Murad 
Dhand
Khyber Agency
 Teshil Haleem Zai
11 Shani Khel
12 Dorba Khel 
13 Ghalani Khas
14 Ghallani Colony
Teshil Prang Ghar
11 Ziarat
12 Dando Khandao
13 Bahlola
14 Karkana
15 Manrai
Teshil Kamli 
Haleem Zai
Teshil Ekka 
Ghund
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 Teshil Haleem Zai
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Upper Orakzai
1 Mashti Bazar
2 Sangra
3 Hassan Dara
4 Mir Ghara
5 Karim Shah Kalai
6 Mulagai
7 Shahkar Nwasi Kalay
Lower Orakzai
1 Kalaya
2 Char Khel
3 Zaridar
4 Qalat
5 Zera
6 Andkhel
7 Tazi Khel
8 Shamar 
9 Palosai
10 Naka Mela
11 Bar Merako 
12 Kuku Dara
13 Abishel
14 Qambara Ali Kalay
Lower Orakzai
1 Kuraiz
2 Suleman Khel
3 Khandoo
4 Meetho
5 Pat Tangay
6 Kada Bazar
7 Hussaini Gari
Orakzai Agency
Tehsil Upper Kurram 
Parachinar
1 Parachinar
2 Ziran
3 Karman
4 Loqman Khel
5 Shaluzan
6 Mali Kali
7 Shablan
8 Agra
9 SultanNasti Kot
10 Ibrahim Zai Main
11 Ibrahim Zai
12 Borki
13 Khar Luchi
14 Pewar
15 Gambeel
16 Alam Sher
17 Mali Khel 
18 Sara Gala
19 Kachkina
Lower Kurram Sadda
1 Sateen 
2 Pirak
3 Pir Qayum
4 Sadda
5 Darnni
6 Khanano Kalay
7 Shashoo
8 Warsak
9 Skhi Ahmad Shah
10 Makizai Sharki
11 Kochi
12 Mat Khoza
13 New Abadi
14 Jabei Kalay
15 Sanzalo Kalai
16 Bugen
17 Uchat
18 Manduri
19 Chapri
Central kurram 
1 Tarali
2 Gawai  Ghara
3 Sultanei
4 Tawde oba
5 Gawdra
6 Apange
7 Zangai
8 Mazreena
9 Wrasta
10 Morghan
11 Morgan dara
12 Sham kai
13 Manato
14 Gawaki
15 Oweet
16 Jalmai
17 Tando
18 Mandan
19 Doger
Kurram Agency
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Tehsil Miranshah
1 Shehzad Kot, 
2 Datta Khel Village, 
3 Shana khura, Hamzoni
4 Patti khel, hamzoni
5 Ali khel
6 Ahmad khel
7 Umarzai
8 Raghzai Kalai
9 Khatti kalai
10 Khaer kalai
11 Aghzan kalai
Tehsil Razmak
1 Zaman Malak Kalay
2 Sher Khan kalai
3 Fateh Mod
4 Zargwal Khel
5 Diroon
Tehsil Spinwam
1 Shamiri
2 Aba khel
3 Hassan Khel
4 Bobali
5 Mirali Village
6 Data khel
7 Spinwam Chowk 
North Waziristan Agency
Tehsil Data Khail
1 Pir Samand Kot
2 Boya
3 Tarka khel
4 Char Khel
5 Bar kalai, Degon
6 Keez Kalai, Degon
TehsilShewa
1 Tora Sawabai
2 Almara
3 Shadimi kot
4 Por khel
5 Pipali
6 Dhai
7 Tandi
8 Zalol Khel
9 Alam Khel
10 Druzanda
11 Khan Khel
Mirali Tehsil
1 Haider Khel
2 Eidak
3 Khadi
4 Zariki
Tehsil Upper Kurram 
Parachinar
20 Kunjali Zai
21 Jhalandar
22 Dangila
23 Wacha Dara
24 Jalm Zai
25 Sadino Kali
26 Sameer
27 Sara Kali
Lower Kurram Sadda
20 Mir bagh
21 Badma
Central Kurram 
20 Zarani
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Tehsil Birmal
1 Dana
2 Sarghishai
3 Sara khawra 
4 Margha
5 Kaza punga
6 Azam warsak
7 Baghara
8 Ghandai
9 Kaloosha
10 Zairai lita
11 Sholam
12 Manra
13 Nargosai
14 Wacha dana
Tehsil Wana 
1 Doag
2 Dabkot
3 Daza ghondai
4 Ghwa khwa
5 Mughal khel
6 Kari kot
7 Sherana
8 Spin
9 Tanai
10 Wacha khorha
Tehsil Toi Khula
1 Kotkai
2 Gul kuch
3 Gul kuch bazar kalai
4 Zarmillana
Sourth Waziristan Agency
Jana Kor
1 Barki Janakor
2 Mandi
3 Samabadaba
4 Samabadabere Herchan
5 Tatki Janakor
Asho Khail
1 Sarmast Khel
2 Zarin Khel
3 Murid Khel
FR Peshawar
Bosti Khel
1 Las Gari Mirwal Kalai
2 Samandi Mela Habib Kalai
3 Isra mela Main Noor Kalai
Zarghan Khel
1 Babozai
2 Bazi Khel
3 Ferozi Mela
4 Mani Khel
5 Sardar Khel
6 Shapal Kiwal
7 Toor Khel
Sheraki
1 Amal Khel Bala
2 Azbar kalay
3 Obash Khel
4 Doctor Sallem
5 Tary Kalley 
6 Noor Ali Kalai
FR Kohat
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1 Beezan Khel
2 Azeem Kalay
3 Mohmand Khel Wazer
4 Chari Narmi Khail
5 Hindi Khel
6 Ghowara Baba Khail
7 Custam Bakakhel
8 Chashma
FR Bannu 
1 Masti Khail
2 Guli Khail
3 Sargara Muhammad Khan
4 Tajori
FR Lakki
1 Jandola
2 Kerriwam
3 Khaicha
4 Khargai
5 Doulat Korona
6 Musa Khan Korona
7 Serra Khowla
8 Sobat Kech
FR Tank
1 Mughal Kot
2 Darazanda
3 Landi Baloch Khan
4 Doogh Shengai
5 Ragha Sar
6 Parwara
7 Shiek Mela
8 Karriwam
FR D.I. Khan
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AREGULATION
further to amend Frontier Crimes Regulation, 1901
WHEREAS it is expedient further to amend the Frontier Crimes Regulation, 1901 (III of 1901) for the 
purposes hereinafter appearing;
NOW, THEREFORE, in pursuance of the provisions contained in clause (5) of Article 247 of the 
Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the President of Pakistan is pleased to make the following 
Regulation:–
1. Short title and commencement.– (1) This Regulation may be called the Frontier Crimes 
(Amendment) Regulation, 2011. 
(2)  It shall come into force at once.
3. Substitution of long title and preamble Regulation III of 1901.– In the Frontier Crimes 
Regulation, 1901 (III of 1901), hereinafter referred to as the said Regulation, 
(a) for the long title, the following shall be substituted, namely:-
"further to provide for maintenance of peace, law and order and good governance in the 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas";
(b) for the preamble, the following substituted, namely:-
“WHEREAS it is expedient further to provide for maintenance of peace, law and order and good 
governance in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas;
NOW, THEREFORE, in pursuance of clause (5) of Article 247 of the Constitution of the Islamic 
Republic of Pakistan, the President is pleased to make the following Regulation:-”; and
(c) the words, colon and dash "it is hereby enacted as follows:-"
shall be omitted.
4. Amendment of section 1, Regulation III of 1901.– In the said Regulation, in section 1,–
(a) for sub-section (3) the following shall be substituted, namely:–
“(3) It shall extend to such Federally Administered Tribal Areas as may be notified by the 
Governor from time to time in pursuance of  Article 145 of the Constitution of Islamic 
Republic of Pakistan. The Federally Administered Tribal Areas include the tribal areas as 
specified in the Third Schedule to this Regulation.”; and
(b) sub-sections (4) and (5) shall be omitted.
3. General Amendment, Regulation III of 1901.– In the said Regulation, for the words “Deputy 
Commissioner” or “District Magistrate” wherever occurring the words “Political Agent” or “District 
Coordination Officer or "Assistant Political Agent”, as the case may be, shall be substituted.
5. Substitution of sections 2,3,4 and 5, Regulation III of 1901.– In the said Regulation, for sections 
2,3,4 and 5 the following shall respectively be substituted, namely:–
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“2. Definitions.– In this Regulation, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,-
(a) “Appellate Authority” means an Authority established under section 48 of this Regulation;
(b) “Council of Elders” means in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, a council of three or 
more respectable elders appointed by the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as 
the case may be, and presided over by Assistant Political Agent  vested with powers under 
section 30 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 (Act V of 1898);
(c) “FATA Tribunal” means a Tribunal established under section 55A; 
(d) “Governor” means the Governor of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa as Agent to the President of 
Pakistan for Federally Administered Tribal Areas in terms of Article 145 of the Constitution 
of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan; 
(e) “Qaumi Jirga” means Jirga consisting of respectable elders and representatives of the 
tribes; and
(f). “Rewaj” means usages, traditions and customs of the tribes in vogue in Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas.
3. Relation of Regulation to other laws.– (1) The provisions of this Regulation shall take effect in 
case to which they apply, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in 
force.
(2) The powers conferred by this Regulation may be exercised in addition to any powers 
conferred by or under any other law for the time being in force, and, where the contrary is not 
expressed or implied, other laws in force in Tribal Areas in which all or any of the provisions of this 
Regulation are for the time being in force shall, so far as may be, apply to cases dealt within that 
place under this Regulation.
(3) The laws specified in the Second Schedule shall apply to the Federally Administered 
Tribal Areas.
4. Assistant Political Agent.– (1)   In any Agency or Frontier Region in the whole or any part thereof 
where all or any of the provisions of this Regulation are for the time being in force, the Governor 
may confer powers under section 30 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act V of 1898) on any 
Assistant Political Agent. 
(2) Every Assistant Political Agent  shall have all the ordinary powers of a Magistrate of the 
First Class as specified in Schedule III and additional powers as specified in Part I of Schedule IV to 
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act V of 1898), and may pass any sentence of imprisonment 
or fine or both as provided in this Regulation.
(3) When exercising any of the powers of a Political Agent or District Coordination Officer 
under this Regulation, an Assistant Political Agent shall be deemed, for the purposes of this 
Regulation, to be the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, and shall 
exercise all or any of the powers specified in the First schedule. 
(4) Every Assistant Political Agent shall exercise his powers in subordination to the Political 
Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, and in such cases or class of cases, and 
within such local limits as the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer may, by order in 
writing, direct.
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(b) for the preamble, the following substituted, namely:-
“WHEREAS it is expedient further to provide for maintenance of peace, law and order and good 
governance in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas;
NOW, THEREFORE, in pursuance of clause (5) of Article 247 of the Constitution of the Islamic 
Republic of Pakistan, the President is pleased to make the following Regulation:-”; and
(c) the words, colon and dash "it is hereby enacted as follows:-"
shall be omitted.
4. Amendment of section 1, Regulation III of 1901.– In the said Regulation, in section 1,–
(a) for sub-section (3) the following shall be substituted, namely:–
“(3) It shall extend to such Federally Administered Tribal Areas as may be notified by the 
Governor from time to time in pursuance of  Article 145 of the Constitution of Islamic 
Republic of Pakistan. The Federally Administered Tribal Areas include the tribal areas as 
specified in the Third Schedule to this Regulation.”; and
(b) sub-sections (4) and (5) shall be omitted.
3. General Amendment, Regulation III of 1901.– In the said Regulation, for the words “Deputy 
Commissioner” or “District Magistrate” wherever occurring the words “Political Agent” or “District 
Coordination Officer or "Assistant Political Agent”, as the case may be, shall be substituted.
5. Substitution of sections 2,3,4 and 5, Regulation III of 1901.– In the said Regulation, for sections 
2,3,4 and 5 the following shall respectively be substituted, namely:–
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“2. Definitions.– In this Regulation, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,-
(a) “Appellate Authority” means an Authority established under section 48 of this Regulation;
(b) “Council of Elders” means in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, a council of three or 
more respectable elders appointed by the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as 
the case may be, and presided over by Assistant Political Agent  vested with powers under 
section 30 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 (Act V of 1898);
(c) “FATA Tribunal” means a Tribunal established under section 55A; 
(d) “Governor” means the Governor of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa as Agent to the President of 
Pakistan for Federally Administered Tribal Areas in terms of Article 145 of the Constitution 
of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan; 
(e) “Qaumi Jirga” means Jirga consisting of respectable elders and representatives of the 
tribes; and
(f). “Rewaj” means usages, traditions and customs of the tribes in vogue in Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas.
3. Relation of Regulation to other laws.– (1) The provisions of this Regulation shall take effect in 
case to which they apply, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in 
force.
(2) The powers conferred by this Regulation may be exercised in addition to any powers 
conferred by or under any other law for the time being in force, and, where the contrary is not 
expressed or implied, other laws in force in Tribal Areas in which all or any of the provisions of this 
Regulation are for the time being in force shall, so far as may be, apply to cases dealt within that 
place under this Regulation.
(3) The laws specified in the Second Schedule shall apply to the Federally Administered 
Tribal Areas.
4. Assistant Political Agent.– (1)   In any Agency or Frontier Region in the whole or any part thereof 
where all or any of the provisions of this Regulation are for the time being in force, the Governor 
may confer powers under section 30 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act V of 1898) on any 
Assistant Political Agent. 
(2) Every Assistant Political Agent  shall have all the ordinary powers of a Magistrate of the 
First Class as specified in Schedule III and additional powers as specified in Part I of Schedule IV to 
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act V of 1898), and may pass any sentence of imprisonment 
or fine or both as provided in this Regulation.
(3) When exercising any of the powers of a Political Agent or District Coordination Officer 
under this Regulation, an Assistant Political Agent shall be deemed, for the purposes of this 
Regulation, to be the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, and shall 
exercise all or any of the powers specified in the First schedule. 
(4) Every Assistant Political Agent shall exercise his powers in subordination to the Political 
Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, and in such cases or class of cases, and 
within such local limits as the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer may, by order in 
writing, direct.
5. Power of Political Agent or District Coordination Officer to transfer the case.– The Political 
Agent or the District Coordination Officer may, on the application of any of the parties, after notice 
to the other party and hearing them, transfer any civil or criminal matter to any Assistant Political 
Agent, within thirty days from the appointment of the Council of Elders and shall record reasons 
thereof for such transfer of the case.”.
6. Omission of section 6, Regulation III of 1901.– In the said Regulation, section 6 shall be omitted.
7. Substitution of sections 7,8,9,10 and 11, Regulation III of 1901.– In the said Regulation, for 
sections 7,8,9,10, and 11, the following shall be substituted, namely:–
“7.  Tender of pardon to accomplices.– Section 337 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act V 
of 1898), for the purpose of this Regulation, shall be construed to read as under,-Z
"(1)  In the case of any offence, at any stage of the investigation or inquiry into, or trial of the 
offence, with a view to obtaining the evidence of any person supposed to have been directly or 
indirectly concerned in or privy  to the offence, the Political Agent or the District Coordination 
Officer, as the case may be, may tender pardon to such person on condition of his making full and 
true disclosure of the whole of the circumstances within his knowledge related to the offence and to 
every other person concerned, whether, as principal or abettor, in the commission thereof:
Provided that no person shall  be tendered pardon who is  involved in an offence relating to 
hurt or qatl without permission of the victim or, as the case may be, of the heirs of the victim.
(2)   The Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, who tenders a 
pardon under sub-section (1) shall record his reasons for doing so. 
(3)  Every person accepting a tender of pardon under this section shall be examined as a 
witness in the subsequent trial, if any. 
(4)  Such person, unless he is already on bail, shall be detained in custody until the 
termination of the trial.
8.  Civil reference to the Council of Elders.– (1) Where the Political Agent or the District 
Coordination Officer, as the case may be, is satisfied from any information that a civil dispute exists 
between the parties which is likely to cause breach of peace, he may, for the settlement thereof 
make an order in writing stating the grounds for his being so satisfied, refer the dispute within 
fifteen days to the Council of Elders, for findings in accordance with Rewaj who shall give its findings 
within ninety days on the issues in dispute after making necessary inquiry and hearing the parties 
and their witnesses.  
(2)  Where a reference to the Council of Elders is made under sub-section (1), the Political 
Agent or the District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, shall nominate  the Council of Elders.  
The names of the members so nominated be communicated to the parties, and any objection taken 
thereto by any of the parties, shall be recorded. The Political Agent or  the District Coordination 
Officer, as the case may be, shall dispose of  the objections after hearing the parties and recording 
the reasons thereof, appoint the members of the Council accordingly.
(3)  The order of reference made under sub-section (1) shall state the issues in dispute on 
which the findings of Council of Elders is required.
(4)  On receipt of the findings of Council of Elders, the Political Agent or the District 
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Coordination Officer, as the case may be, by recording his reasons may,- 
(a) pass a decree in accordance with the findings of the majority of the Council of Elders; or
(b) remand the case to the Council of Elders for further inquiry and findings.
9.  Effect of decree on finding of Council.– A decree passed under clause (a of sub-section (4) of 
section 8 shall,-
(a) be a final settlement of the case so far as the decree relates to the matter stated in the 
reference; and 
(b) have, to that extent and subject to the provisions of this Regulation with respect to the 
finding of appeal or revision as the case may be, the same effect as a decree of a Civil Court 
of ultimate jurisdiction, and be enforced by the Political Agent or the District Coordination 
Officer, as the case may be, as a decree of such Court.
10. Restriction on jurisdiction of Civil Courts.– No Civil Court shall have Jurisdiction to call in 
question the legality of anything done or purported to be done in respect of any matter, the cause of action 
whereof has arisen in the Tribal Area.
11.  Criminal references to Council of Elders.– (1) Whenever an offence, of which the Political Agent 
or District Coordination Officer is competent to take cognizance under this Regulation, is 
committed, the case shall be registered and the accused shall be produced before the Assistant 
Political Agent concerned within twenty four hours of the arrest of the accused excluding the time 
necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the Assistant Political Agent having jurisdiction. 
The Political Agent or District Coordination Officer as the case may be, shall make an order in writing 
referring the question for finding of guilt or innocence of any person or persons accused of any 
offence or offences, to the Council of Elders for its findings who after holding necessary inquiry and 
hearing the parties and witnesses, submit its findings to the Political Agent or District Coordination 
Officer as the case may be. The Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, 
shall appoint the members of the Council of Elders within ten days from the date of arrest of the 
accused and shall require the Council of Elders to submit its findings on the question referred to 
within ninety days.
(2)  Where a reference to the Council of Elders is made under sub section (1) and the 
members of the Council have been nominated by the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, 
as the case may be, the names of the members so nominated be communicated to the accused and 
the complainant, and any objection taken thereto by any of the parties, shall be recorded. The 
Political Agent or the District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, shall dispose of the 
objections after hearing the parties and the reasons thereof be recorded and appoint the members 
of the Council accordingly.
(3)  On receipt of the findings of the Council of Elders, the Political Agent or the District 
Coordination Officer, as the case may be, by recording his reasons may,-
(a) pass an order in accordance with the findings of the majority of the Council of Elders; or 
(b) remand the case to the Council of Elders for further inquiry and findings.
(4)  No person shall be prosecuted or punished for the same offence more than once.”.
5. Power of Political Agent or District Coordination Officer to transfer the case.– The Political 
Agent or the District Coordination Officer may, on the application of any of the parties, after notice 
to the other party and hearing them, transfer any civil or criminal matter to any Assistant Political 
Agent, within thirty days from the appointment of the Council of Elders and shall record reasons 
thereof for such transfer of the case.”.
6. Omission of section 6, Regulation III of 1901.– In the said Regulation, section 6 shall be omitted.
7. Substitution of sections 7,8,9,10 and 11, Regulation III of 1901.– In the said Regulation, for 
sections 7,8,9,10, and 11, the following shall be substituted, namely:–
“7.  Tender of pardon to accomplices.– Section 337 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act V 
of 1898), for the purpose of this Regulation, shall be construed to read as under,-Z
"(1)  In the case of any offence, at any stage of the investigation or inquiry into, or trial of the 
offence, with a view to obtaining the evidence of any person supposed to have been directly or 
indirectly concerned in or privy  to the offence, the Political Agent or the District Coordination 
Officer, as the case may be, may tender pardon to such person on condition of his making full and 
true disclosure of the whole of the circumstances within his knowledge related to the offence and to 
every other person concerned, whether, as principal or abettor, in the commission thereof:
Provided that no person shall  be tendered pardon who is  involved in an offence relating to 
hurt or qatl without permission of the victim or, as the case may be, of the heirs of the victim.
(2)   The Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, who tenders a 
pardon under sub-section (1) shall record his reasons for doing so. 
(3)  Every person accepting a tender of pardon under this section shall be examined as a 
witness in the subsequent trial, if any. 
(4)  Such person, unless he is already on bail, shall be detained in custody until the 
termination of the trial.
8.  Civil reference to the Council of Elders.– (1) Where the Political Agent or the District 
Coordination Officer, as the case may be, is satisfied from any information that a civil dispute exists 
between the parties which is likely to cause breach of peace, he may, for the settlement thereof 
make an order in writing stating the grounds for his being so satisfied, refer the dispute within 
fifteen days to the Council of Elders, for findings in accordance with Rewaj who shall give its findings 
within ninety days on the issues in dispute after making necessary inquiry and hearing the parties 
and their witnesses.  
(2)  Where a reference to the Council of Elders is made under sub-section (1), the Political 
Agent or the District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, shall nominate  the Council of Elders.  
The names of the members so nominated be communicated to the parties, and any objection taken 
thereto by any of the parties, shall be recorded. The Political Agent or  the District Coordination 
Officer, as the case may be, shall dispose of  the objections after hearing the parties and recording 
the reasons thereof, appoint the members of the Council accordingly.
(3)  The order of reference made under sub-section (1) shall state the issues in dispute on 
which the findings of Council of Elders is required.
(4)  On receipt of the findings of Council of Elders, the Political Agent or the District 
Understanding FATA212 APPENDIX V:  Frontier Crimes Regulation, 1901 213
Coordination Officer, as the case may be, by recording his reasons may,- 
(a) pass a decree in accordance with the findings of the majority of the Council of Elders; or
(b) remand the case to the Council of Elders for further inquiry and findings.
9.  Effect of decree on finding of Council.– A decree passed under clause (a of sub-section (4) of 
section 8 shall,-
(a) be a final settlement of the case so far as the decree relates to the matter stated in the 
reference; and 
(b) have, to that extent and subject to the provisions of this Regulation with respect to the 
finding of appeal or revision as the case may be, the same effect as a decree of a Civil Court 
of ultimate jurisdiction, and be enforced by the Political Agent or the District Coordination 
Officer, as the case may be, as a decree of such Court.
10. Restriction on jurisdiction of Civil Courts.– No Civil Court shall have Jurisdiction to call in 
question the legality of anything done or purported to be done in respect of any matter, the cause of action 
whereof has arisen in the Tribal Area.
11.  Criminal references to Council of Elders.– (1) Whenever an offence, of which the Political Agent 
or District Coordination Officer is competent to take cognizance under this Regulation, is 
committed, the case shall be registered and the accused shall be produced before the Assistant 
Political Agent concerned within twenty four hours of the arrest of the accused excluding the time 
necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the Assistant Political Agent having jurisdiction. 
The Political Agent or District Coordination Officer as the case may be, shall make an order in writing 
referring the question for finding of guilt or innocence of any person or persons accused of any 
offence or offences, to the Council of Elders for its findings who after holding necessary inquiry and 
hearing the parties and witnesses, submit its findings to the Political Agent or District Coordination 
Officer as the case may be. The Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, 
shall appoint the members of the Council of Elders within ten days from the date of arrest of the 
accused and shall require the Council of Elders to submit its findings on the question referred to 
within ninety days.
(2)  Where a reference to the Council of Elders is made under sub section (1) and the 
members of the Council have been nominated by the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, 
as the case may be, the names of the members so nominated be communicated to the accused and 
the complainant, and any objection taken thereto by any of the parties, shall be recorded. The 
Political Agent or the District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, shall dispose of the 
objections after hearing the parties and the reasons thereof be recorded and appoint the members 
of the Council accordingly.
(3)  On receipt of the findings of the Council of Elders, the Political Agent or the District 
Coordination Officer, as the case may be, by recording his reasons may,-
(a) pass an order in accordance with the findings of the majority of the Council of Elders; or 
(b) remand the case to the Council of Elders for further inquiry and findings.
(4)  No person shall be prosecuted or punished for the same offence more than once.”.
8. Insertion of sections 11A and 11B, Regulation III of 1901.- In the said Regulation, after section 
11, the following new sections shall be inserted, namely:-
“11A.  Bail.– (1) Where any person accused of non-bailable offence is arrested or detained or 
appears or is brought before the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, 
he may be released on bail,. However, he shall not be so released if there appear reasonable 
grounds for believing that he has been guilty of an offence punishable with imprisonment for ten  
years:
Provided that the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer may direct that 
any person under the age of sixteen years or any woman or any sick or infirm person 
accused of such an offence be released on bail:
Provided further that a person accused of an offence as aforesaid shall not be 
released on bail unless the complainant has been given notice to show cause why he should 
not be so released.
(2)  If it appears to the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, at 
any stage of the investigation, inquiry or trial that there are no reasonable grounds for believing that 
the accused has committed a non-bailable offence, but that there are sufficient grounds for further 
inquiry into his guilt, the accused may, pending such inquiry be released on bail with or without 
sureties for his appearance.
(3)  The Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, releasing any 
person on bail under sub-section (1) or (2), as the case may be, shall record his reasons in writing for 
so doing. 
(4)  Nothing herein shall be deemed to authorize the Political Agent or District Coordination 
Officer, as the case may be, to release on bail any person accused of non-bailable offence not in 
custody or not produced before him.
(5) The FATA Tribunal, Appellate Authority, or in case of a person released on bail by the 
Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, may cause any person who has 
been released under this section, to be re-arrested and may be committed to custody by an order 
recording  reasons for so doing.
11B.  Reference by Qaumi Jirga in exceptional cases.– The Political Agent or District Coordination 
Officer, as the case may be, may take cognizance of any offence or civil dispute in exceptional 
circumstances, if so recommended by a Qaumi Jirga of the Tribe in the interest of justice and public 
peace.”.
9.  Substitution of sections 12 and 13, Regulation III of 1901.– In the said Regulation, for sections 12 
and 13 the following shall be substituted, namely:–
“12. Punishment on conviction on findings of Council.–  Where the Political Agent or District 
Coordination Officer, as the case may be, convicts a person under clause (9) of sub-section (3) he 
may pass sentence of imprisonment or fine or both for the offence, provided that the sentence shall 
not exceed fourteen years.
13.  Manner of enforcing sentences.– Any sentence passed under section 12 shall be executed in 
the manner provided for the execution of sentences in Chapter XXVIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 
1898 (Act V of 1898); and-
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(a) an offence punishable with imprisonment for life shall be punishable with rigorous 
imprisonment for a term which may extend to fourteen years;
(b) the imprisonment in default of payment of fine shall be simple and the provisions of sections 63 
to 70 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 (Act XLV of 1860) shall, subject to aforesaid provisions, 
apply to sentences passed under this Regulation; and
(c)   the sentence of imprisonment and fine provided by the Pakistan Penal Code or any other law 
specified in the Second Schedule to this Regulation for the offence shall (1860 XLV of 1860) be 
applicable to such offence committed in Federally Administered Tribal Areas.”.
10.  Omission of sections 14,15,16,17 and 18, Regulation III of 1901.– In the said Regulation, 
sections 14,15,16,17 and 18 shall be omitted.
11. Substitution of sections 19 to 32, Regulation III of 1901.– In the said Regulation, for sections 19 
to 32 the following shall be substituted, namely:–
“19. Record of Political Agent or District Coordination Officer.– (1) Where the Political Agent or 
District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, passes any sentence of imprisonment or fine or 
both, he shall maintain a complete record of the case and record his reasons for passing the 
sentence.
(2) The record shall be made by the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the 
case may be, and the Council of Elders in Urdu, English or Pushto.
20.  Attendance of parties and witnesses before Political Agent or District Coordination Officer or 
Council of Elders.– Where a reference is made to a Council of Elders, the Political Agent or the 
District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, may exercise all or any of the powers conferred by 
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, (Act V of 1908) and the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, (Act V 
of 1898) respectively, as the case may be, for the purpose of compelling the attendance, before 
himself or the Council of Elders or Joint Council of Elders, of the parties, and witnesses, or any of 
them, in any case and at any stage of the proceedings. 
21.  Blockade of hostile or unfriendly tribe.– In the event of any tribe of Federally Administered 
Tribal Areas or any section of the tribe or any member of the tribe, acting in hostile, subversive or 
offensive manner towards the State or to any person residing within the settled area of Pakistan, the 
Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, by an order in writing may 
direct,–  
(a) the arrest of hostile members of such tribe wherever they may be, and the attachment of 
the property both movable and immovable wherever it may be found, belonging to them or 
any of them; 
(b) the detention in safe custody of any person so arrested or property so attached; and  
(c) debar all or any such member of the tribe from access into the settled area of Pakistan by 
public proclamation: 
Provided that the above-mentioned actions shall be taken against plareena of the 
accused in the first instance, and if the circumstances so warrant, then  any or all of the 
following actions may be taken by a well-reasoned order in writing against,- 
8. Insertion of sections 11A and 11B, Regulation III of 1901.- In the said Regulation, after section 
11, the following new sections shall be inserted, namely:-
“11A.  Bail.– (1) Where any person accused of non-bailable offence is arrested or detained or 
appears or is brought before the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, 
he may be released on bail,. However, he shall not be so released if there appear reasonable 
grounds for believing that he has been guilty of an offence punishable with imprisonment for ten  
years:
Provided that the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer may direct that 
any person under the age of sixteen years or any woman or any sick or infirm person 
accused of such an offence be released on bail:
Provided further that a person accused of an offence as aforesaid shall not be 
released on bail unless the complainant has been given notice to show cause why he should 
not be so released.
(2)  If it appears to the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, at 
any stage of the investigation, inquiry or trial that there are no reasonable grounds for believing that 
the accused has committed a non-bailable offence, but that there are sufficient grounds for further 
inquiry into his guilt, the accused may, pending such inquiry be released on bail with or without 
sureties for his appearance.
(3)  The Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, releasing any 
person on bail under sub-section (1) or (2), as the case may be, shall record his reasons in writing for 
so doing. 
(4)  Nothing herein shall be deemed to authorize the Political Agent or District Coordination 
Officer, as the case may be, to release on bail any person accused of non-bailable offence not in 
custody or not produced before him.
(5) The FATA Tribunal, Appellate Authority, or in case of a person released on bail by the 
Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, may cause any person who has 
been released under this section, to be re-arrested and may be committed to custody by an order 
recording  reasons for so doing.
11B.  Reference by Qaumi Jirga in exceptional cases.– The Political Agent or District Coordination 
Officer, as the case may be, may take cognizance of any offence or civil dispute in exceptional 
circumstances, if so recommended by a Qaumi Jirga of the Tribe in the interest of justice and public 
peace.”.
9.  Substitution of sections 12 and 13, Regulation III of 1901.– In the said Regulation, for sections 12 
and 13 the following shall be substituted, namely:–
“12. Punishment on conviction on findings of Council.–  Where the Political Agent or District 
Coordination Officer, as the case may be, convicts a person under clause (9) of sub-section (3) he 
may pass sentence of imprisonment or fine or both for the offence, provided that the sentence shall 
not exceed fourteen years.
13.  Manner of enforcing sentences.– Any sentence passed under section 12 shall be executed in 
the manner provided for the execution of sentences in Chapter XXVIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 
1898 (Act V of 1898); and-
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(a) an offence punishable with imprisonment for life shall be punishable with rigorous 
imprisonment for a term which may extend to fourteen years;
(b) the imprisonment in default of payment of fine shall be simple and the provisions of sections 63 
to 70 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 (Act XLV of 1860) shall, subject to aforesaid provisions, 
apply to sentences passed under this Regulation; and
(c)   the sentence of imprisonment and fine provided by the Pakistan Penal Code or any other law 
specified in the Second Schedule to this Regulation for the offence shall (1860 XLV of 1860) be 
applicable to such offence committed in Federally Administered Tribal Areas.”.
10.  Omission of sections 14,15,16,17 and 18, Regulation III of 1901.– In the said Regulation, 
sections 14,15,16,17 and 18 shall be omitted.
11. Substitution of sections 19 to 32, Regulation III of 1901.– In the said Regulation, for sections 19 
to 32 the following shall be substituted, namely:–
“19. Record of Political Agent or District Coordination Officer.– (1) Where the Political Agent or 
District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, passes any sentence of imprisonment or fine or 
both, he shall maintain a complete record of the case and record his reasons for passing the 
sentence.
(2) The record shall be made by the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the 
case may be, and the Council of Elders in Urdu, English or Pushto.
20.  Attendance of parties and witnesses before Political Agent or District Coordination Officer or 
Council of Elders.– Where a reference is made to a Council of Elders, the Political Agent or the 
District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, may exercise all or any of the powers conferred by 
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, (Act V of 1908) and the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, (Act V 
of 1898) respectively, as the case may be, for the purpose of compelling the attendance, before 
himself or the Council of Elders or Joint Council of Elders, of the parties, and witnesses, or any of 
them, in any case and at any stage of the proceedings. 
21.  Blockade of hostile or unfriendly tribe.– In the event of any tribe of Federally Administered 
Tribal Areas or any section of the tribe or any member of the tribe, acting in hostile, subversive or 
offensive manner towards the State or to any person residing within the settled area of Pakistan, the 
Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, by an order in writing may 
direct,–  
(a) the arrest of hostile members of such tribe wherever they may be, and the attachment of 
the property both movable and immovable wherever it may be found, belonging to them or 
any of them; 
(b) the detention in safe custody of any person so arrested or property so attached; and  
(c) debar all or any such member of the tribe from access into the settled area of Pakistan by 
public proclamation: 
Provided that the above-mentioned actions shall be taken against plareena of the 
accused in the first instance, and if the circumstances so warrant, then  any or all of the 
following actions may be taken by a well-reasoned order in writing against,- 
(i)  the sub-section of the tribe of the accused;
(ii)  the section of the tribe of the accused;
(iii)  any other section of the tribe of the accused,
Provided further that the confiscation of the property so attached shall be made after 
public proclamation and holding necessary inquiry,:
Provided also that women, children less than sixteen years of age persons over sixty-five years of 
age shall not be arrested and detained under this section.
Explanation:– Plareena as mentioned in first proviso includes the male descendants of the paternal 
grandfather of the accused.
22. Fines on communities accessory to crime.–(1) Where, from the circumstances of any case, 
there appears to be good reason to believe that the inhabitants of any village, or part of a village, or 
any of them, have -
(a) connived at, or in any way abetted, the commission of any offence; or
(b) failed to render any assistance in their power to discover the offenders or to effect their 
arrest;
(c) connived at the escape of, or harbored, any offender or person suspected of having taken 
part in the commission of any offence; or 
(d) combined to suppress material evidence of the commission of an offence;
the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, may with the previous 
sanction of the Commissioner,  impose a fine on the inhabitants of such village or part of a village,  
or any of them as a whole:
Provided that women, children less than sixteen years of age and persons over sixty-five 
years of age shall not be arrested and  detained under this section.
Explanation.- (2)  Nothing contained hearing shall be construed to debar the Political 
Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, to take any appropriate action against the 
personnel entrusted with watch and ward duties in the particular locality in accordance with Rewaj.
23. Fines on communities where murder or culpable homicide is committed or attempted.– 
Where, within the area occupied by a village community or part of a village-community, a person is 
found  dangerously or fatally wounded, or the body is found of a person believed to have been 
killed, the members of the village community or part thereof shall be deemed to have committed an 
offence under section 22, unless the elders of the village-community or part thereof show that the 
members thereof -
(a) had not found an opportunity of preventing the offence or arresting the offender; or
(b) have used all reasonable means to bring the offender to justice.
24.  Recovery of fines.– Fines imposed under section 22 shall, in default of payment, be recoverable 
as if they were arrears of land revenue due by the members of the community or part thereof upon 
whom the fine is imposed.  
25.  Forfeiture of remissions of revenue etc. in the case of communities and persons accessory to 
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crime.– Where a village-community or part of a village-community has become liable to fine under 
section 22, it shall further be liable to forfeit, in whole or in part and for a term or in perpetuity, any 
remission of land revenue of which it may be in joint enjoyment, and the members of the village-
community or part thereof, as the case may be, shall in like manner be liable severally to forfeit any 
assignment or remission of land-revenue or allowance paid out of public funds which they, or any of 
them, may enjoy.
26.  Forfeiture of public emoluments etc., of persons guilty of serious offences or of conniving at 
crime.– Where it is shown to the satisfaction of the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, 
as the case may be, that any person who is in the enjoyment of an assignment or remission of land-
revenue or allowance payable out of public funds, has been guilty of a serious offence,  or has 
colluded with or harboured any criminal, or has suppressed material evidence of the commission of 
any offence, or has failed, on the investigation of any criminal case, to render loyal and proper 
assistance to the authorities, to the best of his ability, the Political Agent or District Coordination 
Officer, as the case may be, may in addition to any other penalty to which such person may be liable 
under any law for the time being in force, direct the forfeiture, in  whole or in part and for a term or 
in perpetuity, of such assignment or remission of land-revenue or allowance, as the case may be:
Explanation.– For the purposes of this section the expression “serious offence” means any 
offence punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years or more.
27.  Powers to direct forfeiture.–  Forfeiture under section 25 or section 26 may be adjudged by 
order of the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be,  for a term which 
may extend to three years, and by order of the Governor or any officer authorized by him for any 
longer term or in perpetuity. 
28.  Powers of Governor saved.– Nothing contained in sections 25, 26 and 27 shall affect the 
powers of the Governor  with respect to the grant, continuance or forfeiture, in whole or in part, of 
any assignment or remission of land-revenue or of any allowance paid out of public funds.
29.  Preparation to commit certain offences.– Where a person is found carrying arms in such 
manner or in such circumstances as to afford just grounds of suspicion that the arms are being 
carried by him with intent to use them for an unlawful purpose, and that person has taken 
precautions to elude observation or evade arrest,  he shall be taken in custody and be tried as 
provided in section 11 and if found guilty, may be punished with fine which may extend to five 
thousand rupees and the arms  carried by him be confiscated and in case of habitual offender or 
previous convict, he may be punished with imprisonment with extend to two years or with fine 
which may extend to rupees ten thousand and the arms carried may be confiscated.
30.  Adultery.-(1) A married woman who, knowingly and by her own consent, has sexual intercourse 
with any man who is not her husband, is guilty of the offence of adultery, and shall be punishable 
with imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years, or with fine, or  with  both.
(2) Cognizance shall not be taken of an offence under this section unless a 
complaint has been made by the husband of the woman, or, in his absence, by a person 
who had care of the woman on his behalf at the time when the offence was committed.
31. Power to prohibit erection of new villages or towers on frontier.– (1)  No new hamlet, village-
habitation, tower or walled enclosure shall, without the previous sanction in writing of the Political 
Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, who may either grant or refuse such 
sanction as he thinks fit, be erected at any place within one hundred and twenty yards from the 
(i)  the sub-section of the tribe of the accused;
(ii)  the section of the tribe of the accused;
(iii)  any other section of the tribe of the accused,
Provided further that the confiscation of the property so attached shall be made after 
public proclamation and holding necessary inquiry,:
Provided also that women, children less than sixteen years of age persons over sixty-five years of 
age shall not be arrested and detained under this section.
Explanation:– Plareena as mentioned in first proviso includes the male descendants of the paternal 
grandfather of the accused.
22. Fines on communities accessory to crime.–(1) Where, from the circumstances of any case, 
there appears to be good reason to believe that the inhabitants of any village, or part of a village, or 
any of them, have -
(a) connived at, or in any way abetted, the commission of any offence; or
(b) failed to render any assistance in their power to discover the offenders or to effect their 
arrest;
(c) connived at the escape of, or harbored, any offender or person suspected of having taken 
part in the commission of any offence; or 
(d) combined to suppress material evidence of the commission of an offence;
the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, may with the previous 
sanction of the Commissioner,  impose a fine on the inhabitants of such village or part of a village,  
or any of them as a whole:
Provided that women, children less than sixteen years of age and persons over sixty-five 
years of age shall not be arrested and  detained under this section.
Explanation.- (2)  Nothing contained hearing shall be construed to debar the Political 
Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, to take any appropriate action against the 
personnel entrusted with watch and ward duties in the particular locality in accordance with Rewaj.
23. Fines on communities where murder or culpable homicide is committed or attempted.– 
Where, within the area occupied by a village community or part of a village-community, a person is 
found  dangerously or fatally wounded, or the body is found of a person believed to have been 
killed, the members of the village community or part thereof shall be deemed to have committed an 
offence under section 22, unless the elders of the village-community or part thereof show that the 
members thereof -
(a) had not found an opportunity of preventing the offence or arresting the offender; or
(b) have used all reasonable means to bring the offender to justice.
24.  Recovery of fines.– Fines imposed under section 22 shall, in default of payment, be recoverable 
as if they were arrears of land revenue due by the members of the community or part thereof upon 
whom the fine is imposed.  
25.  Forfeiture of remissions of revenue etc. in the case of communities and persons accessory to 
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crime.– Where a village-community or part of a village-community has become liable to fine under 
section 22, it shall further be liable to forfeit, in whole or in part and for a term or in perpetuity, any 
remission of land revenue of which it may be in joint enjoyment, and the members of the village-
community or part thereof, as the case may be, shall in like manner be liable severally to forfeit any 
assignment or remission of land-revenue or allowance paid out of public funds which they, or any of 
them, may enjoy.
26.  Forfeiture of public emoluments etc., of persons guilty of serious offences or of conniving at 
crime.– Where it is shown to the satisfaction of the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, 
as the case may be, that any person who is in the enjoyment of an assignment or remission of land-
revenue or allowance payable out of public funds, has been guilty of a serious offence,  or has 
colluded with or harboured any criminal, or has suppressed material evidence of the commission of 
any offence, or has failed, on the investigation of any criminal case, to render loyal and proper 
assistance to the authorities, to the best of his ability, the Political Agent or District Coordination 
Officer, as the case may be, may in addition to any other penalty to which such person may be liable 
under any law for the time being in force, direct the forfeiture, in  whole or in part and for a term or 
in perpetuity, of such assignment or remission of land-revenue or allowance, as the case may be:
Explanation.– For the purposes of this section the expression “serious offence” means any 
offence punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years or more.
27.  Powers to direct forfeiture.–  Forfeiture under section 25 or section 26 may be adjudged by 
order of the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be,  for a term which 
may extend to three years, and by order of the Governor or any officer authorized by him for any 
longer term or in perpetuity. 
28.  Powers of Governor saved.– Nothing contained in sections 25, 26 and 27 shall affect the 
powers of the Governor  with respect to the grant, continuance or forfeiture, in whole or in part, of 
any assignment or remission of land-revenue or of any allowance paid out of public funds.
29.  Preparation to commit certain offences.– Where a person is found carrying arms in such 
manner or in such circumstances as to afford just grounds of suspicion that the arms are being 
carried by him with intent to use them for an unlawful purpose, and that person has taken 
precautions to elude observation or evade arrest,  he shall be taken in custody and be tried as 
provided in section 11 and if found guilty, may be punished with fine which may extend to five 
thousand rupees and the arms  carried by him be confiscated and in case of habitual offender or 
previous convict, he may be punished with imprisonment with extend to two years or with fine 
which may extend to rupees ten thousand and the arms carried may be confiscated.
30.  Adultery.-(1) A married woman who, knowingly and by her own consent, has sexual intercourse 
with any man who is not her husband, is guilty of the offence of adultery, and shall be punishable 
with imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years, or with fine, or  with  both.
(2) Cognizance shall not be taken of an offence under this section unless a 
complaint has been made by the husband of the woman, or, in his absence, by a person 
who had care of the woman on his behalf at the time when the offence was committed.
31. Power to prohibit erection of new villages or towers on frontier.– (1)  No new hamlet, village-
habitation, tower or walled enclosure shall, without the previous sanction in writing of the Political 
Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, who may either grant or refuse such 
sanction as he thinks fit, be erected at any place within one hundred and twenty yards from the 
center of the road. 
(2) Where the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, refuses to 
sanction the erection of any such hamlet, village-habitation, tower or walled enclosure, as the case 
may be, he shall record his reasons in writing for so doing. 
32.  Power to direct removal of villages.– Where it is expedient on military grounds, the Federal 
Government may, by order in writing, direct the removal of any village situated in close proximity to 
the frontiers of Islamic Republic of Pakistan to any other suitable site, and award to the inhabitants 
such compensation for any loss which may have been occasioned to them by the removal of their 
village as, in the opinion of the Federal Government, is just and adequate.”.
12.  Omission of section 33, Regulation III of 1901.– In the said Regulation, section 33 shall be 
omitted.
13.  Substitution of section 34, Regulation III of 1901.– In the said Regulation, for section 34 the 
following shall be substituted, namely:–
“34. Attachment or disposal of buildings used by robber, etc.– (1)  Where the Political Agent or 
District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, is satisfied that any building is habitually used as a 
meeting place by robbers, house-breakers, thieves,  receivers of stolen properties, protectors  or 
harbourers of thieves or their abettors, habitual offenders who commit or attempt to commit, or 
abet the commission of the offences of kidnapping, abduction, extortion, cheating, mischief, car-
lifting, offences involving breach of peace, or by desperate and dangerous criminals or for the 
purpose of gambling, he may, by order in writing, direct the arrest of such persons and  prohibit the 
owner or occupier thereof from so using such building, and, if the order is not obeyed, he may, by a 
like order, direct that the building be attached in favour of Government of Pakistan, and where such 
attachment is not feasible, then the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may 
be, may pass an order of the disposal of the building if the Jirga of the Tribe expresses its inability to 
effect surrender of the accused to the Administration.  Such further order shall be without 
prejudice to any punishment to which the offenders or owner or occupier of such building may, 
under any law for the time being in force, be liable for disobedience of the prohibitory order.
(2)  No person shall be entitled to any compensation in respect of the disposal of any 
building under sub-section (1).”. 
14.  Omission of section 35, Regulation III of 1901.– In the said Regulation, section 35 shall be 
omitted.
15.  Substitution of sections 36 to 40, Regulation III of 1901.– In the said Regulation, for sections 36 
to 40 the following shall be substituted, namely:–
“36.  Power to require persons to remove in certain cases.– Where, in the opinion of the Political 
Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, any person,–
(a)      is dangerously fanatic; or
(b) belongs to a frontier tribe and has no ostensible means of subsistence or can not give a 
satisfactory account of himself; or
(c) has a blood-feud; or
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(d) has occasioned cause of quarrel likely to lead to blood-shed;
the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be,  may  by order in writing, 
require him to reside beyond the limits of the territories to which this Regulation extends, or at such 
place within the said territories as may be specified in the order:
Provided that, if the person has a fixed habitation in the place which the Political Agent or 
District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, requires him to leave, an order under this section 
may not be made without the recommendations of  Council of Elders.
37.  Penalty for breach of certain orders.– Whoever contravenes the provisions of section 31, or 
disobeys an order under section 21 or section 32, or a prohibition under section 34, or a requisition 
under section 36, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, 
and shall also be liable to fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees. 
38.  Powers of arrest.– In any place in which all or any of the provisions of this Regulation are for the 
time being in force–
(i) any private person may, without an order from a local administration and without a 
warrant, arrest or cause to be arrested, and make over or cause to be made  over to Political 
Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, or take or cause to be taken to the 
nearest notified post of the local administration, any person who has been concerned in 
any cognizable offence or against whom a reasonable complaint has been made or credible 
information has been received, or a reasonable suspicion exists of his having been so 
concerned; and
(ii) section 46 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,1898 (Act V of 1898), shall, mutatis mutandis 
apply to Federally Administered Tribal Areas.
39.  Arrest without warrant in cases  under section 496A, Pakistan Penal Code 1860 (XLV of 1860).- 
(1).  Where there is reason to believe that a person has committed or attempted to commit an 
offence punishable under section 496A of the Pakistan Penal Code (XLV of 1860), an officer of the 
Law Enforcement Agencies, under the command of Political Agent or  District Coordination Officer, 
as the case may be, without an order from a Magistrate and without a warrant, arrest that person on 
the requisition of the husband of the woman, or, in his absence of a person having the care of her on 
his behalf, or, in the absence of  both the husband and any such person as laws aforesaid from the 
village in which the woman resides, on the requisition of a head man of the village. 
(2). An officer of law Enforcement Agencies, under the command of Political Agent or  
District Coordination Officer, as the case may be , making an arrest under sub-section (1) shall, 
without unnecessary delay, take or send the person arrested to the nearest Magistrate having 
jurisdiction. 
(3). The Magistrate may  in default of bail being furnished to his satisfaction, detain the 
person arrested for such period, not exceeding fourteen days, as may be necessary to enable the 
husband, or , his absence, a person who had care of the woman on his behalf, to make a complaint.
40.  Security for keeping the peace.– (1) Where any person, who is likely to do any wrongful act or 
commit any offence, which may cause breach of peace or disturb the public tranquility, is produced 
before the Political Agent or the District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, he may require 
such person to show cause why he should not be ordered to execute a bond with or without sureties 
for good behaviour and keeping the peace for a period not exceeding two years. 
center of the road. 
(2) Where the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, refuses to 
sanction the erection of any such hamlet, village-habitation, tower or walled enclosure, as the case 
may be, he shall record his reasons in writing for so doing. 
32.  Power to direct removal of villages.– Where it is expedient on military grounds, the Federal 
Government may, by order in writing, direct the removal of any village situated in close proximity to 
the frontiers of Islamic Republic of Pakistan to any other suitable site, and award to the inhabitants 
such compensation for any loss which may have been occasioned to them by the removal of their 
village as, in the opinion of the Federal Government, is just and adequate.”.
12.  Omission of section 33, Regulation III of 1901.– In the said Regulation, section 33 shall be 
omitted.
13.  Substitution of section 34, Regulation III of 1901.– In the said Regulation, for section 34 the 
following shall be substituted, namely:–
“34. Attachment or disposal of buildings used by robber, etc.– (1)  Where the Political Agent or 
District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, is satisfied that any building is habitually used as a 
meeting place by robbers, house-breakers, thieves,  receivers of stolen properties, protectors  or 
harbourers of thieves or their abettors, habitual offenders who commit or attempt to commit, or 
abet the commission of the offences of kidnapping, abduction, extortion, cheating, mischief, car-
lifting, offences involving breach of peace, or by desperate and dangerous criminals or for the 
purpose of gambling, he may, by order in writing, direct the arrest of such persons and  prohibit the 
owner or occupier thereof from so using such building, and, if the order is not obeyed, he may, by a 
like order, direct that the building be attached in favour of Government of Pakistan, and where such 
attachment is not feasible, then the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may 
be, may pass an order of the disposal of the building if the Jirga of the Tribe expresses its inability to 
effect surrender of the accused to the Administration.  Such further order shall be without 
prejudice to any punishment to which the offenders or owner or occupier of such building may, 
under any law for the time being in force, be liable for disobedience of the prohibitory order.
(2)  No person shall be entitled to any compensation in respect of the disposal of any 
building under sub-section (1).”. 
14.  Omission of section 35, Regulation III of 1901.– In the said Regulation, section 35 shall be 
omitted.
15.  Substitution of sections 36 to 40, Regulation III of 1901.– In the said Regulation, for sections 36 
to 40 the following shall be substituted, namely:–
“36.  Power to require persons to remove in certain cases.– Where, in the opinion of the Political 
Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, any person,–
(a)      is dangerously fanatic; or
(b) belongs to a frontier tribe and has no ostensible means of subsistence or can not give a 
satisfactory account of himself; or
(c) has a blood-feud; or
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(d) has occasioned cause of quarrel likely to lead to blood-shed;
the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be,  may  by order in writing, 
require him to reside beyond the limits of the territories to which this Regulation extends, or at such 
place within the said territories as may be specified in the order:
Provided that, if the person has a fixed habitation in the place which the Political Agent or 
District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, requires him to leave, an order under this section 
may not be made without the recommendations of  Council of Elders.
37.  Penalty for breach of certain orders.– Whoever contravenes the provisions of section 31, or 
disobeys an order under section 21 or section 32, or a prohibition under section 34, or a requisition 
under section 36, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, 
and shall also be liable to fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees. 
38.  Powers of arrest.– In any place in which all or any of the provisions of this Regulation are for the 
time being in force–
(i) any private person may, without an order from a local administration and without a 
warrant, arrest or cause to be arrested, and make over or cause to be made  over to Political 
Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, or take or cause to be taken to the 
nearest notified post of the local administration, any person who has been concerned in 
any cognizable offence or against whom a reasonable complaint has been made or credible 
information has been received, or a reasonable suspicion exists of his having been so 
concerned; and
(ii) section 46 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,1898 (Act V of 1898), shall, mutatis mutandis 
apply to Federally Administered Tribal Areas.
39.  Arrest without warrant in cases  under section 496A, Pakistan Penal Code 1860 (XLV of 1860).- 
(1).  Where there is reason to believe that a person has committed or attempted to commit an 
offence punishable under section 496A of the Pakistan Penal Code (XLV of 1860), an officer of the 
Law Enforcement Agencies, under the command of Political Agent or  District Coordination Officer, 
as the case may be, without an order from a Magistrate and without a warrant, arrest that person on 
the requisition of the husband of the woman, or, in his absence of a person having the care of her on 
his behalf, or, in the absence of  both the husband and any such person as laws aforesaid from the 
village in which the woman resides, on the requisition of a head man of the village. 
(2). An officer of law Enforcement Agencies, under the command of Political Agent or  
District Coordination Officer, as the case may be , making an arrest under sub-section (1) shall, 
without unnecessary delay, take or send the person arrested to the nearest Magistrate having 
jurisdiction. 
(3). The Magistrate may  in default of bail being furnished to his satisfaction, detain the 
person arrested for such period, not exceeding fourteen days, as may be necessary to enable the 
husband, or , his absence, a person who had care of the woman on his behalf, to make a complaint.
40.  Security for keeping the peace.– (1) Where any person, who is likely to do any wrongful act or 
commit any offence, which may cause breach of peace or disturb the public tranquility, is produced 
before the Political Agent or the District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, he may require 
such person to show cause why he should not be ordered to execute a bond with or without sureties 
for good behaviour and keeping the peace for a period not exceeding two years. 
(2) The Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, shall hold 
necessary inquiry as nearly as may be practicable, into the truth of the information upon which such 
action has been taken, in accordance with sub-section (2) of 117 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 
1898 (Act V of 1898).
(3) Pending completion of such inquiry, the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, 
as the case may be, if he considers that immediate measures are necessary for preventing the 
breach of peace or commission of any offence, direct the person to execute a bond with or without 
sureties for keeping the peace and maintaining good behaviour failing which he may be detained 
until such bond is executed or, in default of execution of bond, until the inquiry is concluded within a 
period of thirty days. 
(4) After holding such inquiry, as provided above, if it is proved that there is an 
apprehension of breach of peace or disturbance of public tranquility, the Political Agent or District 
Coordination Officer, as the case may be, may pass an order directing such person to execute the 
bond with or without sureties for his good behaviour and for keeping peace and tranquility for a 
period not exceeding two years failing which he may be detained. In case it is not proved that there 
is any apprehension of breach of peace or disturbance of public tranquility, the Political Agent or the 
District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, shall release such person if in custody, and if not in 
custody shall discharge him.
(5) Where a person has been convicted of the offences as mentioned in section 106 of the 
Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 (Act V of 1898), for the offences under the laws mentioned in the 
Second Schedule he may be ordered to execute a bond with or without sureties for his good 
behaviour and for keeping the peace. If the conviction is set aside on appeal or otherwise, the bond 
so executed shall become void. 
(6) Where the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, is of the 
opinion that sufficient grounds exist for making an order under sub- section, (4) he may, by order in 
writing, direct that the person concerned after his release shall notify his residence and any change 
of his residence in the manner prescribed in section 565 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, 
for a term not exceeding two years.”.
16. Insertion of section 40A, Regulation III of 1901.- In the said Regulation, after section 40, the 
following new section shall be inserted, namely:-
“40A. Arrest by authorities other than Political Agents etc.- Whenever a person is arrested by the 
authorities other than the Political Agents, District Coordination Officers or their subordinate staff 
and is produced before the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, he 
shall immediately inform the Governor or an Officer authorized by him and the Chairman FATA 
Tribunal about the production of such person before him and thereafter shall proceed against him 
in accordance with the provisions of this Regulation and the circumstances of the case.”.
17. Substitution of sections 41 to 45, Regulation III of 1901.– In the said Regulation, for sections 41 
to 45 the following shall be substituted, namely:–
“41. Security from families or factions in case of blood-feud.–  Where a blood-feud or other cause 
of quarrel likely to lead to bloodshed exists, or, in the opinion of the Political Agent or District 
Coordination Officer, as the case may be, is likely to arise between two families or factions or tribes, 
the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, after holding an inquiry as 
hereinafter provided, order all or any of the members of both families or factions or tribes or of 
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either family or faction or tribe to execute a bond, with or without sureties, for their good behavior 
and  keeping the peace, during such period, not exceeding two years as he may fix. 
42. Procedure in inquiry.– Where the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the  case 
may be, holds an inquiry under this Regulation, he shall follow the procedure as prescribed in  
section 117 (2) of the  Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act V of 1898), as nearly as may be 
practicable. The record of the inquiry proceedings shall be maintained and such inquiry shall be 
concluded within thirty days.
43. Breach of bond.– (1) A bond executed under section 40 shall be liable to be forfeited if the 
person bound thereby to be of good behaviour or to keep the peace, as the case may be, commits or 
attempts to commit, or abets the commission of, any offence punishable with imprisonment or fine 
or both. 
(2) A bond executed under section 41 shall be liable to be forfeited, if the person or persons bound 
thereby to be of good behaviour or to keep the peace, as the case may be, commit or attempt to 
commit, or abet the commission of, any offence punishable with imprisonment in respect of any 
member of the opposite family or faction or tribe to which the bond related.
(3) If, while a bond executed under section 41 is in force, the life of any member of either family or 
faction or tribe is taken or attempted to be taken, the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, 
as the case may be, may declare the bond of all or any of the members of the other family or faction 
or tribe and their sureties if any, to be forfeited, unless it is shown to his satisfaction that the 
homicide or attempt was not committed by, or in consequence of the abetment of, any member of 
that family or faction or tribe.
(4) The procedure as provided in Chapter XLII of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 (Act V of 
1898), shall be followed for the forfeiture of the bond under this Regulation.
44. Imprisonment in default of security.– (1) Where a person ordered to give security under section 
40 or section 41, does not give security on or before the date on which the period for which the 
security is to be given commences or in cases of forfeiture of bond, he shall be committed to prison 
or, if he is already in prison, be detained in prison until the period for which the security was 
required, expires, or until within such period he or they furnish the required security bond to the 
satisfaction of the Court.
(2) Imprisonment for failure to give security under this Chapter may be simple or as the offence 
requiring the security directs in each case.
45. Length of imprisonment.– Where a person has suffered imprisonment for two years for failure 
to give security under section 40 or section 41, he shall be released forthwith, provided where the 
person in the opinion of the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, is 
habitual or desperate or hardened criminal or the grounds on which he was detained have not 
ceased, the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, may proceed afresh 
under the provisions  of this Chapter for passing a fresh order and reasons thereof be recorded.”.
18. Omission of section 46, Regulation III of 1901.– In the said Regulation, section 46 shall be 
omitted.
19. Substitution of sections 47 and 48, Regulation III of 1901.– In the said Regulation, for sections 
47 and 48 the following shall be substituted, namely:–
(2) The Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, shall hold 
necessary inquiry as nearly as may be practicable, into the truth of the information upon which such 
action has been taken, in accordance with sub-section (2) of 117 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 
1898 (Act V of 1898).
(3) Pending completion of such inquiry, the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, 
as the case may be, if he considers that immediate measures are necessary for preventing the 
breach of peace or commission of any offence, direct the person to execute a bond with or without 
sureties for keeping the peace and maintaining good behaviour failing which he may be detained 
until such bond is executed or, in default of execution of bond, until the inquiry is concluded within a 
period of thirty days. 
(4) After holding such inquiry, as provided above, if it is proved that there is an 
apprehension of breach of peace or disturbance of public tranquility, the Political Agent or District 
Coordination Officer, as the case may be, may pass an order directing such person to execute the 
bond with or without sureties for his good behaviour and for keeping peace and tranquility for a 
period not exceeding two years failing which he may be detained. In case it is not proved that there 
is any apprehension of breach of peace or disturbance of public tranquility, the Political Agent or the 
District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, shall release such person if in custody, and if not in 
custody shall discharge him.
(5) Where a person has been convicted of the offences as mentioned in section 106 of the 
Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 (Act V of 1898), for the offences under the laws mentioned in the 
Second Schedule he may be ordered to execute a bond with or without sureties for his good 
behaviour and for keeping the peace. If the conviction is set aside on appeal or otherwise, the bond 
so executed shall become void. 
(6) Where the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, is of the 
opinion that sufficient grounds exist for making an order under sub- section, (4) he may, by order in 
writing, direct that the person concerned after his release shall notify his residence and any change 
of his residence in the manner prescribed in section 565 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, 
for a term not exceeding two years.”.
16. Insertion of section 40A, Regulation III of 1901.- In the said Regulation, after section 40, the 
following new section shall be inserted, namely:-
“40A. Arrest by authorities other than Political Agents etc.- Whenever a person is arrested by the 
authorities other than the Political Agents, District Coordination Officers or their subordinate staff 
and is produced before the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, he 
shall immediately inform the Governor or an Officer authorized by him and the Chairman FATA 
Tribunal about the production of such person before him and thereafter shall proceed against him 
in accordance with the provisions of this Regulation and the circumstances of the case.”.
17. Substitution of sections 41 to 45, Regulation III of 1901.– In the said Regulation, for sections 41 
to 45 the following shall be substituted, namely:–
“41. Security from families or factions in case of blood-feud.–  Where a blood-feud or other cause 
of quarrel likely to lead to bloodshed exists, or, in the opinion of the Political Agent or District 
Coordination Officer, as the case may be, is likely to arise between two families or factions or tribes, 
the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, after holding an inquiry as 
hereinafter provided, order all or any of the members of both families or factions or tribes or of 
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either family or faction or tribe to execute a bond, with or without sureties, for their good behavior 
and  keeping the peace, during such period, not exceeding two years as he may fix. 
42. Procedure in inquiry.– Where the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the  case 
may be, holds an inquiry under this Regulation, he shall follow the procedure as prescribed in  
section 117 (2) of the  Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act V of 1898), as nearly as may be 
practicable. The record of the inquiry proceedings shall be maintained and such inquiry shall be 
concluded within thirty days.
43. Breach of bond.– (1) A bond executed under section 40 shall be liable to be forfeited if the 
person bound thereby to be of good behaviour or to keep the peace, as the case may be, commits or 
attempts to commit, or abets the commission of, any offence punishable with imprisonment or fine 
or both. 
(2) A bond executed under section 41 shall be liable to be forfeited, if the person or persons bound 
thereby to be of good behaviour or to keep the peace, as the case may be, commit or attempt to 
commit, or abet the commission of, any offence punishable with imprisonment in respect of any 
member of the opposite family or faction or tribe to which the bond related.
(3) If, while a bond executed under section 41 is in force, the life of any member of either family or 
faction or tribe is taken or attempted to be taken, the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, 
as the case may be, may declare the bond of all or any of the members of the other family or faction 
or tribe and their sureties if any, to be forfeited, unless it is shown to his satisfaction that the 
homicide or attempt was not committed by, or in consequence of the abetment of, any member of 
that family or faction or tribe.
(4) The procedure as provided in Chapter XLII of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 (Act V of 
1898), shall be followed for the forfeiture of the bond under this Regulation.
44. Imprisonment in default of security.– (1) Where a person ordered to give security under section 
40 or section 41, does not give security on or before the date on which the period for which the 
security is to be given commences or in cases of forfeiture of bond, he shall be committed to prison 
or, if he is already in prison, be detained in prison until the period for which the security was 
required, expires, or until within such period he or they furnish the required security bond to the 
satisfaction of the Court.
(2) Imprisonment for failure to give security under this Chapter may be simple or as the offence 
requiring the security directs in each case.
45. Length of imprisonment.– Where a person has suffered imprisonment for two years for failure 
to give security under section 40 or section 41, he shall be released forthwith, provided where the 
person in the opinion of the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, is 
habitual or desperate or hardened criminal or the grounds on which he was detained have not 
ceased, the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, may proceed afresh 
under the provisions  of this Chapter for passing a fresh order and reasons thereof be recorded.”.
18. Omission of section 46, Regulation III of 1901.– In the said Regulation, section 46 shall be 
omitted.
19. Substitution of sections 47 and 48, Regulation III of 1901.– In the said Regulation, for sections 
47 and 48 the following shall be substituted, namely:–
“47. Modified applications of Chapters VIII and XLII, Act V of 1898.– Where, within the territories 
in which all or any of the provisions of this Regulation are for the time being in force, it is found 
necessary or expedient to take security under this Regulation from the inhabitants of the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas against whom all or any of the provisions of section 40 to 45 may for the 
time being in force, the provisions of Chapters VIII and XLII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, 
shall be read as if for the words “High Court”, “Court of Session” and “Sessions Judge” wherever 
they occur, the words “FATA Tribunal and the Appellate Authority” be substituted, and all references 
to any such Court shall be deemed to refer to FATA Tribunal or the Appellate Authority, as the case 
may be.
48. Appeal.– An appeal shall lie to the Commissioner or Additional Commissioner if authorized so 
by the Governor, within thirty days  from the date of any decision given, decree or sentence passed, 
or order made by the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, under this 
Regulation,".
20. Omission of section 49, Regulation III of 1901.– In the said Regulation, section 49 shall be 
omitted.
21. Substitution of sections 50 to 55, Regulation III of 1901.– In the said Regulation, for sections 50 
to 55 the following shall be substituted, namely:–
“50. Powers in exercise of criminal appellate jurisdiction.– The Appellate Authority may, in the 
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction in any criminal proceedings, exercise the powers to direct 
tender of pardon conferred by section 338 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and any of the 
powers conferred on an Appellate Court by sections 195, 405 to 410, 422, 423, 426 to 428 of the 
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act V of 1898), and may also enhance any sentence after 
issuance of show cause notice to the convict:
Provided that nothing in this Chapter shall be deemed to authorize the Appellate Authority 
to set aside the findings on any question of fact of a Council of Elders, where such findings has been 
accepted by the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, unless it is of the 
opinion that there has been a material irregularity or defect in the proceedings or that the 
proceedings have been so conducted as to occasion a miscarriage of justice. The Appellate 
Authority shall dispose of the appeal within sixty days.
51.  Sentences which may not be passed on appeal.– No sentence shall be passed by the Appellate 
Authority in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction which the Political Agent or District 
Coordination Officer, as the case may be, could not have passed under this Regulation.
52.  Powers in exercise of civil appellate jurisdiction.– The Appellate Authority may on appeal 
confirm, set aside, vary or modify the decision, decree or order appealed against or remand the 
case:
Provided that nothing in this Chapter shall be deemed to authorize the Appellate Authority 
to vary or set aside any decision, decree or order given, passed or made in any civil proceedings 
under this Regulation, unless it is of the opinion that there has been a material irregularity or defect 
in the proceedings or that the proceedings have been so conducted as to occasion a miscarriage of 
justice or that the decision, decree or order is contrary to good conscience or public policy.
53.  Record of reasons.– Where the Appellate Authority, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction 
in any proceedings under this Regulation, varies or sets aside or confirms any decision, decree, 
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sentence or order, it shall record its reasons for so doing.
54. Bar of review of order passed by the Appellate Authority, Political Agent or District 
Coordination Officer.– The Appellate Authority, Political Agent or the District Coordination Officer, 
as the case may be, shall not review any decision, decree, sentence or order given, passed or made 
by  itself.
55. Enforcement of orders made on appeal.– Every decision given, judgment and decree passed or 
order made by the Appellate Authority in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be enforced as if 
it was a judgment, decree or an order of the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the 
case may be, and the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, shall do all 
acts and things necessary to give effect thereto.”.
22. Substitution of section 55A, Regulation III of 1901.– In the said Regulation, for section 55A the 
following shall be substituted, namely:–
“55A. (1) A revision shall lie to the FATA Tribunal within ninety days against any decision given, 
judgment, decree or sentence passed or order made by the Appellate Authority under this 
Regulation. 
(2) FATA Tribunal shall consist of a Chairman, being a person who has been a civil servant of not less 
than BPS-21 having experience of Tribal Administration and two other members, out of whom one 
shall be a person who is qualified to be appointed as Judge of the High Court, well conversant with 
Rewaj, and  the other who has been a civil servant of not less than BPS-20 having experience of 
Tribal Administration. 
(3) The Chairman and the members shall be appointed by the Governor on such terms and 
conditions as he may determine for a period of three years or during the pleasure of the Governor.
(4) The Tribunal shall have the same powers with which the Appellate Authority has been invested 
under sections 50 and 52 of this Regulation and may also call for the record of any proceedings or 
case from the subordinate forum and revise any decision, decree, sentence or order given, passed 
or made under this Regulation. The Tribunal may whenever it thinks proper, direct.-
(a) that a person within limits of its jurisdiction be brought up before the tribunal to be dealt 
with according to law;
(b)    that a person illegally or improperly detained in public or private custody within such limits 
be set at liberty;
(c) that a person detained in any jail situated within such limits be brought before the tribunal 
to be there examined as a witness in any matter pending or to be inquired into such 
tribunal; and
(d) that a prisoner within such limits be removed from a custody to another  for purpose of 
trial.
(5) The tribunal may from time to time, frame rules to regulate the procedure in such cases.". 
23. Insertion of sections 55AA and 55AAA, Regulation III of 1901.- In the said Regulation, after 
section 55A, substituted as aforesaid, the following new sections shall be inserted, namely:-
“55AA. Review.– The FATA Tribunal may, on an application of any person, filed within thirty days, 
“47. Modified applications of Chapters VIII and XLII, Act V of 1898.– Where, within the territories 
in which all or any of the provisions of this Regulation are for the time being in force, it is found 
necessary or expedient to take security under this Regulation from the inhabitants of the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas against whom all or any of the provisions of section 40 to 45 may for the 
time being in force, the provisions of Chapters VIII and XLII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, 
shall be read as if for the words “High Court”, “Court of Session” and “Sessions Judge” wherever 
they occur, the words “FATA Tribunal and the Appellate Authority” be substituted, and all references 
to any such Court shall be deemed to refer to FATA Tribunal or the Appellate Authority, as the case 
may be.
48. Appeal.– An appeal shall lie to the Commissioner or Additional Commissioner if authorized so 
by the Governor, within thirty days  from the date of any decision given, decree or sentence passed, 
or order made by the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, under this 
Regulation,".
20. Omission of section 49, Regulation III of 1901.– In the said Regulation, section 49 shall be 
omitted.
21. Substitution of sections 50 to 55, Regulation III of 1901.– In the said Regulation, for sections 50 
to 55 the following shall be substituted, namely:–
“50. Powers in exercise of criminal appellate jurisdiction.– The Appellate Authority may, in the 
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction in any criminal proceedings, exercise the powers to direct 
tender of pardon conferred by section 338 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and any of the 
powers conferred on an Appellate Court by sections 195, 405 to 410, 422, 423, 426 to 428 of the 
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act V of 1898), and may also enhance any sentence after 
issuance of show cause notice to the convict:
Provided that nothing in this Chapter shall be deemed to authorize the Appellate Authority 
to set aside the findings on any question of fact of a Council of Elders, where such findings has been 
accepted by the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, unless it is of the 
opinion that there has been a material irregularity or defect in the proceedings or that the 
proceedings have been so conducted as to occasion a miscarriage of justice. The Appellate 
Authority shall dispose of the appeal within sixty days.
51.  Sentences which may not be passed on appeal.– No sentence shall be passed by the Appellate 
Authority in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction which the Political Agent or District 
Coordination Officer, as the case may be, could not have passed under this Regulation.
52.  Powers in exercise of civil appellate jurisdiction.– The Appellate Authority may on appeal 
confirm, set aside, vary or modify the decision, decree or order appealed against or remand the 
case:
Provided that nothing in this Chapter shall be deemed to authorize the Appellate Authority 
to vary or set aside any decision, decree or order given, passed or made in any civil proceedings 
under this Regulation, unless it is of the opinion that there has been a material irregularity or defect 
in the proceedings or that the proceedings have been so conducted as to occasion a miscarriage of 
justice or that the decision, decree or order is contrary to good conscience or public policy.
53.  Record of reasons.– Where the Appellate Authority, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction 
in any proceedings under this Regulation, varies or sets aside or confirms any decision, decree, 
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sentence or order, it shall record its reasons for so doing.
54. Bar of review of order passed by the Appellate Authority, Political Agent or District 
Coordination Officer.– The Appellate Authority, Political Agent or the District Coordination Officer, 
as the case may be, shall not review any decision, decree, sentence or order given, passed or made 
by  itself.
55. Enforcement of orders made on appeal.– Every decision given, judgment and decree passed or 
order made by the Appellate Authority in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be enforced as if 
it was a judgment, decree or an order of the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the 
case may be, and the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, shall do all 
acts and things necessary to give effect thereto.”.
22. Substitution of section 55A, Regulation III of 1901.– In the said Regulation, for section 55A the 
following shall be substituted, namely:–
“55A. (1) A revision shall lie to the FATA Tribunal within ninety days against any decision given, 
judgment, decree or sentence passed or order made by the Appellate Authority under this 
Regulation. 
(2) FATA Tribunal shall consist of a Chairman, being a person who has been a civil servant of not less 
than BPS-21 having experience of Tribal Administration and two other members, out of whom one 
shall be a person who is qualified to be appointed as Judge of the High Court, well conversant with 
Rewaj, and  the other who has been a civil servant of not less than BPS-20 having experience of 
Tribal Administration. 
(3) The Chairman and the members shall be appointed by the Governor on such terms and 
conditions as he may determine for a period of three years or during the pleasure of the Governor.
(4) The Tribunal shall have the same powers with which the Appellate Authority has been invested 
under sections 50 and 52 of this Regulation and may also call for the record of any proceedings or 
case from the subordinate forum and revise any decision, decree, sentence or order given, passed 
or made under this Regulation. The Tribunal may whenever it thinks proper, direct.-
(a) that a person within limits of its jurisdiction be brought up before the tribunal to be dealt 
with according to law;
(b)    that a person illegally or improperly detained in public or private custody within such limits 
be set at liberty;
(c) that a person detained in any jail situated within such limits be brought before the tribunal 
to be there examined as a witness in any matter pending or to be inquired into such 
tribunal; and
(d) that a prisoner within such limits be removed from a custody to another  for purpose of 
trial.
(5) The tribunal may from time to time, frame rules to regulate the procedure in such cases.". 
23. Insertion of sections 55AA and 55AAA, Regulation III of 1901.- In the said Regulation, after 
section 55A, substituted as aforesaid, the following new sections shall be inserted, namely:-
“55AA. Review.– The FATA Tribunal may, on an application of any person, filed within thirty days, 
considering himself aggrieved of any decision given, judgment and decree passed or order made by 
it, review the same to correct any mistake or error apparent on the face of record or for any other 
sufficient ground and shall record reasons thereof. 
55AAA. False Prosecutions,-(1) Where the Political Agent or the District Coordination Officer, as the 
case may be, finds that the accusation against the accused was false or malicious, he may call upon 
the complainant or the informant to show cause why he should not pay adequate compensation to 
such accused or, where there are more than one, to each or any of such accused, after considering 
any cause which such complainant or informant may show, and on the satisfaction of the Political 
Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, was false and malicious, he may, for 
reasons to be recorded in writing, order the complainant or Informant to pay adequate 
compensation to such accused or each of any of such accused keeping in view the nature of 
accusation and quantum of sentence of offence with which he was falsely or maliciously charged 
and in default of payment of compensation shall suffer simple imprisonment which may extend to 
six months. 
(2) In any civil matter the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, finds 
that any claim or defence of any party to be false, frivolous or vexatious, he may direct to pay the 
cost of litigation and also grant compensatory costs corresponding to the false claim or defence, as 
the case may be.”.
24. Substitution of sections 56,57 and 58, Regulation III of 1901.– In the said Regulation, for 
sections 56,57 and 58 the following shall be substituted, namely:–
“56. Protection of Property Rights.– No person shall be compulsorily deprived of his property 
unless he is paid adequate compensation with consensus rate or Government assessed value as in 
vogue in settled areas. 
57. Power of Political Agent or District Coordination Officer to order disposal of certain fines.– (1) 
The Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, may make such order in 
writing for the disposal of any fine imposed under sections 12 and 22,  deposited in Agency Welfare 
Fund to be regulated by the rules to be framed under section 62. 
(2) Where, in pursuance of an order made under sub-section (1), a person has received 
compensation for an injury out of the proceeds of a fine, no Civil Court shall take cognizance of a 
claim to compensation based on the same injury.
58. Maintenance of register.– (1) Registers shall be kept and maintained, in forms to be approved by 
the Governor, of all cases dealt with by the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the 
case may be, the Appellate Authority and the FATA Tribunal under this Regulation.
(2) The record of all sums received as fines under this Regulation and disbursed by the 
Political Agent or the District Coordinating Officer, as the case may be, shall be maintained and 
accounted for, which shall be audited annually.  The auditing  authority, audit mechanism and such 
other modalities to be determined in the rules to be framed under section 62".
25. Insertion of section 58A, Regulation III of 1901.- In the said Regulation, after section 58 the 
following new section shall be inserted, namely:-
“58A.  Jail Inspection.- FATA Tribunal, the Appellate Authority and the Political Agent or District 
Coordination Officer, as the case may be, shall visit the jails where the tribal convicts or detainees 
have been kept  twice a year.”. 
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26. Omission of section 59, Regulation III of 1901.– In the said Regulation, section 59 shall be 
omitted.
27. Substitution of sections 60 to 62, Regulation III of 1901.– In the said Regulation, for sections 60 
to 62 the following shall be substituted, namely:–
“60. Finality of proceedings under this Regulation.– Except as otherwise provided in this 
Regulation, no decision made, judgment, decree or sentence passed or order made or act done, 
under Chapter III, Chapter IV, Chapter V or Chapter VI of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, (Act V 
of 1898), shall be called in question in, or set aside by, any civil or criminal court.
61. Application of provisions of the Limitation Act of 1908.– Unless otherwise provided in this 
Regulation, the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1908 (IX of 1908), for filing an appeal, revision and 
review before the Appellate Authority or the FATA Tribunal shall, mutatis mutandis, apply under this 
Regulation.
62.  Power to make rules.–  The Governor may make rules to carry out the purposes and objects of 
this Regulation.”.
28. Insertion of section 62A, Regulation III of 1901.- In the said Regulation, after section 62, the 
following new section shall be inserted, namely:-
“62A. Power to make rules for the issue and safe custody of rifles and ammunition and for the 
imposition and recovery of fines.– (1) The Federal Government may make rules for the issue and 
safe custody of rifles and ammunition for border village defence, and for the imposition and 
recovery of fines for any breach of such rules.
(2) Fines imposed for a breach of the rules made under this section may be recovered in the 
manner laid down in section 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act V of 1898).”.
29. Substitution of section 63, Regulation III of 1901.– In the said Regulation, for section 63, the 
following shall be substituted, namely:–
“63. Indemnity.- No suit or other legal proceeding shall lie against any person for anything done or 
intended to be done in good faith under this Regulation.”.
30. Omission of section 64, Regulation III of 1901.– In the said Regulation, section 64 shall be 
omitted.
31. Substitution of First, Second and Third Schedules, Regulation III of 1901.- In the said 
Regulation, for the First, Second and Third Schedules the following shall be respectively substituted, 
namely:–
"THE FIRST SCHEDULE 
[see section 4(3)]
PART I ------ Powers and Functions with which Assistant Political Agents may be vested by Political Agent 
or District Coordination Officer.
(a) All or any of the powers and functions of a Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case 
may be; and
considering himself aggrieved of any decision given, judgment and decree passed or order made by 
it, review the same to correct any mistake or error apparent on the face of record or for any other 
sufficient ground and shall record reasons thereof. 
55AAA. False Prosecutions,-(1) Where the Political Agent or the District Coordination Officer, as the 
case may be, finds that the accusation against the accused was false or malicious, he may call upon 
the complainant or the informant to show cause why he should not pay adequate compensation to 
such accused or, where there are more than one, to each or any of such accused, after considering 
any cause which such complainant or informant may show, and on the satisfaction of the Political 
Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, was false and malicious, he may, for 
reasons to be recorded in writing, order the complainant or Informant to pay adequate 
compensation to such accused or each of any of such accused keeping in view the nature of 
accusation and quantum of sentence of offence with which he was falsely or maliciously charged 
and in default of payment of compensation shall suffer simple imprisonment which may extend to 
six months. 
(2) In any civil matter the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, finds 
that any claim or defence of any party to be false, frivolous or vexatious, he may direct to pay the 
cost of litigation and also grant compensatory costs corresponding to the false claim or defence, as 
the case may be.”.
24. Substitution of sections 56,57 and 58, Regulation III of 1901.– In the said Regulation, for 
sections 56,57 and 58 the following shall be substituted, namely:–
“56. Protection of Property Rights.– No person shall be compulsorily deprived of his property 
unless he is paid adequate compensation with consensus rate or Government assessed value as in 
vogue in settled areas. 
57. Power of Political Agent or District Coordination Officer to order disposal of certain fines.– (1) 
The Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, may make such order in 
writing for the disposal of any fine imposed under sections 12 and 22,  deposited in Agency Welfare 
Fund to be regulated by the rules to be framed under section 62. 
(2) Where, in pursuance of an order made under sub-section (1), a person has received 
compensation for an injury out of the proceeds of a fine, no Civil Court shall take cognizance of a 
claim to compensation based on the same injury.
58. Maintenance of register.– (1) Registers shall be kept and maintained, in forms to be approved by 
the Governor, of all cases dealt with by the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the 
case may be, the Appellate Authority and the FATA Tribunal under this Regulation.
(2) The record of all sums received as fines under this Regulation and disbursed by the 
Political Agent or the District Coordinating Officer, as the case may be, shall be maintained and 
accounted for, which shall be audited annually.  The auditing  authority, audit mechanism and such 
other modalities to be determined in the rules to be framed under section 62".
25. Insertion of section 58A, Regulation III of 1901.- In the said Regulation, after section 58 the 
following new section shall be inserted, namely:-
“58A.  Jail Inspection.- FATA Tribunal, the Appellate Authority and the Political Agent or District 
Coordination Officer, as the case may be, shall visit the jails where the tribal convicts or detainees 
have been kept  twice a year.”. 
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26. Omission of section 59, Regulation III of 1901.– In the said Regulation, section 59 shall be 
omitted.
27. Substitution of sections 60 to 62, Regulation III of 1901.– In the said Regulation, for sections 60 
to 62 the following shall be substituted, namely:–
“60. Finality of proceedings under this Regulation.– Except as otherwise provided in this 
Regulation, no decision made, judgment, decree or sentence passed or order made or act done, 
under Chapter III, Chapter IV, Chapter V or Chapter VI of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, (Act V 
of 1898), shall be called in question in, or set aside by, any civil or criminal court.
61. Application of provisions of the Limitation Act of 1908.– Unless otherwise provided in this 
Regulation, the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1908 (IX of 1908), for filing an appeal, revision and 
review before the Appellate Authority or the FATA Tribunal shall, mutatis mutandis, apply under this 
Regulation.
62.  Power to make rules.–  The Governor may make rules to carry out the purposes and objects of 
this Regulation.”.
28. Insertion of section 62A, Regulation III of 1901.- In the said Regulation, after section 62, the 
following new section shall be inserted, namely:-
“62A. Power to make rules for the issue and safe custody of rifles and ammunition and for the 
imposition and recovery of fines.– (1) The Federal Government may make rules for the issue and 
safe custody of rifles and ammunition for border village defence, and for the imposition and 
recovery of fines for any breach of such rules.
(2) Fines imposed for a breach of the rules made under this section may be recovered in the 
manner laid down in section 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act V of 1898).”.
29. Substitution of section 63, Regulation III of 1901.– In the said Regulation, for section 63, the 
following shall be substituted, namely:–
“63. Indemnity.- No suit or other legal proceeding shall lie against any person for anything done or 
intended to be done in good faith under this Regulation.”.
30. Omission of section 64, Regulation III of 1901.– In the said Regulation, section 64 shall be 
omitted.
31. Substitution of First, Second and Third Schedules, Regulation III of 1901.- In the said 
Regulation, for the First, Second and Third Schedules the following shall be respectively substituted, 
namely:–
"THE FIRST SCHEDULE 
[see section 4(3)]
PART I ------ Powers and Functions with which Assistant Political Agents may be vested by Political Agent 
or District Coordination Officer.
(a) All or any of the powers and functions of a Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case 
may be; and
(b) without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing clause, with the-
(i) power to make orders of reference to Council of Elders under section 8 (1);
(ii) power to appoint the members of Council of Elder with the consent of parties under section 8(2) 
when an order of reference to a Council of Elders is made under section 8(1);
(iii) power to nominate the members of the Council of Elders when an order of  reference to a 
Council of Elders is made under section 11(1);
(iv) power to consider and dispose of objections made by the accused or the complainant to the 
nomination of the members, and after the disposal of the objections, appoint the members of 
Council of Elders under section 11(2) and
(v) power to take surety bond under section 40.
PART II ------ Powers and Functions with which Magistrates may be invested by the Governor
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(c)  power to consider and dispose of objections made by an accused or the complainant to the 
nomination of the members, and after disposal of the objections, appoint the members of  Council 
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THE SECOND SCHEDULE
[see section 3(3), 13(c) and 40(5)]
1.  Any offence punishable under any of the following sections of the Pakistan Penal Code, namely sections 
121, 121-A, 122, 123, 124-A, 125, 126, 127, 131, 144, 148, 150, 193, 194, 195, 196, 201, 211, 212, 216, 216-
A, 295-B, 302, 304, 307, 308, 324, 325, 326, 328, 354, 363,364,365,365A,366,367,368, 369, 376, 377, 
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5.   Any offence punishable under any of the provisions of the Employment of Children Act, 1991 (V of 1991).
6.   Any offence punishable under the Control of Narcotics Substances Act, 1997 (XXV of 1997).
7.  Abetment of any of the offences aforesaid.
8.  Attempt to commit any of the offences aforesaid which are not themselves expressed to be attempts to 
commit offences.
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(v) Tribal Areas adjoining Lakki Marwat District;
(vi) Tribal Areas adjoining Tank District; 
(vii) Bajaur Agency;
(viii) Orakzai Agency;
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(x) Khyber Agency;
(xi) Kurram Agency;
(xii) North Waziristan Agency;
(xiii) South Waziristan Agency.”.
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